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Preface 
The  Chernobyl  accident,  which  occurred  on  26  April  1986,  presented  maJor 
challenges to the European Community with respect to the practical and regulatory 
aspects of radiation protection, public information, trade, particularly in food, and 
international politics.  The Chernobyl accident was also a major challenge to the 
international scientific community which had to evaluate rapidly the radiological 
consequences of  the accident and advise on the introduction of  any countermeasures. 
Prior to the accident at Chernobyl, countermeasures to reduce the consequences of 
radioactive contamination had been conceived largely in the context of relatively 
s1nall  accidental  releases  and  for  application  over  relatively  small  areas.  Less 
consideration had been given to the practical implications of  applying such measures 
in case of a large source term and a spread over a very large area. 
The Radiation Protection Research and Training Programme was influential in a 
number of important initiatives taken within the Community immediately after the 
accident.  Information was  collected  by Community scientists  and,  from  it,  an 
assessment made within days of the possible consequences. This showed that the 
health impact on the population of the European Community was not expected to 
be significant.  About four weeks after the accident, the Programme, together ,,·ith 
the US  Department of Energy, organised a meeting in Brussels during \vhich the 
data on dispersion of radioactive material were discussed and evaluated. Several 
other meetings followed soon after on the transfer of radionuclides in the food chain 
and possible health effects. These meetings were carried out in close co-operation 
\vith  the  DG  XI  (Directorate  General,  Environment,  Consumer Protection  and 
Nuclear Safety) within the CEC, and, externally, with international organisations 
such as  the International Atomic  Energy Agency  (IAEA)  and the World  Health 
Organisation (WHO). In addition, the Commission convoked a Committee of high-
level independent scientists to assess the scientific evidence from current research 
in vie\v of recent nuclear incidences, to consider the possible implications for the 
Basic Standards and emergency reference levels and to advise the Commission on 
future action in radiological protection including research. (EUR 11449 EN). 
Soon after the accident, additional research requirements were  identified by  the 
Progran1n1e; these were mainly better methods to assess accident consequences and 
- Ill  -the further improvement of  off-site accident management. Several existing contracts 
were reoriented and new contracts were placed; however, the financial means then 
available within the Programme were insufficient to fund the additional research 
identified as necessary. A proposal for a revision of the Programme was, therefore, 
elaborated in 1986. It comprised 10 specific "post-Chernobyl" research actions.  This 
revision,  with an additional budget of 10  MEcu for  a  period of two years, was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers on 21  December 1987. With the help of the 
Management and Coordination Advisory Committee (CGC) "Radiation Protection" 
a  number of institutes was identified to carry out the research in a  co-operative 
manner, and the research began in the spring of 1988. 
These post-Chernobyl activities have now been completed. Detailed reports on each 
of these studies and an additional volume containing the executive summaries of all 
reports are now available. 
Evaluation of data on the transfer of radionuclides in the food chain, 
Improvement of reliable long-distance atmospheric transport models, 
Radiological aspects of nuclear accident scenarios, 
A.  Real-time emergency response systems, 
B.  The RADE-AID system, 
Monitoring and surveillance in accident situations, 
Underlying data for derived emergency reference levels, 
Improvement  of  practical  countermeasures  against  nuclear 
contamination in the agricultural environment, 
Improvement  of  practical  countermeasures  against  nuclear 
contamination in the urban environment, 
Improvement of practical countermeasures: preventive medication, 
Treatment and biological dosimetry of exposed persons, 
Feasibility of studies on health effects due to the reactor accident at 
Chernobyl. 
The research undertaken within the "post-Chernobyl" actions has added considerably 
to  the  understanding  of the  basic  underlying  mechanisms  of the  transfer  of 
radionuclides in the environment, of the treatment of accident victims and of ho\v 
the environmental consequences of  accidents may be mitigated. In addition, progress 
has  been  made  in  the  setting  up  environmental  surveillance  program1nes 
development of predictive and decision-aiding techniques, the implementation of 
- IV  -which will lead to significant improvements in off-site accident management. Several 
new ideas and lines of theoretical and practical research have originated from the 
post-Chernobyl research and these have already been integrated into the ongoing 
Community Radiation Protection Research Programme. A further important feature 
which should not be overlooked,  is  the close and effective collaboration of many 
institutes  in  the  research;  this  has  markedly  strengthened  the  ties  between 
Community institutes and scientists. The outcome of all of this work is that the 
Community and all other countries are now better prepared and co-ordinated should 
a significant release of radioactivity ever occur again 
Further research is continuing within the current Radiation Protection Research and 
Training Programme 1990-1991 on a number of the "post-Chernobyl" topics; these 
also form part of the proposal of  the specific Programme on "Nuclear Fission Safety" 
1992-1993,  e.g.  real-time  emergency  management  systems,  development  of 
countermeasures in the agricultural environment, treatment of radiation accident 
victims, etc. Moreover, the Community Programme is currently making a significant 
contribution  to  an international  evaluation,  being undertaken by IAEA  at the 
request  of the  Soviet  Government,  on  the  consequences  in  the  USSR  of the 
Chernobyl accident and of the measures being taken to ensure safe living conditions 
for the affected populations. 
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i . Introduction 
Monitoring and Surveillance in Accident Situations 
Executive Summary 
Monitoring and surveillance after an accidental release of radionuclides to the environment 
can be considered in four categories: 
detection of the accident; 
early measurements to determine the need for countermeasures; 
continuing surveillance of radionuclides in the environment, in foods and in people; 
until  the  situation  returns  to  normal,  to  assess  doses,  to  demonstrate  that 
countermeasures  have  provided  adequate  protection  and  to  provide  public 
reassurance; 
research studies, to follow  the behaviour of radionuclides in the environment, in 
foods and in people so as to improve predictive models. 
Experience gained as a result of the Chernobyl reactor accident suggested that there was 
scope  for  improvement with respect to  the  practical  aspects  of the  measurement and 
collection of  reliable data and their communication in suitable forms to the decision-making 
authorities  and  the  public.  Studies  were  required  to  define .how  the  multitude  of 
measurements required can be made rapidly and reliably by various organisations, and how 
their standardisation and harmonisation can be achieved. 
The Commission therefore re-directed its programme to accommodate additional research 
programmes concerned with preparedness for monitoring and surveillance of any future 
accident. Seven research contracts were initiated as a result. Progress achieved in the course 
of  these  one-year  contracts  is  summarised  below.  Conclusions  are  drawn  and 
recommendations made for future work. 
- IX  -i i.  Accident Detection Networks 
There were two contracts concerned with the detection of unusual levels of dose rate and 
the interpretation of readings from simple dose-rate instruments and alarm monitors. 
One, by Walmod-Larsen et al of Riso National Laboratory, Denmark, was concerned with 
development  of  a  nation-wide  on-line  early  warning  monitoring  network  with  high 
sensitivity to accidental discharges and good  discrimination against variations in natural 
radiation levels. The objective given to the Laboratory was that the system should be able 
to detect an increase due to man-made radionuclides corresponding to a 10% increase in the 
natural background level. 
A test station as constructed consisting of: 
a wide-range ionisation chamber, with a range ofO.Ol11Svh·1 to 100 mSvh-1; 
a Nai (Tl) detector with a multi-channel analyser; 
a rain intensity gauge. 
The instrumentation is controlled by a micro-computer, which stores the data and transmits 
data to a central computer via the public telecommunications network. The hut housing the 
equipment is temperature controlled. 
Data from the ionisation chamber have been collected  for  more than two years. Careful 
analysis of the rate of variation of dose rate and rainfall rate have led to the formulation 
of an algorithm that permits an alarm to be raised if the dose-rate level increases by 5% in 
dry weather or 20% in wet weather. 
Detailed analysis of the results from the Nal(Tl) spectrqmeter is in progress. The intention 
is that, if  the ion chamber reading exceeds the pre-set warning value, comparison of  a recent 
Nai(Tl) spectrum with a mean spectrum accumulated over several days will reveal whether 
the higher level is due to radon decay products or man-made radionuclides. 
When tests on the prototype station are complete, a nation-wide network of ten stations will 
be set up to act as an early warning system for deposition of man-made radionuclides onto 
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Danish territory. 
The second contract in this category was by Ortega et al  of the Universidad Politecnica de 
Catalunya. The contract consisted of: a survey of monitoring networks in members states 
of the European Community;  analysis of results obtained over a  two-year period  from 
networks around two nuclear power stations sited in Spain, calculations of  detector response 
to  natural and man-made radionuclides in the environment; development of calibration 
techniques for environmental dose-rate monitoring; development of a new electrometer for 
use in measuring environmental dose rates. 
The survey addressed the existence of monitoring networks at the time of the Chernobyl 
reactor  accident  as  well  as  networks  planned  or  implemented  since  that  time.  The 
environmental surveillance systems in existence at the time of the accident were mainly in 
research centres or at nuclear power stations sites. All systems proved sufficiently sensitive 
to detect the Chemobyl radioactivity. As a result of  the accident, most countries developed 
plans for national monitoring networks, but little consideration has been given to linking 
networks between countries. The networks are largely based on Geiger-Muller counters, 
although ionisation chambers are used in some. Provision has also been made in some plans 
for measurement of radionuclides in airborne particles and radio-iodine in both particulate 
and vapour forms. 
The existing networks in Catalonia consist of four measuring stations around each of two 
nuclear power stations sites. Each station has a monitor for measuring environmental dose 
rates in the range 0.01 J.LSv h-1 to 100 mSv h-1• This wide range is achieved by the use of two 
Geiger-Muller probes. Each station is connected to a computer on the power station site 
which then transmits data to a control computer at regional government headquarters. A 
detailed analysis has been made of  data from these monitoring stations collected over a two-
year period. The availability of the stations has been between 75% and 90%. Most failures 
were probably due to breakdowns in the data transmission telegraphic lines. During the two-
year period studied, there were eight occasions when abnormal values were observed i.e. 
values higher than three standard deviations above the mean of  all measurements obtained 
in the previous six days. Correlations have been observed between rainfall and increase in 
dose rate, with a time delay of between one and two hours. 
- XI  -A mathematical model has been developed to predict dose rates due to natural and man-
made radionuclides in the environment. To provide validation of the model, dose rates on 
beaches along the Catalan coastline were measured with an ionisation chamber and samples 
were collected for laboratory analysis of radionuclide content. Good correlation was found 
between the measured and calculated dose rates. 
iii  . Dose-rate measuring instruments 
Burgess et al, National Radiological Protection Board, UK, have evaluated five instruments 
suitable for measuring environmental background dose rates and assessed their suitability 
, 
for use in emergency situations. Four of the instruments tested were those commonly used 
within the European Community, but one relatively new instrument was  included. The 
instruments were:  three scintillation detectors;  one energy-compensated  Geiger-Muller 
detector; and one high pressure ionisation chamber. 
A comprehensive evaluation programme was followed. Laboratory measurements included: 
linearity tests, to determine the variation in response with indicated dose and dose rate; 
energy response, to check the variation in response with changes in photon energy; polar 
response, to investigate the variation in response with changes of direction of incident 
radiation, tests of sensitivity to changes in temperature and humidity; determination of 
battery life under normal conditions. In addition, each instrument  was evaluated in the field 
to assess ease of use in realistic operating conditions. 
High-pressure  ionisation chambers show the  quickest  response  to  changes  in  gamma 
radiation levels, but all the instruments tested are capable of giving a reliable indication of 
significant changes in environmental dose rates. The instruments which use scintillation 
detectors operating in the current mode show the greatest variations in response when 
subject to significant temperature changes. This is ·a disadvantage for field measurements. 
In  contrast,  instruments  based  on  high-pressure  ionisation  chambers  and  energy-
compensated Geiger-Muller detectors are much less sensitive to temperature changes. 
All instruments were also evaluated by making  measurements at a number of  sites including 
areas of  normal and elevated natural radionuclides, an area of  high deposition ofChernobyl 
radioceasium  and  an  area  contaminated  with  industrial  discharges.  The  evaluation 
- XII  -considered matters such as ease of use,  portability, weather proofness and time taken to 
make a measurement. 
Details are given in the full  report. 
i v. Measurement of surface contamination with B-emitting radionuclides 
Lauterbach et al,  Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB),  FRG,  have  evaluated 
commercially available surface contamination monitors. The evaluation was carried out in 
collaboration with 18 institutes which measured surface activity sources calibrated at PTB. 
, 
The radionuclides were chlorine-36,cobalt-60, strontium-90/yttrium-90and  promethium-14  7, 
and  the  activities  were  involved  in  this  programme,  mainly  Geiger-Muller  counters, 
scintillation detectors and proportional counters with methane, butane, xenon or a mixture 
of butane and propane as filling gases. 
Measurements were made under carefully controlled conditions by trained operators who 
knew the identity of the radionuclide. Even so, the activities reported by the participants 
varied over almost an order of magnitude, even for instruments of the same type. In the 
case of  accidental contamination, the composition of  the radionuclide mixture could be quite 
complex and not known. It is recommended that  measurements with portable contamination 
meters should be used to distinguish between more and less· contaminated areas and as a 
guide to where samples should be taken for laboratory measurements; the reading of the 
instruments should not be used as an indication of  the true surface deposit, without careful 
evaluation of the measurements. 
v. In situ gamma-ray spectrometry 
Bramati et al (ENEL, Italy) have evaluated the technique of  in situ gamma-ray spectrometry 
for measurement of surface concentration of radionuclides and radiation exposure rate in 
situations of accidental contamination. The instrumentation was selected on the basis of 
compact size and light weight, together with a high level of efficiency and resolution. The 
detector was a hyper-pure germanium detector with 1.76 keY resolution and 20% efficiency 
at 1.3 MeV.  The cryostat of 7 litres capacity permitted operations for 3 to 4 days before 
refilling with liquid nitrogen was required. The rest of the equipment included: a portable 
- XIII  -analyser, a personal computer with hard disk and printer; a telescopic tripod for mounting 
the detector. This complete set of  equipment was contained in two cases with a total weight 
of 60  kg. Ancillary equipment included: a  generator to  provide the power supply of the 
printer; 251 dewar for liquid nitrogen storage. A surface concentration of 104 Bq m-2 can be 
measured in a few minutes, at 3% confidence level. 
The performance of the in situ gamma-ray spectrometry technique was evaluated in two 
measurement campaigns;  one  in  an  area  of low  natural  activity but high  Chernobyl 
deposition; the other in an area of high natural radiation and low Chernobyl deposition. In 
addition to in situ gamma-ray spectrometry, dose rates were measured with two different 
instruments and soil samples were collected for laboratory analysis. All measurement results 
were in good agreement. However, it was noted that  gamma-ray spectra acquired in the field 
with simple processing equipment require careful analysis by trained operators. 
vi Rapid methods of radionuclide analysis 
In the immediate aftermath of an accidental release of radionuclides into the environment, 
measurement of activity concentrations in environmental materials are required rapidly to 
aid  decisions on the need for  countermeasures. In the case of accidental releases  from 
nuclear power reactors, most of the radionuclides of potential radiological importance--are-
gamma-ray emitters and so  their activity concentration can be determined directly by 
measurement with  high-resolution  germanium  detectors  and  the  minimum  of sample 
processing. However, other potential types of  accidents releasing other radionuclides should 
not be neglected and Green and Wilkins (National Radiological Protection Board, UK) have 
evaluated rapid methods of radiochemical analysis for actinides and for radioisotopes of 
strontium. 
Published procedures for the radiochemical isolation of actinides were reviewed and it was 
found that none offers particular advantages in terms of speed. All  procedures are quite 
complex and it  was therefore recommended that, in an emergency, laboratories should make 
use of their established and validated methods. For many environmental materials, the 
plutonium content can  be  determined  by  alpha spectrometry  following  radiochemical 
isolation within 20 hours, with results for higher actinides being  available the following day. 
Unfortunately, results for air filters, a medium of urgent interest, can only be achieved on 
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a longer timescale because of the greater time required for as bing. 
The capability of  direct measurement  of  the low-energy photons with hyper-pure germanium 
detectors  was  also investigated. This technique is  of practical  use  only when used  for 
measurement of the photon emissions from the decay of americium-241. Inference of the 
content of plutonium isotopes then requires knowledge of the radionuclide composition of 
the release. 
The  normal  procedure  for  determination of strontium-90 in routine analyses  requires 
measurement of the beta emissions of its decay product, yttrium-90, following a delay of 
about 3  weeks for ingrowth. Such a  protracted procedure is  clearly unacceptable in an 
emergency.  Furthermore,  strontium-89  may  also  be  present. A  method  based  on the 
determination of strontium-89 by Cherenkow counting and subsequent measurement of 
strontium-90 by liquid scintillation counting has been tested and validated. Full details are 
given in the report. 
One of  the most important recommendations is that the required detection limits should  -be 
specified in advance so that sample sizes can be decided. This is of fundamental importance 
because the time required for sample preparation is dependent upon sample size. 
vi i • In vivo measurements 
Where  possible,  direct  measurements  of  radionuclides  in  the  human  body  provide 
independent  confirmation of  doses estimated from limited environmental measurement and 
predictions of human intake by inhalation and ingestion following transfer of  radionuclides 
to foodstuffs. Experience following the Chemobyl reactor accident has shown that they are 
also more directly reassuring to members of the public than are such calculations. 
Pellerin et al (SCPRI, France) have continued development of mobile monitoring facilities, 
designed primarily for measurement of iodine isotopes in thyroid and gamma-ray emitting 
radionuclides in the human  body. The equipment used for whole body measurement  can also 
be  used for measuring radionuclides in environmental samples. The philosophy was  to 
choose standardised units that could be deployed  .. in small vans, in large trucks or in a 
specially-designed railway carriage. The intention is to be able to perform measurements on 
- XV  -large number of people anywhere within France within 24 to 48 hours after an accidental 
release  of radioactive  materials.  The  equipment could  also  be  made  available  for  use 
elsewhere in Europe. 
viii .Conclusions and Recommendations 
1.  Perhaps inevitably, most contracts focussed on monitoring  and surveillance following 
accidents at nuclear installations which would involve the release of gamma-ray 
emitting radionuclides.  One  (Green  and  Wilkins)  considered  the  measurement 
requirements  for  accidents  involving  a  substantial  release  of  actinides  and 
radioisotopes  of  strontium  and  one  (Lauterbach  et  al)  considered  surface 
contamination with beta-emitting radionuclides. Emergency response planning, at 
the national level, must consider accidents that may not release gamma-ray emitting 
radionuclides. Specific consideration should be given to accidents involving nuclear 
weapons or satellites powered by plutonium sources. 
2.  Since  the  Chernobyl  reactor  accident,  many countries  have  developed  national 
monitoring systems to detect accidental releases of radionuclides. These  are mostly 
based on dose-rate measuring devices.  Co~id~!ation  should be given to: 
(i)  linking data from national networks into a Community-wide network; 
(ii)  improved methods of distinguishing increases in dose rate due to accidental 
releases from natural variations in background levels; 
(iii)  automatic air-sampling and analysis, so as to provide immediate identification 
of the  radionuclides  involved  in an accidental  release.  An  independent 
evaluation of currently-available equipment would be useful. 
3.  None of the contractors in this programme considered sampling from aircraft to 
determine  the  extent  and  composition  of the  plume  of radioactive  material. 
Techniques for isokinetic sampling of particle- and gas-phase radionuclides from 
aircraft exist. Some consideration should be  given to the availability of suitable 
equipment and aircraft within the Community and to how such data can be used in 
predictive modelling of the trajectory of the plume and estimating the radiological 
consequences for the areas affected. 
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4.  Several contracts within this programme considered various methods of measuring 
surface deposition of radionuclides: gamma-ray dose-rate measurement (Burgess et 
a]);  surface  contamination measurement (Lauterbach et al);  in situ  gamma-ray 
spectrometry (Bramati et al). Dose-rate measurements are easy to do,  but difficult 
to interpret; they should be used as a guide to areas where further investigation is 
required. Surface contamination measurements appear to be difficult to undertake 
in a  consistent manner. In situ gamma-ray spectormetry provides  the required 
information, but requires expensive instrumentation and experienced operators. 
5.  None of the contractors considered aerial surveillance of  deposited activity. This can 
be achieved by deploying dose-rate measuring instruments (but the same limitation 
applies as above) or high-resolution germanium detectors in aircraft. Measurement 
techniques and mapping techniques exist. Consideration needs to be given to the 
administrative arrangements needed so that adequate monitoring of affected areas 
of  the Community can be achieved rapidly in order to demonstrate to the public and 
to decision makers that all affected areas have been identified. 
6.  There is  a  need for simple screening of contaminated goods,  animals and 
people,  in order to distinguish between those  uncontaminated and those 
requiring further investigation. The interpretation of  such measurements will 
depend upon the radionuclide composition, and appropriate advice needs to 
be developed for each particular circumstance. 
7.  Experience following the Chernobyl reactor accident suggests that there is a need 
for measurements of radionuclides in people, as a means of reassurance. 
8.  In the event of  an accident, many organisations will undertake measurements of  dose 
rates and of radionuclides. There is a need to provide guidance in advance of any 
future accident on sampling, measurement and reporting procedures, so as to ensure 
the quality and comparability of the data. 
9.  There is a need for central collation of data, both at national and at Community 
level. More consideration needs to be given to methods of  data handling, display and 
interpretation both for public information and for decision making. 
-XVII  -10.  Emergency response plans must be prepared in advance of  any accident, they should 
be regularly reviewed and updated, staff must be trained and procedures must be 
exercised. 
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I.  IN  SITU  GAMMA  RAY  SPECTROMETRY  IN ACCIDENTAL  SITUATIONS 
L.  BRAMATI,  C.  MAFFEI,  G.  PANDOLFI 
ENEL,  ROME  (ITALY) 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  use  of  gamma-ray  spectrometry  for  the  direct 
determination of environmental radioactivity is referred to 
as  "in  situ  gamma-ray  spectrometry"  (ISGS)  (ref.  1,2,3). 
With  this  tecnique  it  is  possible  to  determine  the 
concentration  in  the  soil  of  radioisotopes,  the  surface 
concentration  of  fall-out  and  radiation  exposure  rate. 
Within the framework of the "Radiation Protection" Research 
Program of the Commission of the European Communities  (EEC) 
ENEL,  working  in cooperation with  CISE,  has  carried out  a 
research  and  development  program  on  an  ISGS  system 
appropriate  for  use  in  accident  situations.  The  main 
objectives were the followings: 
selection of instrumentation for high-resolution ISGS; 
preparation  of  a  specifically  designed  computer 
program  for  obtaining  and  analysing  spectra  in-situ. 
Besides  the  in-situ gamma  spectrometry  measurements, 
the  same  strumentation  allows  measurement  of  the 
radioactivity  concentration  in  environmental  samples 
in a  portable cylindrical shield. 
2.  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  APPARATUS 
The  choice  of  the  basic  instrumentation  for  the  ISGS 
(detector,  cryostat  and  analyzer)  pointed  to  a  CANBERRA 
detector  and  multichannel  analyzer,  apparatus  which 
presented  the  required  characteristics, 
size  and  light  weight  coupled  with  a 
meaning  compact 
high  level  of 
efficiency and resolution. Similar criteria were adopted in 
selecting  the  personal  computer  (ZENITH)  and  the  printer 
(EPSON),  (see  fig.  1  and  2).  The  detector  is  an  HPGe, 
closed end,  of  47  x  53  mm,  with 1.76  keV  resolution  (FVHM) 
and  20  %  efficiency  at  1332  keV.  The  cryostat  gives  an 
autonomous  range  of  3-4  days.  The  analyzer  is  a  CANBERRA 
S10  PLUS,  4096  channels;  the  PC  is  a  ZENITH  DATA  SYSTEMS 
Z-180,  640  kb  RAM  memory,  3.5"  floppy  disk and  10  Mb  hard 
disk.  The  detector is mounted  on  a  telescoping tripod. 
- 1  -As  a  power  supply  we  use  a  YAMAHA  EF600  generator,  400  W 
power.  The  complete  set of  equipment  is contained  in  two 
cases  of  60  kg  total  weight.  Each  individual  component 
comes  with  batteries;  the  external  power  supply  is  used 
only for printer.  To perform measurements on environmental 
samples  a  cylindrical  shield is provided  (Fig.  3},  120  kg 
in weight,  divided  into  six parts.  The  shield  houses  the 
detector head and  a  container for  500-ml  samples. 
3.  METHOD 
3.1  In situ qamma  ray  spectrometry 
a)  basic theory 
The  relationship  between  the  observed  area  of  the 
photopeak  and  the  corresponding  exposure  rate  or 
concentration is as  follows: 
N/I  (or A}  =  No/F*N/No*F/I  (or  A}  (1} 
where: 
N•  =  photopeak area in a  unit of time  [cpm); 
I  =  exposure rate  [~R/h]; 
A  =  concentration injon the ground  [Bqjkg or Bqjm2]; 
N°/F  =  intrinsic  efficiency  factor  for  the  detector 
employed,  expressed as the ratio between the photopeak 
area  and  the  flux  F  [fjcm2js]  of  incident  photons 
reaching  the  detector  parallel  to  the  axis  of 
longitudinal  symmetry  [cpm/f/cm2js];  N/No=factor that 
takes  into  account  the  possibility  of  an  anisotropic 
response  of  the  detector  to  incident  radiation  with 
different angles  [cpmjcpm];  F/I(or A}=ratio between the 
flux of photons of energy considered to be  incident on 
the  detector  and  the  exposure  rate  (or  concentration} 
of  the  isotope  under  consideration  [fjcm2/s/~R/h  (or 
Bqjkg-Bqjm2}].  It should be noted that: 
- N°/F  is otbained  in  the  laboratory  from  a  standard 
source placed at a  known distance from the detector; 
- N/No  is obtained  in the  laboratory  by  rotating the 
standard source with respect to the axis of symmetry; 
F/I  and  F/A  were  calculated  and  tabulated  by  Beck 
(ref.2},  integrating  the  photon  fluxes  due  to  the 
unitary concentrations  injon the ground. 
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b)  Calculation program 
The  CISE  has  developed  a  calculation code  to transfer 
the  spectrum  from  the multichannel  analyzer to the  PC 
and to analyze it. The analysis of the spectrum is based 
on  the  identification  of  the  isotopes,  and  on 
calculation of the photopeak area. With reference to the 
relation  (1)  it  is  then  possible  to  determine  the 
exposure rate and the concentration.  In the event that 
a  nuclide has gamma  emissions at different energies,  a 
test for the significance is performed for each energy; 
if  the  result  is  positive,  a  weighted  mean  is 
calculated; if not,  the inconsistency is recorded.  The 
output  of  the  ISGS  program  is  a  printout  with  the 
exposure  rate  and  the  concentration  for  fall-out  and 
natural  radioisotopes.  The  software  as  well  as  the 
instrumentation are extensively described in ref.  4. 
c)  Sensibility 
In a  one-hour counting period,  the number of net pulses 
for the following  isotopes are: 
- 2  per Bqjm2  for 
134cs  and  137 cs 
- 3  per Bqjm2  for 
131 I 
- 1. 5  per Bqjm2  for 
60co 
- 60  per Bqjkg  for uranium  (over three peaks) 
- 45  per Bqjkg for thorium  (over three peaks) 
- 7  per Bqfkg  for  4°K 
Therefore  a  surface  concentration  of  10000  Bqjm2, 
corresponding to a  food  contamination below any action 
level,  can  be  measured  in  a  few  minutes,  at  3% 
confidence level. 
3.2  sample measurement 
a)  General analysis description 
Basically,  the  analysis  of  the  pulse-height  spectrum 
carried out  by  Spectran  (software  package  produced  by 
Canberra),  consists of the  following  steps: 
1)  Locate peaks  of interest in the spectrum. 
2)  Determine  the  background  corrected  area  and  the 
statistical uncertainty in the area of each peak. 
- 3  -3)  Identify  the  radionuclides  that  produced  the 
spectrum. 
4)  Determine  the  activities  of  the  nuclides  of 
interest,  including decay corrections. 
Before  steps  3)  and  4)  above  can  be  carried  out,  the 
system must be calibrated in order to relate gamma-ray 
energy to pulse-height,  and radionuclide concentrations 
to  measured  peak  areas.  This  is  accomplished  by 
determining  the positions  and  areas  of  spectral  peaks 
produced  by  gamma  rays  of  known  energies  and 
intensities,  and  generating  appropriate  calibration 
parameters that may  be used in subsequent analyses.  For 
energy and efficiency calibration use was made of a  500-
ml  liquid  standard  source  containing  radioisotopes 
having  the  activities  given  in  Table  1.  The  equation 
correlating channel  and  energy resulted to be: 
Energy  (keV)  = -7.69E-01+7.02E-01*Ch-3.66E-07*Ch2. 
Fig.  4  shows  the curve  of efficiency as  a  function  of 
energy  for  the  500-ml  geometry.  Measurement  of  the 
background was performed in an area having a  background 
radiation  level  of  10  ~R/h,  for  a  collection  time  of 
5000 seconds.  The resulting spectrum shows a  4°K  peak at 
1460  keV  and  a  232Th  peak  at  2614  keV,  besides  other 
minor peaks,  as shown in Table 2 •  This spectrum was used 
to correct the  measurements  performed  subsequently  on 
environmental  samples. 
4.  RESULTS 
4.1  In situ spectrometry 
To  verify  the  in  situ  responses  of  HPGe  and  the  related 
software,  ad  hoc  campaigns  were  carried out  in areas with 
uniform  levels  of  radioactivity,  and  not  cultivated  for 
many  years.  The  results were  compared to the exposure rate 
measured with ionization chambers and to the concentrations 
obtained  from  soil  samples  measured  in  laboratory.  The 
agreement  was  quite good,  as  can  be  seen  from  table  3  and 
4.  Two  campaigns were then performed to verify the response 
of the instrumentation for  ISGS  in different environmental 
conditions. 
- 4 -II 
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The  areas  selected for the campaigns  were: 
- Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
- Alto Lazio 
Friuli is the most affected Italian region by the Chernobyl 
fall-out.  Therefore,  we  expected  to  find  considerable 
amounts of cesium in the presence of generally low exposure 
rate due to limestone formations.  In the alto Lazio we  have 
a  completely different situation: the cesium deposition was 
generally  low  in  an  area  of  volcanic  origin  with  high 
background radiation levels from natural radioisotopes.  The 
results are reported in Tab.  5  and  Tab.  6. 
4.2  Measurements  on  environmental  samples 
To  examine  any  possible  problem  relating  to  in-situ 
utilization  of  the  Spectran,  three  environmental  samples 
were measured: 
- agricultural soil 
- coal  ash 
- granitic rock. 
The  samples  were  measured  for  5000  sees.  The  measurement 
time was kept intentionally limited to verify the detection 
limits and because the time factor plays an  important role 
with  apparatuses  purposely  made  for  in-situ measurements. 
The  results  of  the  measurements  performed  on  the  three 
environmental  samples  are  shown  in  Table  7.  The  data 
relating  to  4°K  and  137cs  are  given  without  any  further 
processing,  whereas the uranium and thorium concentrations 
are  the weighted  mean  of the  inverse  square of the errors 
of  the  energies  used  for  each  family.  In  one-hour 
measurements,  for  unitary  concentrations  (Bqjkg)  the 
following  values  were  obtained:  - 12  pulses  for  natural 
uranium 
- 14  pulses for natural thorium 
- 0. 5  pulses for  4°K. 
- 5  -Therefore,  with  background  concentrations  (30  Bqjkg  of  u 
and  Th,  and  500  Bqjkg  of  4°K),  the  one-hour  measurements 
lead  to  statistical  errors  around  5%.  Following  the 
aforesaid method,  for  137 Cs  we  obtain  9  pulsesjh per Bqjkg. 
On  the  basis  of  the  system  detection  efficiency,  of  the 
characteristic  energies  and  emission  intensities,  we 
estimate the apparatus sensitivity for  131I  and 
60co to be 15 
and  6  pulsesjh per Bqjkg,  respectively. 
5.  POTENTIALITY  AND  LIMITATIONS 
Some  campaigns  have  been  performed  in  extreme  climatic 
conditions,  on  snow  covered  areas,  at  temperature  below 
freezing  point,  to test the  equipment.  Some  difficulties, 
at low temperatures,  were experienced with the PC  which,  by 
specifications,  should  operate  in  the  range  10-32  oc.  In 
normal  conditions it is possible to plan  3-4  measurements 
per  day  providing  that  each  measuring  point  is  at  about 
one-hour drive distance.  Sometimes it is difficult to find 
plane  surfaces  which  are  representatives  of  the 
contaminated area.  Although  the  liquid nitrogen  is widely 
distributed  and  can  by  purchased  at  least  in  all  the 
Italian towns,  we  used a  25  liters dewar tank providing an 
autonomous capacity of 15 days.  With regard to the required 
personnel,  a  trained graduate is necessary for the analysis 
and  interpretation of  the  results.  A  minimun  team  of  two 
operators  is also  needed  to  carry  out  a  ISGS  measure  (to 
load  and  unload  instrumentation,  to fill  dewar,  to place 
the HPGe,  etc). 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
ISGS  is  a  suitable  method  to  map  the  radioactive 
contaminations in a  wide area following  an accident and to 
guide emergency actions in the intermediate period.  It can 
usefully  substitute  a  campaign  of  sample  collection  and 
measure,  mainly  in  regions  far  away  from  from  central 
laboratory.  Due  to  the  complex  instrumentation  and  the 
specialized operators  required,  it will  be  less effective 
in the initial period of the emergency. 
- 6  -'I 
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- 7 -TABLE  1 
Characteristics  of  the  calibraion  sources  and  experimental 
results. 
'Nuclide I  Energy 
I 
Gamma; sec  lc=J 
Efficiency 
(keV)  (cpsjgammajs) 
Cd-109  88.0  232  2.8 
Co-57  122.1  113  1.7 
Ce-139  165.9  30  0.44 
sn-113  391.7  43  0.39 
Cs-137  661.6  2050  9.5 
Y-88  898.0  468  1.6 
Co-60  1173.2  2334  6.5 
Co-60  1332.5  2337  5.9 
Y-88  1836.0  500  0.98 
TABLE  2 
ENVIRONMENTAL  BACKGROUND  (5000  sec) 
PEAK  ANALYSIS 
I  Peak I Energy ~ 
Net Area tal 
keV  counts  v 
1  511.19  2.2  73  19.5 
2  1461.05  1.8  117  9.9 
3  1729.28  1.3  14  38.4 
4  1764.66  2.2  20  28.3 
5  2614.02  3.6  55  13.5 
- 8  -
0.012 
0.015 
0.015 
0.0090 
0.0046 
0.0034 
0.0027 
0.0025 
0.0012 
Nuclides 
Tl-208,Na-22,ANN 
K-40 
Bi-214 
Bi-214 
Tl-208 
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II.  CONTRIBUTION  TO  THE  OPTIMIZATION  OF  A NETWORK  FOR  MONITORING  AND 
SURVEILLANCE  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  RADIOACTIVITY  IN  SPAIN 
SUMMARY 
Prof.  X.ORTEGA 
Institut de  Tecniques  Energetiques 
Universitat Politecnica de  Catalunya 
Barcelona  - SPAIN 
The  work  plan  we  have  been  following  involves 
initial  action  consisting  of  "sounding  out"  the 
situation  of  environmental  radiological  surveillance 
systems  in  the  countries  of  the  E.E.C.  and  the 
corresponding  emergency  systems.  An  analysis  of  the 
functioning of  a  regional network,  has  been undertaken 
using the centralized  Catalan  network  around  the  two 
nuclear sites.  The  study  covered an operational period 
corresponding to the years  1988  and  1989.  The  causes 
leading to  the non-availability  of the network  and the 
influence of  the differing  localities,  as  well  as of 
radiological incidents,  were  studied.  The  latter study 
enabled us  to get to  know  the  variations  in exposure 
rates  in  the  different  localities  together with the 
natural causes that led  to them.  In this  respect,  and 
for  a  better  knowledge  of  the  relationship between 
natural radioactivity and contaminating agents deposited 
in  the  soil,  a  calculation  model  was  designed  to 
determine  the  contribution  to  the  environmental dose 
from  the  different  radioactive components  in the soil 
and this has  been validated  with  data  from  the field 
along  the  Catalan  coastline.  In  the  studies of  the 
technical features  of the functioning of  the equipment, 
our  attention  focused  on  the  stations measuring the 
environmental  exposure  rate.  In  this  respect,  two 
techniques  for  calibrating  environmental  measuring 
equipment  were  experimented  with,  one  in the  lab and 
the other  under  field  conditions.  Finally pursuing the 
lines of  the technological  development of  detection by 
means  of  ionization chambers,  we  have  reached the end of 
the initial stage whose  final aim is to  develop  a  high-
sensitivity chain with  low-pressure  ionization chambers. 
Our  aim at a  later stage is to contrast this  with other 
commercially available  equipment.  To  do this,  the first 
stage consisted  of developing  a  high-sensitivity,  low-
noise electrometer which has  supplied good  results under 
extreme  temperature conditions. 
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Reflections  in  the  field  of  radiological 
surveillance  in  different  European  countries arising 
from  the  Chernobyl  accident  in 1986  appeared to impose 
common  demands  deriving  from  the  awareness  that  a 
nuclear accident might extend  its  influence  over vast 
distances with  no  respect for frontiers.  These  demands 
might take  shape in the following manner: 
1  - Extending  environmental  radiological surveillance 
plans  and  corresponding  emergency  action  beyond the 
areas surrounding nuclear installations, which was  where 
they  were  normally  focused,  in  order to cover  large 
geographical areas  in  these  countries.  These plans 
should  involve  collaboration  procedures  on  an 
international scale. 
2  The  setting  up  of  a  highly  reliable  on  line 
functioning network  for better and faster management  of 
actions deriving  from  internal  and  external accident 
situations was  considered highly advisable. 
.  These  demands  derived  from  a  double  need,  a 
technical  one,  in  order  to  assist  authorities with 
decision-making  in  emergency  situations,  and  an 
informative one for the different bodies  involved,  thus 
making  better  and  faster  awareness  of  radiological 
events possible. 
In  1986,  environmental  radiological  control was 
limited in Spain to nuclear sites and their neighbouring 
areas of influence,  to  CIEMAT,  and  to  certain other 
limited  initiatives.  After  the  Chernobyl accident, 
differing  thrusts  appeared  between  the  aims  of the 
Spanish central  Safety Body,  the  "Consejo de Seguridad 
Nuclear"(C.S.N.),  anxious,  in  the  light  of  other 
experiences,  to  draw up  a  far-reaching plan that would 
prove reliable despite  the  limited  economic  resources 
available  and  certain  autonomous  administrations, 
particularly that of  Catalonia,  anxious  to  provide  a 
rapid  response  to  the widespread social concern which 
had revealed itself especially after the Chernobyl acci-
dent.  The  Catalan  Autonomous  Region covers  40,000  sq. 
kms.  of  the  northeastern  Iberian  Peninsula, 
(F.ig.2.1).In  the  southern  part of its territory,  near 
the mouth of the river Ebro in Tarragona,  Catalonia has 
two  nuclear  sites  with  a  total  of  4  nuclear  power 
stations and  a  total  installed power  capacity of  3320 
Mwe.  The  mountainous  area  of  the Pyrenees  and the 
Mediterranean waters of the Golfe de  Lyon  separate them 
from  neighboring  France  which,  as  is well known,  is 
equipped with a  large  number  of  nuclear installations, 
particularly along the Rhone  valley.  The  result of these 
diverse thrusts is the  existence  of  a  network,  of  a 
regional  nature,  which  has  had  two years'  experience, 
along with the recent  launching of  the REVIRA  national 
plan.This situation  has  enabled us  to take advantage of 
existing reality in the  local Catalan situation in order 
- 20  -to learn  the required lessons for optimizing the design 
and management  of  an environmental network,  while at the 
same  time  coming  up with ideas  and  knowledge  for  further 
development. 
1  - SOME  CONSIDERATIONS  ON  THE  PLANS  FOR  ENVIRONMENTAL 
RADIOACTIVE  SURVEILLANCE  IN  EUROPEAN  COUNTRIES 
A survey  was  drawn  up  and sent to member  countries 
of  the  EEC  in  order  to  evaluate  the  degree  of 
reliability  of  environmental  control  mechanisms  in 
operation in  European  countries  at  the  time  of the 
Chernobyl  accident,  as  well as the later consequences 
for  the  new  environmental  measurement  networks  at both 
the planning  and  operational  stages.  This  survey took 
in:  a)  structural features,  b)  features resulting from 
the  impact  of  the  Chernobyl  accident,  c)  technical 
characteristics of the  installation  and  d)  features 
deriving from management. 
Not all  those consulted  collaborated in supplying 
the data requested,  although,  to  a  greater  or lesser 
degree,  replies  were  obtained  from  the  following 
countries:  West  Germany,  the United  Kingdom,  Denmark, 
Holland,  France,  Belgium and Spain. 
Generally  speaking,  the  initial  considerations 
drawn  from this survey are as follows: 
1)  The  environmental  radioactive surveillance 
systems existing  prior to  May  1986  proved sufficiently 
sensitive to  detect  the  first  manifestations  of the 
propagation  of  contaminants  after  the  Chernobyl 
accident.  The  main  symptoms  of  this  presence were 
detected  in  the  Research  Centres or in nuclear power 
station sites - the  locations where  most environmental 
control mechanisms  had been installed hitherto. 
2)  As  a  result of this incident,  decisions were 
taken in almost  all  countries  on  the  drawing  up of 
surveillance plans on  a  national scale  (IMS  in Germany, 
TELERAD  in  Belgium,  "Reseau  de  tele-surveillance" in 
France,  RIMNET  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Dutch 
Radiation  Monitoring  Network  in  Holland,  ARGOS  in 
Denmark,  REVIRA  in Spain). 
3)  Most  of  these programs  are at an  advanced 
stage of  implementation at the end of  1989. 
4)  The  plans at present being undertaken are of  a 
national  character  and  practically  no  link-up  is 
envisaged with other programs  in neighboring countries. 
5)  Management  structures in  cases of  emergency 
and  their  relationship  with  the  environmental 
surveillance  networks  vary  greatly  from  country  to 
country.  They depend to a  large extent on  the political 
and administrative organisation of  each  State  and the 
responsibilities of  the different public institutions. 
6)  Practically all the proposals provide for  the 
setting  up  of  on  line  operational  stations,  with 
centralized control  of  exposure  rates and  analysers of 
- 21  -activity  in  aerosols  and  of  radioiodes.  Calculating 
possible contaminants in soil and water  is provided for 
at a  second stage  in the  surveillance plans with  non-
immediate  actions. 
7)  Some  plans make  use  of  a  larger  number  of 
exposure  rate  detectors  than analysers  of  environmental 
radioactivity.  The  exposure  rate detectors  are mostly 
composed  of  Geiger  MUller  counters,  although in some 
cases ionization chambers  are used.  We  have  been unable 
to  find  evidence  of  unified criteria in defining the 
technical specifications of  the  equipment. 
8)  No  coinciding  criteria  appear  to  exist to 
justify the  location of  the stations,  nor do  we  have  any 
knowledge  of  the existence of plans  for calibration and 
control of  the equipment. 
9)  There  is a  widespread tendency to associate 
all or part of  the  radioactivity measuring stations with 
meteorological  stations  in  order  to  increase  the 
information obtainable,  with a  view to  forecasting the 
transport of contaminants. 
10)  Insufficient technical data has  been obtained 
to  compare  the  characteristics  of  the  different 
equipment  used,  although  from  the replies obtained,  a 
considerable diversification of  commercial  models  seems 
apparent. 
It would  appear,  on the basis of these reflections, 
that the national environmental radiological 
surveillance plans in European  countries have  responded 
to  political  and  technical  criteria  on  a  limited 
regional basis and that,  from  the standpoint of  European 
co-operation in this field,  this fact may  hinder 
short-term  forecasts  in  large  areas  of  atmospheric 
transport of contaminants. 
2  - ANALYSIS  OF  THE  FUNCTIONING  OF  THE  REGIONAL  NETWORK 
FOR  ENVIRONMENTAL  RADIOLOGICAL  SURVEILLANCE  IN 
CATALONIA. 
The  administrative  authorities  of  the  Catalan 
Autonomous  Government,  through  the  "Servei  de 
Coordinaci6  d'Activitats  R~dioactives  de  Catalunya" 
(SCAR),  set  up  a  surveillance  network on  a  regional 
scale,  taking in,  first and  foremost,  its nuclear 
installations,  and later on,  other geographical areas of 
the Autonomous  Region.(See Fig.  2.1). 
Thus,  a  Network  for  Environmental  Radiological 
Surveillance was  drawn up,  consisting of  two  types of 
stations  those  already  in place around the Nuclear 
Stations,  and others to be distributed  around different 
strategic  points  in  Catalonia.  Management  of  the 
network is  of  a  centralized nature  - it  is linked to 
SCAR  headquarters  in Barcelona.  The  first sub-network 
around the power  stations basically consists of  exposure 
rate  detectors,  whereas  the  second,  on  a  much  wider 
regional scale,  is  composed  of  8  stations measuring 
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radioactivity in the atmosphere. 
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2.1.  Environmental  dose  ratemeter stations around the 
Asc6  and Vandell6s Nuclear Power Plants 
The  network  had  already  been  blueprinted before 
April 1986,  just before  the Chernobyl  incident.  From 
November  of  the  s~e  yea;  onwards,  the  first remote 
transmission  of  data  tests  started  up  and  this is 
composed of  a  total  of  eight  exposure  rate detection 
monitors. 
The  initial  project  chose  the  siting  of  the 
stations in  response to  the situation  of the existing 
nuclear  power  plants  in  Catalonia  which are divided 
between  two sites,  those  of  Vandell6s  and  Asc6  (see 
Fig.2.2). 
The  Vandell6s  site is in a  coastal location on the 
northern edge of the open area of the mouth of  the Ebro 
river. 
- 23  -The  Asc6  site  corresponds  to  the  natural 
geographical region pertaining to the  lowest  stretch of 
the mean  basin of  the river Ebro,  and is isolated from 
the Mediterranean sea by the presence of coastal ranges. 
Each  station  in  the  network  around the nuclear 
power stations has  a  monitor  for measuring environmental 
radiation in  terms  of  dose  rate,  covering an interval 
ranging  from  0.01  microSv/h  to  100  mSv/h.  This  wide 
interval is covered with  two  attached Geiger MUller-type 
probes.  Each  station  has  an  uninterrupted  0.250  kVA 
power  source  which guarantees  a  supply autonomy of the 
order of  24  hours  as  well  as  a  device  for  avoiding 
important overloading  of the  supply which might affect 
the  equipment.  For  the  information  transmission,  a 
"point to point"-type data transmission telegraphic line 
has  been used,  which is connected to each detector and  a 
"Base"  computer  on  each  site.  This  centralizes 
information  from  all  the  data  coming  in  from  the 
stations situated  in each one  of  them.  The  information 
coming in from  each Base  computer  arrives on  a  line of 
similar  nature  in  the  SCAR  Headquarters in Barcelona, 
where  the  Control computer  is located.  The  lines used 
are telegraphic  and transfer  information at a  speed of 
50  Bd.,  considered sufficient  for  the  transmission of 
radiological data. 
The  communications  system is  in real  time  and permits 
each detector  a  minimum  consultation interval  of three 
minutes.  This may  vary as  a  result of  requirements or 
special preferential attention required  by  a  particular 
location.  At  the  moment,  this  time  is set at six 
minutes  for  the Surveillance  Network  and  one hour for 
the overall Network. 
2.2  -study  of  the  functioning  of  the  surveillance 
network  around  the  Asc6  and  Vandell6s  Nuclear  Power 
Plants 
The  study  contemplated  here  corresponds  to the 
analysis of  the functioning  of the  eight stations for 
detection  of  exposure  rates  located  in the Asc6  and 
Vandell6s sites over  a  period of  24  months  corresponding 
to the whole  of  1988  and  1989. 
The  study  of the network's  functioning is based on 
the records  supplied by  SCAR  ,  the network  manager,  and 
the  observations  made  on  incidents obtained from its 
technical personnel. 
Detailed  study  of  the  records,  made  with  an 
interval  of  fifteen  minutes  from  each  of the eight 
stations,  has  prompted us  to divide this study  into two 
well-defined parts.  On  the one  hand,  in the study of 
the availability of the network,  an  attempt is  made  to 
quantify this  for  each  station, site and  as  a  function 
of the time  factor.  On  the other,  in the radiological 
study of  the network,  an analysis is carried out,  based 
on calculations of  exposure  rates,  of  the situations 
- 24 -which have  led to increases clearly above  mean  values. 
TABLE  2 .1.  \  OF  HOURS  OF  INTERRUPTION  PER  YEAR  ACCORDING  TO  TYPE  OF  INCIDENT 
AND  FOR  EACH  STATION  IN  THE  RESPECTIVE  SITE. 
VANDELLOS 
1988 
1989 
ASCO 
1988 
1989 
STATION  TYPE  1  TYPE  2  TYPE  3  TYPE4  UNA VAIL* 
E1  10.7  1.2  0.3  9.1  21.3 
HL  1.6  1.4  20.9  10.1  34 
E2  12.3  1.4  0.3  4.7  18.7 
AL  11.3  1.4  0.3  12.6  25.6 
E1  4.7  1.6  0  5.3  11.5 
HL  3.4  1.6  14.7  4.9  24.6 
E2  6.3  1.6  0  3.6  16.6 
AL  12.6  1.6.  0  5.9  20.1 
VI  12.1  1.4  0.3  5.4  19.2 
EA  5.5  1.4  0.3  3.2  10.4 
AS  6.7  1.4  0.3  4.7  13.1 
FL  6.7  1.4  0.3  2  10.4 
VI  1  1.6  0  14.5  17 
EA  1.8  1.6  0  7  8.7 
AS  1  1.6  0  6.6  8.3 
FL  1.6  1.6  0  10.4  13 
•  \  of hours unavailable per year in each site. 
•• \  of hours available per year in each site. 
VAHDELLOS  ASCO 
E1  Vandell6s NPP. 
HL  Hospitalet de  l'Infant. 
E2  Limits Vandell6s  NPP. 
AL  L'Almadrava. 
VI  Vinebre. 
EA  Asc6  NPP. 
AS  Asc6. 
FL  Flix. 
2.2.1 Availability of  the network 
AVAIL** 
78.7 
66 
81.3 
74.4 
88.5 
75.4 
83.4 
79.9 
80.8 
89.6 
86.9 
89.6 
83 
91.3 
91.7 
87 
The  study  of  the  incidents  occurring  during  the 
functioning  of  the  network  was  based  above  all on 
analysis  of  the  possible  causes  of the interruptions 
occasioned in  the  functioning  of  the  eight stations 
measuring  environmental  exposure  rates.  The  causes 
attributable to  the  different  interruptions  are very 
diverse and  not  always  well known.  Based  on available 
information,  the  different  types  of  incidents  were 
divided into four  groups. 
- TYPE  1  Incidents.  (Transmissions) 
In  this  block  we  include  those  that  affected data 
transmission from  the stations  to SCAR  Headquarters in 
Barcelona. 
- TYPE  2  Incidents  (Software) 
Here  we  situate the incidents attributable to errors in 
tne software used in network control. 
- TYPE  3  Incidents  (Planned) 
This  type  groups  together  the interruptions occasioned 
in a  pre-planned way  which were  caused by maintenance, 
repair or testing operations. 
- TYPE  4  Incidents  (Non-catalogued) 
This  group  includes all those interruptions  whose  cause 
was  uncertain.  In  some  cases  they may  even be due  to 
- 25  -one  of the  above  causes,  but there is no certainty as to 
this. 
- By  analising  the results  of  the  availability of  the 
network it is observed that the latter is greater in the 
Asc6  site  than  in  that  of Vandell6s.  In the former, 
average availability per station works  out  at about  85% 
in 1988  an  reaches  89%  in  1989.  In  Vandell6s,  on the 
other hand,  it was  of the order of  75%  in  1988  and went 
up the  following year  to  82%  These  results reflect an 
improvement  in 1989  over the previous year. 
- The  results  from  the  classification  of incidents, 
indicate  that  the  largest  percentage  of  these  are 
situated  in  the  TYPE  4  Incidents  groups  (Non-
identifiable).  This  group,  in principle,  contains all 
those interruptions  which prove  difficult to classify. 
However,  after  consultation  with  SCAR  technical 
personnel,  we  may  be certain that between  60%  and  70%  of 
them  were  due  to  breakdowns  in the data transmission 
telegraphic lines  (TYPE  1). 
The  reason for  the  high  proportion  of  this  type of 
breakdown  is  to  be  found  in  the  layout  of  the 
telecommunications  lines in that particular geographical 
area.  In order for the implementation of the network not 
to be excessively costly,  already existing transmission 
lines  were  used  whose  infrastructure is prevailingly 
rural,  and  this  has  proved  to  be  insufficiently 
reliable,  as  well  as  vulnerable  to  the surrounding 
environment. 
- TYPE  1  and  4  incidents  (communications  and  non-
catalogued)  were  more  frequent in the wettest months  in 
the  two  sites, April  and November,  although more  data 
would  need  to  be  available  to  calculate  seasonal 
variations in network incidents more  precisely. 
- Interruptions  due  to  incidents  with  the  software 
protocols  (TYPE  2)  were  more  frequent  in 1989  than in 
1988.  This was  due  to a  problem in  the software which 
began  in  1988,  whose  consequences were  more  important 
from  February 1989  onwards,  coinciding  with  the fact 
that SCAR  began the collection of data from  the stations 
distributed around various points in the whole  region of 
Catalonia. 
-TYPE  3  incidents,  which  totalled  5.2%  of  average 
monthly  hours  of  interruption  in  1988,  were  not 
relevant  in  1989.  Improvements  in exploitation of the 
network meant  important  intervention  on  the equipment 
side was  unnecessary. 
- In  the  study  of  simultaneous  interruptions in the 
stations in each  nuclear  site,  it  is  interesting to 
verify  that  there  were  many  more  interruptions  in 
isolated equipment  in Vandell6s  than in  Asc6,  most of 
them  attributable  to  local  breakdowns  in  the  data 
transmission lines. 
It is also verified that le  least frequent  simultaneous 
interruption is  that affecting  three stations.  This is 
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logical,  bearing in mind  the design  of  each  site, made 
up of four  stations,  one  of which is the site "base". 
- The  difference  between the  two  sites  as  regards the 
significance of  the  interruptions  is  attributable,  on 
the  one  hand,  to  the  fact  that  the  layouts of the 
telegraphic lines are much  more  vulnerable  in the case 
of Vandell6s  than in  Asc6,  and,  on  the other,  that the 
location of  the  sites  also  determines  differences in 
climatological  conditions,  particularly  for rainfall, 
which makes  Vandell6s more  vulnerable. 
Radiological Study 
Based  on  the  data  for  dose  rates  supplied  by the 
different  stations,  it  can  be  appreciated  that  on 
particular  occasions  there  are  periods  of  variable 
duration when  the dose  rate has  increased appreciably. 
A  study  analysing  the  causes  and  quantifying  the 
increases observed  in the two sites was  undertaken.  To 
do this,  the mean  value was  calculated,  as  well as the 
standard deviation  of the  dose  rate corresponding to a 
6-day  interval  prior  to  the  perturbation,  and  the 
increase in  dose  rate has been quantified in percentage 
terms with respect to this mean. 
Altogether,  throughout  the twenty  four  months  studied, 
eight  situations  that  were  considered  abnormal were 
recorded with  regard  to  the  dose  rate  values,  four 
corresponding  to  1988  (January,  March,  April  and 
November)  and four  to  1989  (April,  September,  October 
and November).  Situations were  considered abnormal when 
in one or other of the stations values were  recorded for 
the exposure  rate whose  difference with  regard to the 
mean  was  (  3cr  )  above  the distribution of measurements 
throughout  the  six  days  prior to the perturbation,  cr 
being the standard deviation. 
When  an  abnormal situation  arose,  the  behaviour of  the 
eight stations in the  two  sites was  analysed in order to 
compare  the  existence  of  correlations  of  a 
meteorological  nature.  Periods  with  radiological 
incidents were  detected,  particularly  in the Vandell6s 
site.  The  increases  in  the dose rate in percentage 
terms  with  respect  ·to  the  monthly  mean  were  very 
important  - over three times  above  the results obtained 
during a  six-day interval around the perturbation in all 
the cases presented. 
There were  three particularly significant situations in 
the Vandell6s site: 
November  1988.  The  increases in  the dose  rate were 
over  25%  with respect  to the  mean  in all the stations 
and  in three of  these  (E1,  HL,  E2)  the  increase topped 
34%. 
April  1989.  The  increases in dose  rate for  two  of 
these topped  20%,  and  a  25%  figure  was  also reached. 
September  1989.  During this month  the  increases in 
dose  rate  in  Vandell6s  were  over  43%  in two  stations 
- 27  -(HL,E2). 
After  analysing  the  meteorological  parameters 
corresponding  to  these  two  periods,  supplied by the 
weather  station in the Vandell6s  power  plant,  an evident 
correlation  was  observed  between  the  variations  in 
rainfall and the increases in dose  rate,  with  a  certain 
delay between  the latter  and the  former  which could be 
quantified at between  one  and  two  hours. 
The  Asc6  site  did  not  display  such  important 
radiological  incidents  affecting  the  whole site.  By 
analysing the meteorological  parameters  in  each  zone, 
supplied by the weather station in the Asc6  power plant, 
it was  observed that  in  these  periods  the  amount  of 
rainfall was  in all  cases much  less than that recorded 
in Vandell6s  and  in some  cases nil  (March  1988). 
The  follow up  carried  out  allows  us  to  draw  a 
series of overall conclusions which,  although they refer 
to a  network with  very  particular  characteristics and 
location,  provide significant information with regard to 
the overall  behaviour  of  this  type  of environmental 
control network. 
1.  There is an evident relationship between the siting 
of  a  particular station and its availability,  due  to the 
importance  of  the  meteorological parameters  and their 
correlation with the incidents in the functioning of the 
network.  This  relationship  could be more  acutely felt 
in nuclear sites which by being located in areas distant 
from  more  populated  zones  have  less  reliable 
telecommunications  network equipment. 
2.  Local  meteorological  conditions,  particularly 
the radiation 
site.  It is 
in motion that 
up  of  normal 
the  levels  of 
rainfall,  are  determining  factors  for 
levels considered normal  for  a  particular 
necessary for  a  period of tests to be set 
will  enable  us . to  carry  out  follow 
radiological  incidents,  from  which 
intervention for  anomalous  radiological 
be established. 
situations can 
3.  These  considerations  are  applicable  to  the 
atmospheric  radioactivity  measurement  stations,  whose 
functioning is foreseeably more delicate. 
3  CONTRIBUTION  TO  ENVIRONMENTAL  EXPOSURE  MADE  BY 
NATURAL  AND  MAN-MADE  RADIOISOTOPES  DISTRIBUTED  IN  THE 
SOIL 
Follow  up  and  interpretation  of  environmental 
radiological data,  both under  normal conditions  and in 
cases  of  the  presence  of  artificial  radioactive 
contaminants,  requires close knowledge  of  the different 
components  present  in  the  dose.  These  depend  on the 
locations in which  the  measurement  systems  are housed. 
The  natural  environmental  radiation  field  may  be 
superimposed  by  the  one  caused  by  artificial 
radioisotopes. 
A  study  has  been  undertaken  of the radioactive 
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coastline.  A model  has been designed for calculating the 
contribution  to  the  environmental  dose  made  by the 
radioactivity  of  the  soil  and  this  model  has  been 
validated through dosimetric measurements  in the field. 
As  regards  the variations  in environmental doses, 
there are  several responsible  causes:  changes  in the 
cosmic radiation  flow  affecting  the  earth's surface, 
which  for  a  given  location  are  always  below  10%, 
variations in the concentrations  of  Rn  and  its decay 
products  in  the  atmosphere  occasioned  by changes  in 
atmospheric  variables,  and  variations  in  dose rates 
caused  by  the  radioelernents  in the soil.  The  latter 
constitutes the  main  cause  of  the  temporary changes 
observed in environmental dose  levels. 
The  detection  mechanisms  employed  in  the 
Environmental Radiological Surveillance  Plans  are able 
to  record  the  variations  in  the  dose  rates due. to 
natural sources  which,  in  turn,  superimpose themselves 
on  the  variations  caused  by  the  presence  of 
radioelements of  an artificial origin,  when  they exist. 
It  is  therefore  important  to  find and differentiate 
between the contributions  from  the different components 
of the environmental radiation field. 
The  study performed may  be divided into two parts: 
The  development  of  a  model  for evaluating dose 
rates caused by the natural and artificial radioelements 
present in the soil. 
The  study  of  the  natural  and  artificial 
radioelement contents  of  the  beaches  on  the Catalan 
shoreline  and  evaluation  of  the dose  rates they give 
rise to. 
3.1  - Description of the dose calculation model 
The  calculation  model  for  the  doses  caused by 
ground  nuclides  described  as  follows  enables  us  to 
evaluate the contribution  to  the  total  absorbed dose 
rate in  the atmosphere at one metre  above  ground level, 
due  to  gamma  radiation,  from  each  one  of  the 
radioelements present  in the  soil.  This  allows us to 
learn  and  separate  the  contribution  due  to  the 
radioelements  of  an  artificial  or~g~n  from  that 
corresponding to natural radionuclides. 
In  general,  it  cannot  be  assured  that  the 
distribution  of  the  different  natural and artificial 
radioisotopes in the soil remains constant  with varying 
depths.  In order  to bear  this fact in mind,  the soil 
was  divided into compartments  of  a  particular thickness, 
in  each  one  of  which  it  is  supposed  that  the 
radioelements  are  uniformly  distributed.  The 
compartments  chosen are displayed as  follows: 
- 29  -COMPAR~ENT  DEPTH 
A  o-s  CM 
B  5-15  CM 
c  15-30  CM 
0  30-50  CM 
E  50-80  CM 
Subsequently,  based  on the dose  factors calculated 
by other authors,  the dose rate  conversion factors were 
calculated  for  the  horizontal strips indicated in the 
previous figure.  The  contribution  from  each  one  of  the 
segments  to the total absorbed dose rate one metre  above 
the ground is calculated  through  the  model  developed. 
The  basic  data is  made  up of the concentrations of the 
different  radionuclides  in  each  segment.  These 
concentrations  are  usually  calculated  by  Gamma 
Spectroscopy techniques. 
In order to carry  out  a  check on  the validity of 
the model  developed,a pressurized ionization chamber  was 
used.  Due  to the fact  that  the  effectiveness  of this 
instrument,  varies  in  relation  to  the energy of  the 
photons  involved,  it is most  important to know  the  gamma 
radiation spectrum  inciding on the detector in order to 
estimate with  precision the  real dose  rates that take 
place in a  particular area. 
For this  reason the model  developed incorporates  a 
sub-routine for estimating the spectrum corresponding to 
each  one  of  the  photons  emitted for  each one  of  the 
radioelements present in the soil. 
The  model calculates the exposure rate the detector 
should  record,  based  on  the  radiation  spectrum 
corresponding to each one  of  the photons emitted  by the 
ground radioelements,  the curve of effecti  venes.s  of  the 
detector in relation  to  the  energy  from  the photons 
inciding  on  it  and  from  the  concentrations  of 
radionuclides present  on  the  ground.  The  estimated 
value  is  checked  against  the  exposure rate actually 
detected by the ionization chamber. 
3.2  Experimental checking of  the model 
A check on the reliability of  the dose calculation 
model  presented  was  undertaken  at  five  points 
distributed  along  the  Catalan  coast.  Several  sand 
samples were  collected on  each one  of  the beaches  for 
analysis by  means  of  gamma  spectroscopy.  The  samples 
were  collected at various points on the surface,  as well 
as in each  one  of  the  compartments  outlined  by the 
model. 
In a  parallel way,  experimental determinations  on 
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the dose  rates were  made  on  each one  of  the beaches with 
a  Reuter  & Stokes ionization chamber. 
CUBEU.ES  . 
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TABLE 3.2 
4.tl ..  0.09  4.36 ..  0.20 
• 4.17 ..  0.06 
3.70 ..  0.06 
7.42 ..  0.40 
2.12 •• 0.46 
3.92 ..  0.31 
3.41+- o.o 
The  exposure  rates which  ought to  be  recorded by 
the  ionization  chamber  were  calculated  from  the 
concentrations  of  the different radioelements detected 
in the analyses by gamma  spectroscopy and by  making use 
of the  model developed.  Table  3.2 displays the results 
obtained and also indicates the estimated exposure rates 
if there  is a  30%  emanating power  of Radon  and Theron. 
Good  correlation  is  observed  between  the values 
calculated with the model  and experimental results. 
RESULTS 
Large  variations  were  observed  in  the specific 
activities of K40  as well as  the Radioactive  series of 
uranium and  thorium along  the Catalan coast.  The  mean 
values,  as well as the extreme concentrations which were 
calculated in  the present  study are  summarized in the 
following table: 
Mean  Value  Maximum  Value  Minimum  Value 
(Bq/Kg)  (Bq/Kg)  (Bq/Kg) 
K4o  624  1299  136 
Serie u23a:  Ra226  10.3  18.5  4.7 
Serie Th232:  Ra22a  14.7  44.4  4.7 
Ra224  16.2  53.7  5.3 
Tl20B  5.3  16.8  1.8 
The  calculation of the  absorbed  dose  rates along 
the Catalan coast has  revealed that,  in general,  the K40 
contributes  to  a  major  degree  to  the  dose  rate 
corresponding  to  the  majority of the  samples  studied. 
Likewise,  the  contribution  of  the  thorium  series is 
always  higher  than  that  of  the  uranium  series. 
Moreover,  the  contribution  of  the  artificial 
radionuclides,  Cs137  mainly,  is minimal  in comparison 
with the contribution made  by the natural components. 
- 31  -On  the  average,  cosmic  radiation contributed  43.2% 
(276  ~Gy/y)  of  the  total  absorbed  dose  rate  on the 
Catalan  coast,  whose  mean  value  was  661  ~Gy/y.  The 
remainder  (56.8%,  385  ~Gy/y) is distributed as  follows:. 
K4o  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  36.1  % 
Series Th
232 
•••••••  14.2% 
Series U
238 
••••••••  6.4% 
Cs137  ..............  0.09% 
Others..............  0.01% 
4  - DEVELOPMENT  OF  CALIBRATION  TECHNIQUES  FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL  EXPOSURE  RATES  MONITORING. 
Commercially  available  equipment  for measurement of 
exposure  rates  usually  has  calibration  certificates 
enabling  us  to  know  a  priori  its  suitability  for 
environmental measuring.  Despite this,  the measurements 
on  which  these  certificates  are  based correspond to 
laboratory conditions that  do  not  correctly reproduce 
field conditions.  One  concern of this work has been to 
correlate  laboratory  experiments  with  the  natural 
radiation field  which,  as has been indicated above,  has 
a  complex composition. 
In order  to achieve  these  aims,  our work  follows 
two  guidelines  as - regards  techniques.  The  first 
consists  of  using  well-known  photon  radiation beams 
enabling  us  to  obtain  exposure rates of the order of 
environmental  ones,  with  different  energies.  In 
addition,  a  TLD  dosimetric  system was  set in motion, 
enabling us to  obtain  good  sensitivity  and effective 
control of  fading  ,  in order to study in the field the 
problems  relating to the anisotropy of the field and its 
energy spectrum. 
4.1  Development  of  a  calibration  protocol  in the 
laboratory 
A  calibration  protocol  was  experimented  in  the 
laboratory in  order to  calibrate the  monitors used in 
the environmental radiological surveillance networks,  in 
particular  the  Catalan  network  analysed  previously. 
Since,  this equipment is designed to measure  the natural 
background  and  its  fluctuations,  its  calibration 
presents specific  characteristics  and  greater demands 
than for most  radiation meters. 
Two  types  of  commercially available  envi~onmental 
radiation measuring  equipment were  calibrated,  one was 
an ionization  chamber with  high pressure  gas,  and the 
other  a  Geiger  Muller  detector,  belonging  to  the 
Regional  environmental  network analysed.  The  calibration 
took place with the sources of 
137Cs  of  74  .  10
6  Bq  and 
241Am  of  74  .  10
8  Bq.  It is displayed in fig.  4.1  the 
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polar response  on  the horizontal plane. 
Figure <C.1.  Polar response to radiation of two  com~ercial radiation  monitors. 
270  270 
a) Ionization chamber equipment 
b)  Geiger probe equipment 
The  measurements  displayed  reveal  significant 
anisotropy in  the Geiger  probe detection system,  which 
increases  as  the  inciding  radiation  energy 
decreases.This anisotropy  translates,  in practice,  into 
an underestimation · of  the  mean  dose.  This  problem 
decreases  considerably  if  the Geiger probe is removed 
from  the protective box.  This  latter geometry  is more 
symmetrical  and  eliminates  the  absorption  of  the 
inciding beam  in the  other  components  contained in the 
box.  The  spherical geometry of the detection system with 
the  ionization  chamber  allows  us  to  achieve  a 
practically isotropic response to the radiation. 
For  low  energies  (60  keV),  both systems display low 
efficiency  (44%).  In  the  case  of  the  Geiger probe 
detector,  this efficiency substantially increases  (78%) 
when  the probe  is removed  from  the protective box. 
4.2  Environmental  radioactivity  measurement  using 
thermoluminiscent dosemeters. 
This work,  in progress,  has  been divided into two 
stages:  in the initial stage we  proceeded to  optimize  a 
thermoluminescent  dosemetric  system  enabling  us  to 
evaluate the environmental dose  levels and  minimize the 
influence  of  changeable  atmospheric  conditions;  the 
second stage aims  to analyse the influence of the energy 
spectrum of environmental radiation on the response  from 
the detectors  and to  estimate  a  factor that evaluates 
angular  and  energy  response  from  the TLD  detector.The 
methodology proposed can be  summarised in the fig.  4.2.1 
and  4.2.2. 
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5  DEVELOPMENT  OF  A  NEW  ELECTROMETER  FOR  USE  IN 
MEASURING  ENVIRONMENTAL  RADIOACTIVITY. 
The  study of the  reliability  and  consistency of 
the  indications  for  the  monitors  habitually used in 
environmental radiological surveillance programs,brought 
us to  develop a  new  electrometer to equip the monitors 
that would  serve as  reference.  This electrometer,  in 
fixed installations,  ought to make  possible the eventual 
use of  low pressure chambers  in  which the  thickness of 
the wall  would not  hamper  measurement  of  the  low  gamma 
component of  the field  and,  in  portable monitors,  the 
use of  high pressure  chambers  of  reduced size in order 
to have  lighter and more  manageable  instruments. 
An  analysis of  the present state of  the art of very 
low  intensity  current electrometry  reveals that one  of 
the basic elements  to be  borne  in  mind  if  we  aim to 
obtain precise  results with  systems  for measuring very 
low  intensity currents is: 
- 34  -If 
the  systematic  errors  introduced  by  the  real 
characteristics  of  the  components  forming  the basic 
circuits 
the  random statistical errors caused by the  nature 
of  the  current  detected  and  the  measuring  process 
employed. 
A systematic examination of  the different causes of 
error  and  the  ·elaboration  of  the  corresponding 
predictive models  for  the  systems with  an electrometric 
amplifier,  brought  out  that  the  charge  collection 
current  integrator  systems  (C.C.C.I.S.)  with  two 
comparators  and  initial  conditions  (  the  diagram 
principle for these systems is shown  in figure  5.1)  are 
the ones  that offer the best qualities. 
...  -
F~g. 5.1  Basic  circuitry  for  an  integrator  of  the  current  with  constant 
charge collection, two comparators and initial c:Ondilions. 
5.1.  The  basic circuitry of the electrometer developed 
The  diagram of the basic circuitry of  the electrometer 
developed appears in figure  5.2.  The  main contributions 
of this circuitry compared to that of figure  5.1 are: 
1.  Incorporation of  a  device  that enables us to 
calculate the error current through  a  suitable measuring 
process we  shall describe later. 
2.  It includes another  L4  switch which  remains  off 
during measurements  and  thus  connects  to  mass  the  L1 
switch terminal. 
3.  As  in  these  systems  it  is  not  strictly 
necessary for Voa  = 0  ,  because with  suitable choice of 
initial conditions the error that  Voa  introduces in the 
or1g1n  is  eliminated,  we  can  do  without  the  R2 
resistence from  the compensation  system of  Ip. 
As  regards  the  integration condenser  and the one 
providing the Ic  current,  together  with  the  ramp 
generator,  these  were  the  same.  They must  have  a  very 
high  leakage resistence and  as  stable  a  capacitance as 
possible,  which  can be calculated either through careful 
calibration  or  else  directly  by  geometrical 
considerations. 
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Fig.5.2  The  basic circuitry of the  electrometer developed. 
These  conditioning  factors  were  fulfilled  by 
designing  a  cylindrical  condenser  with  air dielectric 
and  a  guard  ring  structure  eliminating  the  leakage 
current between the electrodes of the condenser. 
A  lengthwise section of  the  condenser,  in which 
the structure  of this  element can  be  seen,  appears in 
figure  5.3. 
Its capacitance  can  be  calculated geometrically 
with a  precision of over one per thousand. 
These results  show that both the tolerance  and  the 
temperature  coefficient  are  at  least  one  order  of 
magnitude  smaller than the values that characterize high 
value resistences. 
The measuring  process  consists  basically  of  two 
stage: 
during the  first stage,  the integration condenser 
integrates the total current  formed  by  the measurement 
current  I  and  the error current  If,  and  the time  ot 
taken by the  system  to pass  from  the  threshold of the 
first comparator to that of  the  second is measured. 
during the  second stage  which begins  when  the Ic 
current,  of  sign opposed  to  that  for  measurement,  is 
injected into  the system,  the total  current that will 
produce the discharge of the integration condenser is 
Ic  +  If.  The  time ot'  is measured. 
5.2  Experiments  aimed  at  checking  the instrument's 
response 
The  electrometer  was  subjected  to a  measurement 
checking  process  under  very  diverse  conditions  as 
regards  the  temperature  inside  the instrument,  ranging 
from  measurements  at ambient  temperature to measurements 
under  extreme conditions with intervals of  sharp thermal 
gradients. 
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Fig.  5.3  Lengthwise section of the Integration capac:ltor. 
The  main  aim of the plan of experiments 
designed was  to calculate with what degree of  prec~s~on 
the unit designed could measure currents of the order of 
the  fA. 
In order  to obtain  this current,  a  ramp generator 
and  the calibration condenser were  used.  The  capacitance 
of  this  generator  was  evaluated,  by  geometrical 
considerations,  at  10.5194  pF  and that the slope of the 
ramp  generator  was  I  mV/s,  the intensity of the current 
supplied by the whole  could  be  estimated  at  10.5194 
fA. 
5.3  Results 
a)  Measurements  at ambient 
At  a  temperature  of 
electrometer corresponded to 
steady between  25.7°C  and 
were  obtained: 
I  =  (10.5188  ±  0.0099)fA 
temperature 
25°C,  which  inside  the 
a  temperature that remained 
26°C,  the following results 
If =  (-0.3789  ±  0.0063)fA 
in which  the first  term of  the  second member  of these 
equalities is the mean  value,  and  the  second  is the 
typical deviation corresponding to a  series of ten read-
outs.  This result  represents  a  relative error  of  the 
order of  0.0054%  in the measurement of intensity  I 
b)  Measurements at variable temperature 
Series  of  read-outs  were  made  at  different 
temperatures between  14°C  and  50~  under  very diverse 
conditions,  and  in some  of  these series with variations 
that represented sharp thermal gradients. 
- 37  -The  overall  result  reflecting  70  read-outs 
corresponding to  85  effective hours  of measurement under 
very varied ambient  conditions was: 
10.4740  ±  0.0495  fA 
where  the  first term is the mean  of  the different means 
and  the  second the typical deviation of this  mean.  The 
relative error was  0.43%  . 
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III.  DEVEl.DPMENT  OF  MOBILE  UNITS  FOR  EMERGENCY 
ACfiON  IN  CASE  OF  NUCLEAR  ACCIDENT 
P.  PELLfRIN,  J.  P.  MORONI 
SCRPI  ,  Le  Vasinet  (F) 
Aim  of the contratct 
The  french legislation and regulations give to the Minister in charge of the 
Public Health and of the Workers,  a  prominent responsibility in nuclear field :  the 
responsibility to guaranty, in regard of the population and of the workers,  that the 
, development and  the use of this form  of energy could not be a  menace  for public and 
professional hygiene. 
Prevention and control are the bases of this action, but they shall be 
completed by  the conception,  the realisation and  the maintenance of a  system able to 
alert in case of accident,  and to perform measurements  on  the field. 
The role of the SCPRI  has been developed,  since it 
1 s  origin, on  these two 
complementary levels. When  the <hernobyl accident occured,  the SCPRI  was  asked to 
send on  the place one of it 
1 s  mobile laboratories; it became  evident, due to the 
difficulties encountered locally to assess the environnemental and human 
contamination,  and the efficiency and flexibility of the mobile unit lend by  the 
SCPRI,  that such mobile laboratories were well fitted to the action in case of 
accident;  the idea of the french authorities to develop,  improve and test these 
units was  thus reinforced. 
It was  the object of the present contract with the EEC. 
The  aim was  the development of mobile ganuna  spectrometry units,  simple, 
standard and  fiable,  able to perform,  on  the field,  in particularly difficult 
conditions created by  the nuclear accident,  controls of large amounts  of pqpulations 
(internal contamination by  gamma  emitters) or environnemental assessments  (liquid as 
well as solid samples)  in large number;  this implies a  great robustness of the 
materials, of the procedures, of the computer codes.  This excludes  too much 
sophistication,  the aim being the efficiency. 
In addition, it has to be noted that these units have been planed with the 
idea of possible intervention not only into french territory, but in other 
cotmtries,  and mainly into EEC  countries. 
Scheme  of action in case of accident 
To  be  able to well understand the role of mobile spectrometric units in case 
of accident, it is necessary to have  a  look on  the scheme  of the action in case of 
nuclear accident. 
- 39  -The duty of the SCPRI,  precised by  the french regulations,  aims  to 
- coordinate,  since the moment  the alert is given,  the several teams 
performing measurements  on  the field 
- assess the radioactivity of the environnement and of men 
- gather and pool all this information,  and draw maps  of ambient exposure,  of 
airborne activity, of soil and food contamination 
- on  this basis, evaluate the sanitary situation and select the accurate 
cotmter-measures to be applied by the authorities. 
The  time-sequence of such actions way  be defined as follows  : 
1) The first measurements concern the external exposure to the plume,  against 
which prompt sheltering may  be effective. Of  course,  the earliest data on 
external exposure to a  plume are given by plume diffusion codes,  which are 
immediately rtm by the SCPRI,  as soon as the term-source is known.  But these 
are theoretical results, which shall be confirmed,  as soon as possible, by 
real measurements. 
To  do  so,  the french regulation imposes  to the owner of the power-plant to 
be able to put immediately into action at least two  mobile tmits,  to check 
the dose rates, at the vicinity of the plant. 
The data gathered in this way  will complete the data given by the fix 
stations of ambiant gannna  ray doses,  four of which are set at 1  km  arotmd 
the plant, in four  directions selected according to the main wind 
directions;  the other four are located at five kilometers of the power-
plant, in the same directions. 
2) Very rapidely too,  surface contamination measurements can be made.  This 
implies, nonetheless, cotmting devices;  a  first set of measurements  may  be 
done using total gamma  or beta cotmting.  But it is convenient to rapidely 
complete these crude estimations, by spectrometric analyses. 
3) Air monitoring implies the collect of aerosols on filters or charcoal 
cartidges. '!his is permanently done by the fix installations above 
mentionned; it is,  thus,  easy to have quick information with mobile tmits 
able to rapidely circle arotmd  the power-plant, collect the samples and make 
a  five minutes cotmt.In addition to that,  the mobile units embark vacuum 
devices able to collect more  filters and cartidges on the field. 
4) These measurements  enable the sanitory authority to evaluate the situation 
and  to decide if early countermeasures are necessary. These countermeasures 
are  :  evacuation,  home  sheltering, distribution of stable iodine pellets. 
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Speaking of countermeasures, it is important to bear in mind  that they may 
include adverse effects, which might in some  cases be severe;  thus,  one 
shall resist to the temptation to take remedial action as a  reflex response 
in accident situations.  On  this point,  the ICRP  is clear  : 
"unless a  limit would  to be exceeded by a  considerable amount,  the risk 
"would still be  sufficiently low  as not to warrant such countermeasures as 
'\rould themselves  involve significant risk or undue cost" (ICRP  PUB  26  and 
PUB  40). 
It is, consequently,  absolutely necessary to have good  evaluations of the 
real situation in regard of possible immediate exposure (essentially 
external),  and as far as possible on  subsequent delayed exposure 
(essentially internal),  to decide remedial action. This implies several 
measurements  on  the field;  one may  not rely only on diffusion computer 
codes;  these,  in fact, act only as guide to plan measurements.  The  need of 
well equiped,  prompt  to be put into action mobile units, is thus evident. 
5) The  early stage of the accident being over, it does not mean  that there is 
no more  need of measurements,  on  the contrary. 
To  confirm the early remedial actions,  taking into account that home 
sheltering can hardly last more  than 24  hours,  to plane relocation when 
needed, it is necessary to caraterize more  precisely the environnemental 
contamination. This requires a  great lot of analyses. 
At  this stage the sanitary authorities shall also provide clear information 
about food const.nnption,  which also is a  matter of sample measurements. 
And,  finally,  one shall be able to perform lots of body burden measurements. 
Sheltered and evacuated people shall be measured;  people living in the zone 
near to the evacuated area shall be measured.  But  there will probably be an 
even greater demand  of measurements  for psychological reasons. It is 
essential to be able to tranquillize people,  since worried people may  have 
unpredictible reactions which may  drive to adverse consequences. 
6) The  final phase of post-accidental actions,  the phase of recovery,  needs 
also an important lot of measurements,  as for example  to check 
decontaminated areas. 
A versatile spectrometry unit. 
Before  the Cllernobyl  accident occured,  the SCPRI  developed a  first model  of 
a  double ganuna  spectrometry unit. This unit was  intended to equip the railroad wagon 
which was  built by  the SCPRI  and  the SNCF  (french railroad national company)  at the 
demand  of Mme  Veil in the name  of Europa. 
- 41  -This wagon  has been achieved in 1986.  But  the use of this basic spectrometric unit, 
initially called "Gemini-gamma"  since it associates  two  gamma  spectrometric tmits, 
has not been restrited to the railroad car. 
It has also been used on  microcars and,  finally,  as fix units which now  are 
the standard material for gamma  spectrometry in the medical services of the french 
power plants. We  shall describe these different uses. 
In the meantime,  the initial version,  Gemini  gamma,  was  modified to take in 
accotmt the feedback of experience gained,  and particularly in USSR  where it has 
been widely used,  as we  shall see below,  after the Chernobyl accident.  After having 
been called "Super Gemini",  it is nowadays  the "Super Gemini  90" version. 
This tmit is basically a  double spectrometric seat, of the shadow shield 
type.  Two  seats and the corresponding detectors are associated in a  single tmit, 
linked by  a  single metallic column as support of the detectors  (see fig. 1). 
The  detectors are soditm1  iodide crystals. One,  of 3  inches x  3  inches, is 
located in front of the chest of the person. The  second detector,  of 2  inches x  1 
inch,  is intended for the measurement of the thyroid activity. The detectors are 
protected by antimony-lead alloy shields;  the first one,  conic in shape,  allows  the 
detector to "see" a  zone corresponding to the lungs and the stomach.  The  second 
detector,  shielded by a  cylindric tube,  is adjustable to fit the neck of the person, 
in front of the thyroid gland. 
The  seats are shielded with 5  em  of antimony-lead alloy,  in all directions 
covering the angle of aperture of the two  detectors shieldings. 
In the "Supergemini 90" version,  the coltnnn  supporting the 4 detectors is 
mobile vertically, and both seats are independantly mobile along an horizontal line. 
Moreover,  the cushion of the seats may  be removed,  to permit the installation of a 
little strecher across the seat. These features are intended to do  a  very versatile 
tool of this basic unit. In it's most  common  use,  the tmit is intended to measure 
the chest and  the thyroid activities. The  choice of the thyroid,  as we  shall see 
later, is evident.  As  for the chest and  stomach region, it covers both routes of 
possible entry of the contamination in case of accident (if one excepts wounds, 
which obviously would constitue a  particular case,  which can be dealth with easily 
with this unit if necessary).  So,  the most  common  use of this spectrometers is 
intended to check airborne or digestive contamination,  two  routes to look at in case 
of a  nuclear accident. 
But  the mobility of the column  along the vertical axis and  the possibility 
to rotate of 90  degrees in both senses the detectors and  their shields also alows  to 
inspect other parts of the body  when  necessary.  If, as an example,  one is willing to 
inspect a  part of the body  mainly composed  of muscle,  it is easy to rotate the 
shield of the 3  x  3  inches crystal so as to let the crystal face down,  and locate it 
on  the thighs of the person. 
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A not uncommon  case which occurs in little contamination incidents is the ingestion 
(or inhalation with consecutive ingestion) of small activities of insoluble metallic 
oxydes  (cobalt 58  mainly) which goes  through the gastrointestinal fract without 
being absorbed;  in such cases, it is possible to follow the migration along the GI 
tract, using the 2 x  1  inch probe;  the crystal being,  in this case, at the extremity 
of the cylindrical shield, may  comme  in close contact with the abdomen,  and  the 
location of the hot particle may  be precised. 
Primarily intended for htnnan  spectrometry,  this device has been adapted for 
sample cotmting;  many  geometries can be adopted;  a  5 liters conic ftmnel able to 
contain soil, grass,  food,  milk  ••• ,  can be fitted to the shield of the 3  x  3  inches 
probe,  in normal position,  the funnel  taking the place of the chest of the person. 
But  the probe may  as well be rotated face up,  to put on  the 3  x  3  inches crystal a 
cylindric 1  liter flask,  for quick urinalyses for exemple.  In this case,  a  lead lid 
of 5 em  covers the sample.  (Fig 2) 
'Ihe multichannel analyser used is the "serie 35+"  Canberra,  4096  channels. 
The data are collected by an Amstrad  6128  computer  (128  k bytes of central memory, 
plus 360  k  bytes floppy disk). This tmi  t  is intended to output results, without any 
help of external computing;  but, when  very large amotmt  of people is being 
monitored,  as it happened in USSR  with the microcar which was  lent to the soviet 
sanitary authorities, it may  be useful! to just collect rough data on  floppy disks, 
and use an external device (possibly another microcomputer of the same  type,  or a 
larger one if statistical processing or mass  storage is intended) for final 
processing. 
For emergency measurement,  it is sufficient to use 200  channels for each 
probe;  energy calibration is made  on  the basis of 10 kev. per chatmel,  the normal 
explored range being 100  kev - 2  MeV.  The  cotmting time may  be easily reducted to 5 
minutes. This being so,  the whole process lasts less than 10 minutes,  including 
processing and printing time. Therefore it is possible to check 24  persons per hour 
in a  microcar Master equiped with 4  seats  (2 tmits),  72  persons per hour in the 
trailer (see description below)  and 192  persons per hour in the railroad carriage 
equiped with 32  seats. 
With such a  counting time,  the measurement  threshold obtained for common 
ganuna  emitters is rather good.  For 137  Cs  it is of 1500 becquerels for the chest 
region (corresponding to 4500  becquerels for the whole body).  This represents a 
small fraction of the correspondant Annual  Limit Intake (for ingestion :  4 000  000 
becquerels for workers,  400  000  Bq  for population).  For 131  Iodine,  the situation is 
similar,  the measurement  threshold for thyroid being 200  becquerels when  ALI  for 
ingestion is 1  000  000  Bq  for workers  and 100 000  for public. It has  to be noted 
that what we  intended as "measurement  threshold" is the lower limit of activity that 
gives a  counting precision of not less  than  20%  with a  confidence level of 95%.  If 
we  consider,  as it is a  rather common  use,  a  result exposed as activity± two  sigma, 
then the threshold becames  five times  lower  (900  Bq  for 137  Cs  for example). 
- 43  -The  efficiency of these tmits is,  then,  very good  for emergency 
measurements,  even if the cotmting time is reduced to 5 minutes.  Of  course,  this 
result has been obtained in normal backgr01..md  conditions,  and it is clear that in 
case of accident the backgrotmd will be  higher.  But  the thresholds are sufficiently 
low  to allow reasonable increases in the background without impairing dangerousely 
the quality of the results, especially when  we  bear in mind  the fact that it is only 
the square root of the background total counts which influences the counting 
precision. 
The mobile units. 
1) The  tiniest of the mobile units of the SCPRI  using Gemini  gamma  is a 
microcar "Master 1500" Renault;  the effective carrying capacity is 600  kg, 
with a  maximal  speed of 130 km/h;  according to the french regulations,  the 
driving licence for the cars is sufficient to drive it. The  Master is 
equiped with 4  seats (2 Gemini  ganuna),  one multichannel analyzer and one 
microcomputer.  24  persons or samples may  be monitored per hour.  The 
experience gained up to now  proves that a  total of 400 persons or samples 
may  be monitored  par day,  providing technicians staff way  interchange 
during the day. 
The  electrical supply may  be provided by 
- public network when  available 
- batteries (10 hours autonomy) 
- generating set (a portable set using gazoline) 
The  Masters are linked one-another and to the headquarters also, with high-
frequency radiotelephones.  Two  technicians are needed to run this mobile 
unit.  (Fig 3  and 4) 
2) The  semi-trailer lorries. 
The  SCPRI  has equiped two  20  tons semi-trailers; one of them  is loaded with 
4  strecher-type total body units,  and is out of the scope of this paper. The 
other one includes 12  seats  (6 Super-Gemini),  plus a  radiochemistry and  a 
photographic dosimetry laboratory. It's capacity may  be raised up to 1500 
samples or persons monitored per day.  (Fig 5  and 6) 
3) The  railroad coach. 
This coach has a  length of 24,5 meters,  a  width of 3 meters,  and a  carrying 
capacity of 18  tons. It's technical features  (bogies,  brakes •••  )  enables it 
to be inserted in a  200  km  par hour train  •  It includes a  70  kVA  generator 
for electrical autonomy.  (Fig 7 and 8) 
- 44  -It is equiped with 32  seats  (16  Gemini-gamma  units),  that is 64  crystal 
probes;  4 multichannel analyzers and 4  microcomputeurs are linked to the 
seats. This modular  fonnula is mainly intended to avoid complete shut-down 
of the couting capacity in case of electronical defect. 
The  alley in the middle of the coach is large enough  to admit more 
spectrometric t.mits  to be added.  The  floor has been provided with mechanical 
parts enabling the set-up of up  to 16  more  seats;  But  the most  common  use of 
this ~ty  place is the addition of one or two  sophisticated spectrometric 
units (as for example germanium detector units) according to the necessity 
of the intervention. 
About  10 people are needded  tu run properly this lot of spectrometric units, 
which may  provide up  to 5000  examens  per day.  Of  course,  such a  large-scale 
screening supposes an additional organization : 
- Preparation of the people being monitored (name  and address,  changing 
clothes if necessary  •••  ) 
- Treatment and storage of results. 
The  SCPRI  works  in close contact with the specialists of the DSC  (Civilian 
Security Department)  for this purpose and,  among  other decisions,  a  second 
railroad coach has been buyed and will be equiped jointly,  to serve as a 
necessary extention of spectrometric railroad coach. 
4)  Up  to now,  the SCPRI  possesses 
- 7 microcars Master 
- 2  trailers 
- 1 railroad coach. 
This enables a  total of CIRCA  12000 measurements  per day. 
In addition,  the SCPRI  has already built 4 more  Master microcars 
- 1  for the medical service of the CEA  (Atomic  Energy  Commission) 
- 1  for the military sanitary service 
- 2 for the sanitary authorities of the CMIR  (Mobile radiologic 
intervention groups) of the DSC  (cf supra). 
There are 16  CMIR  in France (and it is foreseen  to goup  to 25);  one more 
CMIR  is being equiped at this moment  by  the SCPRI;  the other ones will also 
be equiped,  according to a  medium-term  program. 
- 45  -One  may  now  foresee that, in a  not far future,  the french territory will be 
covered with units able to react promptly in case of nuclear accident,  and 
it will become  possible that large-SCALE  screening could be initiated within 
one  two  hours after an accident. 
Experience gained in intervention field. 
1) When  the Olernobyl accident occured,  the french sanitary authorities 
proposed to USSR  sanitary authorities to lend them  a  mobile unit to monitor 
people on a  large scale around the power plant. There was  the possible 
choice between the railroad coach and  the microcar.  The  advantage of the 
railroad coach was  the number  of seats, allowing 5000  exams  per day.  But 
there were  two  inconvenients for use in USSR;  the first was  the gauge of 
railway track, which is larger in USSR  than in Europe;  the second was  in 
fact the major inconvenient,  since the track gauge problem may  be solved 
it was  the fact that the railroad network is not very compact in USSR  •  It 
is more  easy to go  anywhere,  in villages, with a  microcar than with a 
railroad coach.  For these reasons,  the USSR  sanitary authorities choosed to 
borrow the microcar. 
The  25th of february 1987,  the microcar Master Gemini  number  01  was 
embarked on a  soviet cargo sailing to Riga.  The  experience lasted about one 
year,  and several  tens of thousand people have been monitored. 
Of  course,  this first use in a  real situation was  of great interest for us. 
The  mobile laboratory proved to be easy to run,  flexible and robust (in 
conditions of roads and climate,  more  severe than in our countries). The 
experience lead to many  improvements,  as well on  the material himself (it 
was  the first version of Gemini,  modified since, according to the 
experience) as on  the procedures. 
One  major point in this trip was  to avoid contamination of the material, 
with it's consequence of alteration of the background.  Many  precautions were 
taken,  as for example  the use of removable paint for sonune  external parts of 
the car. They  proved to be effective, since the contamination was  very .low 
when  the car returned in our laboratories,  and there has not be difficulties 
in interpreting spectra due  to high background. 
Another experience is being conducted at this moment.  The  first of july of 
1990,  another Master Gemini  microcar was  sent by road in Ukrain and 
Bielorussia, under the sponsorship of IAEA,  to run around making 
measurements until the 15th of september 1990. 
In addition,  France gave  two  fix Super Gemini  installations to the local 
sanitary authorities,  in Ukrain and in Belorussia. 
- 46  -All this constitutes a  very interesting source of feedback informations to 
improve  the material as well as the methods.  But,  as it is the case when  one 
is confronted with large scale operations in real conditions, ·where one  may 
not discard part of the parameters like in exercises,  things are not simple 
and gatheing useful! information is a  rather time-consuming work. 
2) This does nevertheless not prevent us making exercises. French authorities 
organises at  least one large scale exercise every year.  These exercises 
concern power  plants or other nuclear installations, where are supposed  to 
occur important accidents implying the release of large quantities of 
radioelements. 
The  last exercise was  in june this year,  on  the power plant of Belleville-
sur-Loire. The  SCPRI  sent on  the field the railroad coach,  one of the 
lorries and one of the Master Gemini  microcars.  One  of the QfiR of the civil 
Safety Department  (DSC)  sent also one their Master Gemini  microcars which, 
as we  said above,  are absolutely identical to the SCPRI  ones. 
Since organisms others than the SCPRI  uses Master Gemini  microcars,  built by 
the SCPRI  (DSC,  CEA,  Armies),  the SCPRI  provides a  periodic training of the 
staffs from  these external organisms.  Training courses includes 15  days of 
theoretical and pratical training on  the Master Gemini  spectrometric units, 
and also on all the problems which may  occur when  nmning a  laboratory 
microcar. 
3) Gemini  an Supergemini units are now  widely used in France,  as well on mobile 
tmits as on fix installations. Let us remind that every power plant's 
medical service is now  equiped with Super-Gemini  spectrometric units; all 
medical services have more  than one installations, and the number  of 
installations in service is constantly increasing. 
Forttmately, real internal contaminations are very rare in french power 
plants. This good situation has  the disadvantage to provide scarce occasions 
to intercompare materials on  l:xxiy  burden evaluation.  But,  due  to the low 
measurement  threshold of the Super Gemini,  improved by the fact that in 
routine situations the cotmting time may  be increased up  to, reasonably,  30 
minutes,  intercomparisons are possible on a  routine basis. They  involve, 
apart from  the Super Gemini,  more  sophisticated installations, like the 100 
tons steel room  of our laboratory  • 
Calibrations are done with phantoms.  Our  service has developed a  technique 
allowing to incorporate radioelements on rubber foam,  thus making  phantoms 
of various sizes and densities. 
The  experience gained in the Olernobyl accident teached us  that,  among  the 
many  radioelements one may  find in a  reactor core,  few  have an operational 
interest in case of accident.  Speaking of radioelements,  and on  an overall 
point-of-vue,  four situations may  be distinguished in monitoring  : 
- 47 -- the atmospheric military tests accustomed us  to deal with the isotopes 
of iodine,  cesium,  strontium,  zirconium,  ruthenium,  baryum and so on 
- the monitoring of workers  in medical and research field implies a  very 
wide range of isotopes 
- the routine monitoring of power  plants workers  leads to find more 
frequently minor activities of activation products as 58  and  60  Go, 
54  Mn,  51  Cr and  so on,  than fission products. 
- the Chernobyl accident could have let believe, at first look,  that the 
situation would  have been similar to the atmospheric tests situation; 
in fact, it was  very different,  since a  bomb  volatilizes and spreads 
allover all the fission prcxlucts,  when  in a  reactor accident,  the 
only fission prcxlucts being released are the one which have  the 
lowest fusion temperature. 
As  it could be verified, fission prcxlucts with high fusion temperatures like 
strontium 90,  represented a  very low percentage of total activity, if one 
excepts  the very close vicinity of the reactor. The  isotopes measured in 
France with a  percentage higher than 1%  of the total activity are : 
99  Mo,  103 Ru,  106  Ru,  129 Te,  132 Te,  131  I, 134  Cs,  136  Cs,  137  Cs 
and  140 Ba. 
Of  these isotopes,  two  only are of real interest on  the sanitary point of 
vue:  131  !exline since it is able to deliver high thyroid doses within the 
first days,  and 137  Cs  since it is the remaining contaminant after some 
years and for long time. 
It is evident that in accident circumstances,  large scale screenings suppose 
that one knows  the relevant isotopes and has adapted the computer ccxle  to 
it; this task has been completed,  as far as possible due  to the present 
data.  Improvements  are, of course, still possible. 
Conclusion. 
<Xte  thing is sure  :  we  can put into action now  many  mobile tmits, as well 
for the french territory than  for whole  Europe,  in cas of nuclear accident. The 
tmi  ts exist, more  are tmder construction,  and  they have been  tested tmder real 
conditions in the Olernobyl region. This is a  very positive result. 
Much  works  has still to be done.  The  feedback of the USSR  experience with 
the Gemini-Gamma will keep coming;  it shall be interpreted,  improvements  shall be 
foreseen,  then experienced. 
This is our task for future. 
- 48  -Fig.1  -The Supergemini  gamma  used  for  bodyburden  evaluation 
Fig.2  - The  Supergemini  gamma  used  for  sample  measurements 
- 49  -Fig.3  - View  of  the  Gemini  gamma  into  action  in  a Master  microcar 
Fig.4  - An  impressive  lot of  microcars  ready  to  be  put  into  action 
- 50  -Fig.5  -· External  view  of  the  20  tons  lorry 
Fig.6  - 12  spectrometric  units  into  the  20  tons  lorry 
- 51  -Fig.?  - The  railroad  carriage 
Fig.8  - 32  spectrometric  units  into  the  carriage 
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- 53  -ABSTRACT 
Five  instruments,  suitable  for  measuring  environmental  background  gamma 
dose  rates,  have  been  assessed  to  determine  their  suitability for  the  task 
and  ease  of  use  in  emergency  situations  such  as  those  prevailing after  the 
Chernobyl  reactor accident.  The  selection of instruments  for this evaluation 
has  been  influenced by  those  commonly  used within the European Community  for 
the task,  but one  relatively new  instrument has  also been included.  In 
addition,  an  instrument developed to discriminate between variations in 
natural and artificial gamma  emitting radionuclides  has  been evaluated. 
A  comprehensive  evaluation  programme  has  been  followed,  which  involved 
the  instruments  in  field  evaluation  as  well  as  the  more  common  laboratory 
measurements,  to  allow  the  instruments  to  be  assessed  under  realistic 
operating  conditions.  The  laboratory  measurements  have  included:  linearity 
tests to  determine  the variation in response  with  indicated dose  and/or  dose 
rate;  energy  and  polar  response,  to  investigate  response  variations  with 
changes  of energy and direction of  incident radiation respectively;  and 
environmental  tests  of  dependence  on  temperature  and  humidity.  The  battery 
life  of  each  instrument  has  also  been  determined  at  background  conditions. 
The  field  measurements  covered  a  wide  range  of  gamma  radiation  levels  and 
environmental  conditions.  The  sites  used  for  measurements  included  regions 
where  there  are  high  levels  of  natural  radionuclides  and  those  containing 
radionuclides  from  artificial sources. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  primary aim  of this work  has  been to investigate the utility of 
straightforward gamma  dose rate measurements  during nuclear emergencies.  A 
major part of  the work  has  been practical,  involving a  comparative evaluation 
of the  performance  of five portable  instruments  commonly  used for 
environmental  gamma  dose  rate measurements.  Some  of the detectors  used in 
these  instruments are also the basis of permanent  incident detection systems 
around nuclear installations. 
The  five  instruments  were  chosen for this evaluation as  being 
representative of those  most  commonly  used for  environmental  gamma  dose rate 
measurements  in European countries,  but the selection was  not exhaustive,  and 
one  instrument was  a  relatively new  model.  A comprehensive  evaluation 
programme  has  been followed,  involving laboratory measurements  akin to those 
required for  type tests,  and  also field measurements  to assess  the 
instrument's performance  under realistic operating conditions. 
The  laboratory measurements  included:  linearity tests to determine  the 
variation in response to changes  in dose  or dose rates;  energy response 
measurements  to determine variations in response  to different photon 
energies;  polar response  measurements  to investigate the variation in 
response to radiation from  different angles;  and  environmental tests to 
check variations  due  to changes  in temperature  or humidity.  Finally,  there 
were  checks  on  the battery lifetime,  an  important feature  for portable 
instruments. 
The  field measurements  were  carried out in various parts of Britain in 
weather conditions that ranged  from  warm  and dry to windy with heavy rain. 
The  sites included areas  where  there is a  high natural  gamma  ray background 
from  terrestrial sources,  an area where  deposition from  the  Chernobyl 
accident was  relatively high  and  areas in the vicinity of the Sellafield 
nuclear reprocessing plant where  the  environment  is contaminated with 
artificial radionuclides.  Measurements  were  also carried out  in a  typical 
brick-built house  and garden,  and in the Board's  low  background facility used 
for  whole  body  measurements.  The  measurements  therefore covered a  wide  range 
of gamma  radiation levels  and  environmental  conditions. 
2.  THE  ROLE  OF  GAMMA  RADIATION  MEASUREMENTS  IN  EMERGENCIES 
In the event of  a  nuclear accident releasing radionuclides  into the 
atmosphere  and  leading to deposition in the environment,  the measurement  of 
the  gamma  radiation dose  rate can provide rapid and straightforward 
indication of deposition and  the  need for  further,  more  sophisticated 
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immediate aftermath of  such an accident,  there is intense pressure  for 
measurements  to be  made  in the environment,  especially for  reassurance 
purposes,  but  also because of the potential need  for  the early introduction 
of  countermeasures.  Each countermeasures  need to be  introduced quickly 
before  laboratory measurements  on  foodstuffs  and  environmental  samples  are 
available,  and gamma  radiation measurements  can quickly delineate areas where 
countermeasures  may  be  necessary.  This  would help to ensure that resources 
for  laboratory measurements  are concentrated on samples  which may  have 
radiological significance.  The  Soviet experience in the Ukraine  and 
Byelorussia after the Chernobyl  accident also showed  the usefulness  of  gamma 
dose rate measurements  as  a  basis of early dose  assessments  after a  serious 
accident(1,2). 
In the  UK  as  in other EC  countries,  arrangements  for  responding to 
nuclear emergencies  have  undergone  considerable review since 1986,  and many 
organisations which previously had little or no  interest in radiation 
measurements  now  take a  strong interest and will have  a  measurement  role to 
play in any  future nuclear emergencies.  These  organisations  hav~ tended to 
opt for  instruments which  measure  gamma  dose  rates because of their 
straightforward nature,  compared to the techniques  required for  laboratory 
measurements  on environmental  samples  or foodstuffs.  These  developments 
should make  a  comparative  review of instruments  commonly  used in EC  countries 
of general interest. 
It is recognised that,  although gamma  dose  rate measurements  have great 
utility,  they also have  limitations especially in comparison with spectral 
measurements  using germanium  detectors.  Developments  in instrumentation are 
leading to increased portability of instruments based on germanium  detectors, 
but they.are still expensive  and require expert handling.  A straightforward 
method  of providing limited spectral information has  been developed  in the 
UK  using sodium  iodide detectors,  and this has  been used successfully to 
monitor hill farms  adversely affected by  Chernobyl  radiocaesium fallout. 
This  technique is described and  some  results presented. 
3.  THE  EVALUATION  OF  INSTRUMENTS  IN  THE  LABORATORY 
3.1  Linearity 
The  aim  of this test was  to quantify any variation in response  for  the 
full  range  dose  and/or  dose  rate over  which the  instrument  is designed to 
operate. 
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3.1.1  Method 
The  response of the instrument to the 662  keV  gamma  radiation from  137Cs 
was  determined over the complete  range of dose  and/or dose  rate for  each 
instrument.  The  response is defined as  the ratio of the indicated dose  or 
dose  rate to the true dose  or dose  rate at the position of the centre of the 
detector,  determined in the absence  of the detector. 
3.1.2  Results 
The  results of these measurements  are presented in Section 1  of each 
compilation,  as  an overall mean  for all ranges  of either dose  and/or dose 
rate,  along with the associated standard deviation.  The  response factors  for 
dose rate measurements  were  all within ± 10%  of the  known  dose rate over 
their range of use,  with the exception of the Mini  Instruments  6-80,  which is 
designed to have  a  mean  response factor of about  0.72 on its analogue  display 
(the digital display on  this instrument is normally used for  dose  rate 
measurements).  For integrated dose  measurements  the results were  similarly 
good,  with the exception of the  MAB  605  which  showed  an unusually low 
response  over  the range. 
3.2  Energy Response 
The  objective of these measurements  was  to determine  the variation in 
the response of the instrument with photon energies typical of those which 
might  be  found  in the environment  following  an accidental release. 
3.2.1  Method 
All measurements  were  made  at a  fixed indicated dose  or dose  rate.  The 
radiation qualities used were  those  recommended  by  the  International 
Standards  Organisation(3).  The  X-ray qualities used were  from  the  ISO  Narrow 
series of reference filtered X-radiations  with effective energies  between 33 
keV  and  248  keV.  The  gamma  radiations  used were  those  from  137Cs,  226Ra  and 
6 °Co  sources,  using highly collimated beams. 
3.2.2  Results 
The  results of these measurements  are presented graphically in each 
compilation.  It is important  to note that the results are expressed in terms 
of the quantity Exposure  (C/kg)  for all instruments,  with the exception of 
the Mini  6.80,  where  the quantity is absorbed dose  to air in free air and  the 
Bicron Microsievert,  where  the quantity is Ambient  Dose  Equivalent H*  (10). 
All results are normalised to unity at  662  keV  {
137Cs).  The  results  for  the 
- 57  -five  instruments are  sho~~ in Figures  1,  4,  7,  9  and 11.  The  Szintomat 6134A 
and the  MAB  605  had  the best energy response  over the range  30  keV  to 
1.25  MeV.  The  other instruments had relatively poor  responses  below  60  keV, 
but this is to be  expected for  Geiger Muller detectors and especially for the 
thick walled high pressure ionisation chamber  of the Reuter  Stokes  RS-112. 
For  measurements  in the environment  following  an accident at a  nuclear power 
station or reprocessing plant,  a  poor response  below  60  keV  is not  likely to 
be  important. 
3.3  Polar Response 
These  measurements  were  performed to determine the variation of response 
with angle of incident radiation,  and to check whether its response  was 
reasonably uniform,  sufficient to provide reliable environmental 
measurements. 
3.3.1  Method 
The  polar response of each instrument was  measured by rotating the 
instrument about the centre of its detector,  in the particular plane chosen, 
whilst keeping the radiation intensity effectively constant.  Where 
applicable,  more  than one  plane or orientation has  been examined.  The 
radiation qualities used were  those  recommended  by the International 
Standards Organisation(3).  The  X-ray qualities were  from  the  ISO  Low  and 
Narrow  series of reference filtered X-ray radiations.  The  gamma  radiations 
was  from  137Cs  in a  highly collimated beam. 
3.3.2  Results 
Again the results of these measurements  are presented graphically in the 
compilation of results for  each instrument.  The  results are normalised to 
unity in the normal  direction of use,  and are  shown  in Figures  2,  3, ·5,  6,  8, 
10,  12  and  13.  The  polar responses  of  some  instruments were  measured in two 
distinct orientations.  It was  expected that the response of the Mini 
Instruments  6-80 with a  cylindrical detector,  and  the Reuter  Stokes  RS-112 
with a  spherical detector,  should be virtually perfect when  the detectors are 
placed in their normal  field positions.  This  was  confirmed for  the RS-112 
(Figure  12)  because  no  such polar response measurements  had been carried out 
at the  Board before,  for this particular instrument.  Such  a  confirmation was 
not thought necessary for  the  6.80,  because its polar response with the 
detector in the vertical position has  been published.  However  measurements 
were  made  with the detector placed horizontally in the  beam  (Figure  8). 
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3.4  Temperature  Dependence 
The  objective of these measurements  was  to determine  any  dependency of 
instrument operation on  temperature which might  make  it unsuitable  for  use  in 
the environment. 
3.4.1  Method 
Each  instrument was  placed in an  environmental  chamber  and initially 
operated at a  temperature of  20°C.  Under  these conditions,  the background 
reading and a  higher indication produced by an 
2 ~
1 Am gamma  source  were 
recorded.  The  temperature of the chamber  was  then adjusted to 0°C  and the 
instrument left for  two  hours  before further readings at background and the 
higher  indication were  once  again recorded.  This  procedure  was  then repeated 
at temperatures  of -l0°C,  -20°C  and  40°C. 
3.4.2  Results 
The  results of these tests are presented in Section 4  of the  compilation 
of results for  each instrument,  expressed as  a  percentage change  of the 
indication at the temperatures  of interest compared  to the indication at 
20°C.  In general,  the  instruments  showed  greater variations in response  due 
to temperature changes at background levels,  than to temperature  changes  when 
the source was  present.  The  exception to this was  the Automess  Szintomat 
6134A  which  showed  a  greater variation when  the  source was  present.  The  most 
stable instrument over the whole  range  of  temperature  changes  was  the Reuter 
Stokes RS-112  followed closely by  the Mini  Instruments  6-80.  The  other 
instruments,  which all used scintillation detectors,  tended to exhibit 
significant variations in response.  In particular the Bicron microsievert 
showed  some  very large variations with changes  in temperature. 
3.5  Humidity Dependence 
The  objective of these measurements  was  to determine any dependency of 
instrument operation on  humidity which  might  make  the  instrument unsuitable 
for  use in the  environment. 
3.5.1  Method 
Each  instrument was  placed in an  environmental  chamber  and initially 
operated at a  temperature  and  relative humidity of  20°C  and  60%  Rh 
respectively.  Under  these conditions,  the  background reading and  a  higher 
indication produced by  an  241Am  gamma  source  were  recorded.  The  chamber  was 
then adjusted to a  temperature  of  35°C  and  a  relative humidity of  95%  Rh  and 
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the higher indication,  were  once  again recorded. 
3.5.2  Results 
The  results of these tests are presented in Section 5  of the compilation 
of results for  each instrument,  as  the percentage  change  of the indication at 
35°C  and  95%  Rh  compared to 20°C  and  60%  Rh.  The  results are similar to 
those  for  temperature dependence  with the most  stable instruments being the 
Reuter  Stokes  RS-112  followed by the Mini  Instruments  6.80.  However,  in this 
case,  the performance of the  6-80  was  matched by the  MAB  605  which uses  a 
scintillation detector.  The  other  instruments based on scintillation 
detectors  showed  considerably more  variation in response to changes  in 
humidity,  both at background  levels and  when  a  source was  present. 
3.6  Battery Life 
The  aim  of the measurements  was  to determine  how  long the batteries 
could be  expected to power  the  instrument under  normal  operational 
conditions,  without affecting overall performance. 
3.6.1  Method 
As  applicable,  the instruments  were  either fitted with new  alkaline 
batteries or their own  internal batteries given a  full  charge prior to making 
measurements.  The  instruments  were  then continuously operated at background 
level  for  approximately eight hours  each day. 
3.6.2  Results 
The  results of these tests are presented in Section 6  of the compilation 
of results for  each instrument.  These  are quoted as  the  length of time that 
the batteries can be  expected to satisfactorily power  the  instrument,  when 
operated for  8  hrs a  day  on consecutive days.  The  Mini  Instruments ·6.80 
showed  the  longest battery life, with the capacity to operate for nearly 60 
consecutive  8  hr days.  The  Reuter  Stokes  could operate for  15  or 16 
consecutive days,  while the Bicron microsievert and the Automess  Szintomat 
6134A  could last for  8  or  9  days.  The  MAB  605  could only operate for  about 
two  consecutive  days. 
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4.  THE  EVALUATION  OF  INSTRUMENTS  IN  FIELD  CONDITIONS 
4.1  General  Requirements 
All  the  instruments considered in this study are designed to measure 
normal  background dose  rates and  to detect changes  in dose  rate caused,  for 
example,  by  the passage of a  radioactive plume  or by  deposition of 
radionuclides on the ground.  There  is a  conflict between  the  requirements 
for sensitivity to incident radiation and portability of the instrument.  In 
general the smaller,  lighter instruments  are less efficient at detecting 
small  increases in dose  rate. 
Hence  it is essential to consider not only the metrological performance 
of the instruments in a  laboratory (section 3)  but also their operation under 
typical conditions in the environment.  The  following  features  of an 
instrument were  considered to be  important. 
(a)  the rapidity with which  a  measurement  of dose rate can be  made  at normal 
levels,  which  depends  mainly on  the detector sensitivity but also on the 
choice of time constant,  for  ratemeters,  and  the method  of integration 
for other instruments; 
(b)  whether the  instrument  indicates dose rate directly or whether it 
produces  an indication that requires  further calculation; 
(c)  the display visibility; 
(d)  whether  the  instrument requires  an external timer or other equipment; 
(e)  the ease of setting up  the equipment  in the measurement  position, 
including the  prov~sion of tripods,  stands,  ease of connecting and 
disconnecting cables with wet  or gloved hands  etc; 
(f)  the  length of time  taken to unpack  and  pack the instrument  from  its 
transport case; 
(g)  whether the  instrument is fully weatherproof or requires protection from 
rain,  together with ease of cleaning and  drying; 
(h)  whether the  instrument is likely to blow  over in strong winds; 
(i)  the cost; 
{j)  the battery life in field conditions; 
(k)  the weight  and  volume,  especially in terms of the  space it takes  up 
within a  small vehicle; 
(1)  the obtrusiveness and  curiosity value. 
In contrast to the metrological  measurements  in the  laboratory,  the 
assessment of some  of the  above  features  is relatively subjective.  However, 
the  success or failure of  an  environmental  monitoring  instrument will 
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environment. 
4.2  Sites chosen for Field Measurements 
Visits were  made  to a  number  of sites by  two  people with sufficient 
experience to assess.instrument performance in the field.  The  sites covered 
a  full range of conditions in Britain,  and  are listed below: 
(a)  the interior of a  brick terrace house; 
(b)  a  garden,  away  from  large buildings,  with a  clay soil above  chalk; 
(c)  a  limestone area with a  relatively high 1  background dose rate,  which, 
at the time of the visit, was  snow  covered; 
(d)  an area of relatively high Chernobyl  deposition on  a  thin organic soil 
covering rock; 
(e)  an area of relatively high Chernobyl  deposition on  deep boggy  moorland 
which previously had a  very low  background 1  dose  rate; 
(f)  a  sandy,  pebbly beach contaminated mainly by  137Cs  as  a  result of 
discharges to sea from  nuclear fuel  reprocessing; 
(g)  a  silt estuary,  contaminated by  a  range of nuclides,  including  137Cs  and 
2 - 1Am,  as  a  result of discharges to sea from  nuclear fuel reprocessing; 
(h)  the NRPB  shielded steel room. 
The  weather  ranged from  relatively warm  and  dry conditions,  to a  day 
when  there was  intermittent heavy  rain and  a  strong wind  at a  temperature 
only a  few  degrees  above  0°C.  The  conditions are described in detail in 
Table  1. 
4.3  Indicated Dose  Rates 
The  instruments used were  marked  in a  variety of measurement  quantities. 
To  allow a  proper comparison,  the readings  have  been converted to the 
quantity air kerma,  nGy  h-
1
•  The  conversion factors  for  instruments marked 
in ~Sv h- 1  is 1  ~Sv h- 1  =  873  nGy  h- 1  to air in air and  for  those marked  in 
exposure is 1  pR  h- 1  =  8.73  nGy  h- 1  to air in air. 
The  result of the measurements  are given in Table  2,  for  each site and 
instrument.  No  corrections have  been made  to the indications with the 
exception of the Mini  Instruments  type  6-80 where  the intrinsic activity 
within the steel and glass  GM  detector contributes  0.2 counts  per second. 
The  measured  dose  rates  from  the 6-80  have  also been calculated for  two 
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responses,  that for  137Cs  and  that for  226Ra  in equilibrium with its 
daug~ters.  The  results are presented in Table  2. 
Comparison of the results indicates close  agreement  between the Mini 
Instruments  6-80  and the Reuter  Stokes  RS-112,  while  available readings with 
the  MAB  605  instrument tended to be  slightly lower,  but still very close.  In 
contrast  the Automess  Szintomat  6134A  gave  much  lower  readings  on the areas 
of natural radioactivity,  but produced a  much  closer estimation of the man 
made  component  in contaminated areas.  The  Bicron instrument almost  always 
gave  the  lowest  answer  especially in areas where  there were  only natural 
radionuclides present. 
4.4  Observations  on  instrument performance 
The  qualities,  advantages  and disadvantages  are assessed in the Tables 
3  to 14,  under the categories described in the 4.1.  A summary  of the 
performance of the individual instruments is given below. 
4.4.1  Automess  Szintomat  6134A 
This  instrument is extremely versatile and is capable of covering an 
enormous  dose  range  from  background  levels to 10  Sv  h- 1 •  However,  it is not 
easy to use  as  an unattended environmental monitor,  because its dose  function 
operates in units of 0.01  pSv  and  there is no built in timer.  It would 
normally be used in the dose  rate mode,  which  would  require a  means  of 
averaging the indication,  even on  the  longest time constant.  Its temperature 
stability is very good  for  temperatures  in the  range  -10°C  to +20°C,  but is 
poor at -20°C  and +40°C.  In addition, it requires  a  special tripod for 
unattended use,  and it is rather expensive. 
Its niche,  then,  would  be  as  an emergency  instrument,  capable of making 
good  measurements  of dose  rates significantly in excess  of background up  to 
levels of  1  Sv  h-
1
• 
4.4.2  The  Bicron Microsievert 
This  instrument is primarily a  hand held area monitor  for  the workplace, 
which is sensitive enough  for  measuring environmental  gamma  background dose 
rates.  However,  it has  a  very high change  of indication with temperature at 
background dose  rates,  enough  to rule it out  for genuine  environmental 
monitoring.  It was  otherwise light, portable,  inexpensive  and accurate,  and 
would  be  ideally suited to the·rapid measurement  of dose  rate  from  3  or  4 
times  normal  background  levels upwards. 
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This  instrument is light,  easy to use,  reliable and  inexpensive.  It is 
insensitive to changes  in temperature  and  humidity and is well  sealed against 
rain.  It is capable of producing very accurate results if the main  radiation 
components  are known,  for  example,  if 137Cs  has  been deposited on  an area for 
which the natural background is known,  and is capable of producing more  than 
adequate  answers  in previously unsurveyed areas.  Probes  and  ratemeters can 
be  interchanged in emergency  without significantly affecting the response. 
Its only disadvantages  are the need to calculate dose  rate from  the scaler 
readings  and  that it takes  longer to obtain answers  to a  given statistical 
uncertainty for  dose rate changes  of only  10%  above  background,  compared with 
some  of the other equipment  tested. 
4.4.4  MAB  605 
This  instrument is similar in operation to the  Szintomat but is in many 
ways  more  difficult to use.  The  battery charging cable was  inadequate and 
the resultant short circuit damaged  a  fuse  and  rendered the  instrument 
inoperative.  Connecting the probe to the ratemeter was  difficult.  Its 
background dose  rate stability at low  temperatures  was  very poor.  The 
calibration of the dose  range was  very poor although agreement  with the dose 
rate range in the field was  rather better.  Again,  it would  probably best be 
used as  a  dose  ratemeter in most  circumstances,  as there is no  internal 
timer,  but it has  the advantage  over  the  Szintomat of a  better dose 
resolution,  1  nSv,  although the dose  range  on  the  instrument tested was 
incorrectly marked  in units of 0.1 pSv. 
4.4.5  Reuter  Stokes  RSS-112 
This  instrument produces very accurate,  rapid answers  and  has  the 
advantage of a  large internal memory,  which  allows it to be  left out in the 
field for  several days  and  the results analysed later.  It is, however, 
extremely large,  heavy,  expensive  and not particularly easy to use.  In 
addition the background indication is temperature dependent if re-zeroing 
is not carried out after significant temperature changes.  It would  best 
be  suited as  a  transportable installed monitor  for  situations such as  an 
investigation into •
1Ar  dose  rates  from  research reactors. 
5.  THE  UTILITY  OF  INSTRUMENTS  USING  SODIUM  IODIDE  DETECTORS 
As  mentioned in Section 2,  the main  drawback  of most  portable gamma 
dose rate instruments  is the  lack of spectral  information.  In response 
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Chernobyl  a  portable instrument has  been developed which  can discriminate 
between variations in natural background radiation and  137Cs  levels in soil. 
This  instrument comprises  a  51  mm  x  51  mm  sodium  iodide detector, 
connected to a  dual channel scaler timer.  The  two  channels  are set to 
photopeak energies of 600  to 900  keV  and  900  to 1200  keV.  Channel  A is 
intended to detect  137Cs  and  13•cs in the environment while Channel  B 
provides  a  value which can be  used to predict the natural 1  component  in 
Channel  A,  thus yielding a  net  137Cs  and  13'Cs count.  This can be  converted 
to an activity per unit area,  in Bq  m- 2 •  The  instrument was  develop~d by 
John Caunt Ltd to a  specification developed by NRPB(4)for the Food  Sciences 
Division of the Ministry of Agriculture,  Fisheries and Food  (MAFF),  and based 
on  equipment already in use for  in-vivo monitoring of sheep(5). 
Various  measurements  were  made  in the environment to establish the 
utility of the instrument,  and  the results are shown  in Table  15. 
Measurements  using the dual  channel  Nai  detector and the Mini  Instruments 
6.80 have  been compared  in eight distinct environments,  ranging from.a 
garden to a  beach,  and  from  a  normal  house  to the Board's  low  background 
laboratory. 
Table  15  shows  that the garden and  a  area of moorland bog  have  very 
similar environmental  dose  rates  (70-80  nGy  h-
1
)  as measured by  the Mini 
Instruments  6-80.  However  the dual  channel  Nai  detector_ shows  clearly that 
the dose  rate in the garden is due  primarily to natural radionuclides,  while 
the moorland is contaminated by artificial radionuclides  (in this case 
primarily  137Cs  from  Chernobyl).  For the garden,  the ratio of counts per 
1000  seconds  from  Channel  A (600-900  keV)  to those  from  Channel  B 
(900-1200  keV)  is less than 2:1,  while  the  same  ratio for  the moorland bog  is 
nearly 10:1.  Similarly,  measurements  using the Mini  Instruments  6.80 in a 
house  and  on  a  beach showed  nearly identical environmental  dose  rates in the 
range  120-130  nGy  h-
1
,  while the dual  channel  Nai  detector ratio for  Channel 
A to Channel  B gave ratios of approximately 2:1 for the house  and  10:1  for 
the beach.  In the latter case,  the artificial radionuclides are  from  the 
nearby Sellafield reprocessing plant. 
The  results show  the potential utility of this type of instrument for 
making  measurements  following  an accidental release of known  composition. 
The  instrument could be  used by  relatively unskilled personnel to delineate 
contaminated and  uncontaminated areas,  once  sufficient detailed information 
on  deposited radionuclides  has  been obtained from  an intrinsic germanium 
detector,  giving spectrometric measurements  on  environmental  samples.  The 
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detection of  137Cs  in the environment.  They  could be  set alternatively to 
establish  131I  to  137Cs  ratio in the  immediate  aftermath of a  nuclear 
accident. 
6.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
Five portable instruments capable of measuring background gamma 
radiation in the  environment have  been evaluated in the laboratory and in the 
field.  Apart  from  one  relatively new  instrument,  these instruments are 
representative of those  commonly  used in EC  countries,  but the selection of 
instruments was  not exhaustive.  The  laboratory evaluation included linearity 
measurements,  energy response,  polar response,  variations due  to changes  in 
environmental  conditions,  and battery lifetime.  The  field measurements  were 
carried out in a  variety of weather conditions  and in areas that showed 
variations in natural background radiation and  levels of contamination from 
artificial radionuclides. 
Plastic scintillator instruments operating in the current mode  have  some 
disadvantages  for  environmental monitoring because of the uncertainty 
associated with changes  of temperature.  Ion chamber  instruments are less 
sensitive to changes  in temperature but the detector would  have to be very 
large to generate sufficient signal,  and therefore high pressure argon filled 
chambers  are normally used which are heavy and,  to a  minor  extent,  hazardous. 
Pulse  counting instruments,  such as  GM  detectors and proportional counters, 
are inherently more  stable with changes  in temperature  and have  simpler 
electronic circuitry,  but they do  not measure  the quantity of interest 
directly.  However,  they can be  provided with energy compensation filters, 
which  allow energy and polar responses  at least as  good  as  those of the high 
pressure ion chambers,  and which are not significantly inferior to those of 
the plastic scintillators. 
The  main  limitation of measurements  using any of the above  detectors is 
the  lack of spectral information.  The  most  accurate  information can be 
obtained from  modern  Ge  detector instruments  and there are  some  portable 
versions  on  the market.  However,  these require skilled operation and 
interpretation and,  during  an emergency,  some  simpler  instruments  could be 
invaluable.  It is possible to use  a  portable instrument utilising a  sodium 
iodide detector which  can discriminate  changes  in natural background  from 
changes  in levels of artificial radionuclides.  This  type  of  instrument is 
potentially the most  useful  in an  emergency  because it could give rapid and 
reliable information on  the extent of contamination and the potential need 
- 66  -II 
for  countermeasures.  It is recommended  that further work  be carried out to 
investigate the utility of this type  of emergency  instrument. 
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Compilation of Results  for  Specific  Instruments 
1.  AUTOMESS  - SZINTOMAT  6134A 
2.  BICRON  - MICROSIEVERT 
3.  MINI  INSTRUMENTS  - Environmental  Radiation Meter  Type  6.80 
4.  MUNCHENER  APPARATEBAU  - Dose  and Dose  Ratemeter  MAB  605 
5.  REUTER-STOKES  - RSS-112  Environmental  Monitoring System 
Figure 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Figures 
Photon Energy Response  of the Automess  SZINTOMAT  6134A 
Polar Response  of the Automess  SZINTOMAT  6134A  (Probe  out of body) 
Polar Response  of the Automess  SZINTOMAT  6134A  (Probe  within body) 
Photon Energy Response  of the  BICRON  MICROSIEVERT 
Polar Response  of the  BICRON  MICROSIEVERT  (horizontal) 
Polar Response  of the  BICRON  MICROSIEVERT  (vertical) 
Photon  Energy  Response  of the MINI  6.80 
Polar Response  of the MINI  6.80 
Photon Energy  Response  of the  MAB  605 
Polar Response  of the  MAB  605 
Photon Energy  Response  of the  REUTER-STOKES  RSS-112 
Polar Response  of the  REUTER-STOKES  RSS-112  (horizontal) 
Polar Response  of the  RUETER-STOKES  RSS-112  (vertical) 
- 68  -A1  - Compilation of results for  the Automess  Szintomat  6134A 
DESCRIPTION 
Instrument - Automess  Szintomat  6134A 
Detector  - Internal or externally mounted  44  mm  dia x  14  mm  thick plastic 
and  ZnS(Ag)  Scintillator. 
Ratemeter 
Dose  range covered 
Dose  rate range 
Power  requirements 
Features/Controls 
Size:  Electronics* 
Probe 
Weight:  Electronics 
- 0-999.99 pSv  LED  display 
- 3  full decade  (0.01  - 0.1  - 1.0 - 10)  analogue 
meter,  manual  or automatic scaling of pSv/h, 
mSv/h,  Sv/h. 
- 3  x  D cells  (R20) 
- Dose  and  dose  rate alarm settings 
- Automatic  or manual  range  selection 
- Switchable time constants  (low,  medium,  high) 
- Connection for external power  supply 
- Connection for  recorder  and  alarm level outputs 
- Provision to remove  detector from  body  of 
instrument. 
- 230  X  300  X  120  mm 
- 300  x  65  mm  dia 
- 3  kg 
Probe  and cable - 1.7kg 
* With  probe mounted  internally. 
RESULTS  OF  TESTS 
1 .  Linearity 
Response  of the  instrument to 662  keV  1  radiation from  137Cs,  determined 
over the stated ranges. 
Dose  Linearity  Response  Standard 
Factor  Deviation 
From  To 
0.05  pSv  1.0 pSv  0.94  0.075  . 
Dose  Rate  Linearity  Response  Standard 
Factor  Deviation 
From  To 
0.05  pSvh- 1  60  mSvh- 1  0.99  0.075 
·.;.  69-Al  (cont.) 
Automess  Szintomat  6134A 
2.  Photon Energy  Response 
See  Figure 1  for  the results of measurements. 
3.  Polar Response 
See  Figures  2  and  3  for  the results of measurements. 
4.  Temperature Dependence 
Percentage change  of indicated instrument reading compared to that at 
20°C,  for normal  background radiation levels and when  a  source  ( 2 ' 1Am) 
is present. 
Radiation Level  -20°C  -l0°C  0°C  40°C 
Backgroun~ 
Range  =  Auto  -2  -2  0  33 
Source present 
Range  =  Auto  -16  -9  -8  11 
5.  Humidity Dependence 
Percentage change  of indicated instrument reading compared to that at 
20°C,  60%  Rh,  for normal  background radiation levels and  when  a  source 
( 2 • 1Am)  is present. 
Radiation Level  35°C,  95%  Rh 
Background 
Range  =  Auto  51 
Source present 
Range  =  Auto  7 
6.  Battery Life 
Typical  life of new/fully charged batteries when  instrument operated for 
approximately 8  hours  per day: 
Total operating time =  62  hours. 
- 70  -If 
A2  - Compilation of results for  the  Bicron Microsievert 
DESCRIPTION 
Instrument - Bicron Microsievert 
Detector  - Tissue-Equivalent Organic Scintillator 
Ratemeter 
Dose  range covered - None. 
Dose  rate range  -Analogue meter scaled 0-2.0 in steps of 0.1. 
Five switched multipliers of x  0.1,  x  1, x  10,  x  100, 
X  1000. 
Power  requirements  - 1 or 2  PP3  batteries  (6  LR  61) 
Features/Controls  - Single rotary switch off, bat,  HV,  and  scale 
multipliers. 
Will  run off one  or two  PP3  batteries. 
Size:  - 230  x  110  x  200  mm 
Weight:  - 1.4 kg 
RESULTS  OF  TESTS 
1.  Linearity 
Response  of the  instrument to 662  keV  1  radiation from  137Cs,  determined 
over the stated ranges. 
Dose  Linearity  Response  Standard 
Factor  Deviation 
From  To 
Not 
applicable 
Dose· Rate Linearity  Response  Standard 
Factor  Deviation 
From  To 
0.4 pSvh-
1  1100  }JSvh-
1  1.01  0.072 
- 71  -A2  (cont.) 
Bicron Microsievert 
2.  Photon Energy Response 
See  Figure 4  for  the results of measurements. 
NB:  This  instrument is designed to realise the quantity 
Ambient  Dose  Equivalent H*(lO). 
3.  Polar Response 
See  Figures 5  and  6  for  the results of measurements. 
4.  Temperature Dependence 
Percentage change of indicated instrument reading compared to that at 
20°C,  for_normal  background radiation levels and when  a  source  ( 2 ' 1Am) 
is present. 
Radiation Level  -20°C  -10°C  0°C  40°C 
Background 
Range  =  x  0.1  103  79  44  -91* 
Source present 
Range  =  x  10  4  4  4  4 
* Instrument  HV  check indicated low  under  these conditions 
and instrument exhibited erratic readings. 
5.  Humidity Dependence 
Percentage change  of indicated instrument reading compared  to that at 
20°C,  60%  Rh,  for normal  background radiation levels and when  a  source 
( 2' 1Am)  is present. 
Radiation Level  35°C,  95%  Rh 
Background 
Range  = x  0.1  -81* 
Source  present 
Range  = x  10  4 
6.  Battery Life 
Typical  life of new/fully charged batteries when  instrument operated for 
approximately 8  hours  per day: 
Total operating time = 76  hours. 
NB:  This  instrument has  the option of being fitted with two  batteries 
to increase operational capacity.  For  the purpose  of this test 
only ONE  battery was  fitted. 
- 72  -A3  - Compilation of results  for  the  Mini  Instruments  6.80 
DESCRIPTION 
Inst~ument - Mini  6.80 
Detector  - Remote  MC71  probe 
Energy Compensated  ZP1220/01  Geiger Muller tube. 
Ratemeter 
Dose  range  covered  - 0-99999  counts  liquid crystal display 
10,  30,  60,  100,  300,  600,  1k,  •  count times. 
Dose  rate range  Logarithmic  (3  full  decades)  analogue  meter  scaled in 
absorbed dose  rate in air from  0.05  pGyh-
1  to 
75  JJGY  h-
1
• 
Power  requirements  - 4  x  C cells  (R14) 
Features/Controls  - Analogue  voltage output 
- Manual  stop/start buttons 
- Rotary on/off switch +  count  time selection 
- Automatic battery check and  count save  feature 
Size:  Electronics - 240  x  120  x  100  mm 
Detector  - 310  x  33  mm  diameter 
Weight:  Electronics - 1.2 kg 
Detector  - 0.4 kg 
RESULTS  OF  TESTS 
1 .  Linearity 
Response  of the instrument to 662  keV  1  radiation from  137Cs,  determined 
over  the stated ranges. 
Dose  Linearity  Response  Standard 
Factor  Deviation 
From  To 
2000  counts  100  k  counts  56359  counts  536  JJGy 
Dose  Rate Linearity  Response  Standard 
Factor  Deviation 
From  To 
Digital  9  counts  s-1  860  counts  s-1  15.1  counts  s-1 
JJGyh- 1  1.0 
Analogue  0.40  ].lGyh- 1  43  JJGyh- 1  0.72  0.03 
- 73  -A3  (cont.) 
Mini  Instruments  6.80 
2.  Photon  Energy Response 
See  Figure  7  for  the results of measurements. 
3.  Polar Response 
See  Figure 8  for the results of measurements. 
4.  Temperature Dependence 
Percentage change  of indicated instrument reading compared to that at 
20°C,  for normal  background radiation levels and when  a  source  ( 2 - 1Am) 
is present. 
Radiation Level  -20°C  -10°C  0°C  40°C 
Background 
Range  = 300  s  19  11  15  8 
Source present 
Range  =  300  s  -2  -2  -2  0 
5.  Humidity Dependence 
Percentage change  of indicated instrument reading compared to that at 
20°C,  60%  Rh,  for normal  background radiation levels and when  a  source 
( 2 • 1Am)  is present. 
Radiation Level  35°C,  95%  Rh 
Background 
Range  =  300  s  11 
Source present 
Range  =  300  s  -6 
6.  Battery Life 
Typical  life of new/fully charged batteries when  instrument operated for 
approximately 8  hours  per  day: 
Total operating time  >  460  hours. 
- 74  -'! 
A4  - Compilation of Results  for  the  MAB  605 
DESCRIPTION 
Instrument - MAB  605 
Detector  - Remote  44  mm  dia x  15  mm  thick plastic Scintillator with 
ZnS(Ag)  layer. 
Ratemeter 
Dose  range  covered  -LED display 0-99999.9  pSv  in steps of 0.1  pSv. 
Dose  rate range  - Linear analogue  meter  - two  scales  0 to 1  in steps of 
0.02,  and  0  to 3  in steps of 0.1. 
Ten  switched ranges  0.3,  1,  3,  10,  30,  100,  300,  1000, 
3000,  10,000 pSv/h. 
Power  requirements  - Internal sealed Pb  and batteries, nominal  12V,  3Ah. 
Alternative plug-in mains  power  supply/battery 
charger. 
Features/Controls  - Recorder  output 
- Dose  and  dose  rate alarm settings 
- Dose  on/off/reset 
- Alarm  on/off 
- Twelve-position Rotary Switch off-bat check 
+ range selection. 
Size:  Electronics - 220  x  210  x  110  mm 
Detector  - 240  x  80  mm  diameter 
Weight:  Electronics - 4.5 kg 
Detector  - 1.3 kg 
RESULTS  OF  TESTS 
1.  Linearity 
Response  of the instrument to 662  keV  1  radiation from  137Cs,  determined 
over the stated ranges. 
Dose  Linearity  Response  Standard 
Factor  Deviation 
From  To 
1  pSv  60  J!SV  6.6  X  10-3  2.1  X  10-" 
Dose  Rate Linearity  Response  Standard 
Factor  Deviation 
From  To 
0.5  pSvh- 1  5800  pSvh- 1  1.16  0.063 
- 75  -A4  (cont.) 
MAB  605 
2.  Photon Energy Response 
See  Figure  9  for  the results of measurements. 
3.  Polar Response 
See  Figure  10  for  the results of measurements. 
4.  Temperature Dependence 
Percentage change of indicated instrument reading compared to that at 
20°C,  for  normal  background radiation levels  and when  a  source  ( 2 ' 1Am) 
is present. 
Radiation Level  -20°C  -10°C  0°C  40°C 
Background 
Range  = 0.3 pSvh-
1  -29  -30  -15  55 
Source present 
Range  =  100  pSvh-
1  -1  -4  -4  4 
5.  Humidity Dependence 
Percentage change  of indicated instrument reading compared to that at 
20°C,  60%  Rh,  for  normal  background radiation levels  and when  a  source 
( 2 '
1Am)  is present. 
Radiation Level  35°C,  95%  Rh 
Background 
Range  =  0.3 lJSVh-
1  12 
Source present 
Range  =  100  lJSvh-
1  -4 
6.  Battery Life 
Typical  life of new/fully charged batteries when  instrument operated for 
approximately 8  hours  per day: 
Total operating time = 18  hours. 
- 76  -II 
AS  - Compilation of results  for  the Reuter-Stokes  RSS-112 
DESCRIPTION 
Instrument  - Reuter-Stokes  RSS-112 
Detector  - RSS-211  high pressure ionisation chamber. 
Eight litre, spherical geometry. 
Ratemeter 
Dose  rate range  - Auto  ranging electrics with multi-function menu  drive 
liquid crystal display,  two  ranges  1  ~R/h to 500  ~/h 
(low range)  and  SOO  ~R/h to 100  mR/h  (intermediate 
range). 
RS232  interface and  solid state data cartridge storage 
facility. 
Dose  range  covered  - 0-999R  in steps of 1  ~R,  features  as  above. 
Power  requirements  - Internal sealed Pb  acid battery nominal  capacity 12V, 
6  Ah.  Separate plug-in charger/float power  supply. 
Features/Controls  - Rotary off/zero/read switch 
- Multiple soft key options as  designated from  LED 
menu  driven graphics. 
Size:  Electronics - 420  x  280  x  120  mm 
Detector  - 30S  x  305  x  30S  mm 
Weight:  Electronics - 9  kg 
Detector  - 10  kg 
RESULTS  OF  TESTS 
1.  Linearity 
Response  of the  instrument to 662  keV  1  radiation from  137Cs,  determined 
over the stated ranges. 
Dose  Linearity  Response  Standard 
Factor  Deviation 
From  To 
1  ~R  10  mR  1.03  0.10 
Dose  Rate Linearity  Response  Standard 
Factor  Deviation 
From  To 
SO  ~Rh-
1  50  mRh- 1  0.91  0.02 
- 77  -AS  (cont.) 
Reuter-Stokes RSS-112 
2.  Photon Energy  Response 
See  Figure  11  for  the results of measurements. 
3.  Polar Response 
See  Figures  12  and  13  for  the results of measurements. 
4.  Temperature Dependence 
Percentage change  of indicated instrument reading compared to that at 
20°C,  for normal  background radiation levels  and when  a  source is 
present  ( 241Am). 
Radiation Level  -20°C  -10°C  0°C  40°C 
Background 
Range =  18  min  Average  2  18  18  5 
pRh- 1 
Source present 
Range =  18  min  Average  3  3  1  1 
pRh- 1 
5.  Humidity Dependence 
Percentage change  of indicated instrument reading compared to that at 
20°C,  60%  Rh,  for  normal  background radiation levels and when  a  source 
is present  (241Am). 
Radiation Level  35°C,  95%  Rh 
Background 
Range  =  18  min  Average  2 
pRh - 1 
Source present 
Range  =  18  min  Average  1 
pRh- 1 
6.  Battery Life 
Typical  life of new/fully charged batteries when  instrument operated for 
approximately  8  hours  per  day: 
Total  operating time =  135  hours. 
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Table  1 
Sites and  Weather 
Weather 
Site  Source of  0  S Grid 
Description  artificial  reference  Temperature  Wind  Rain 
radionuclides  (oC) 
Brick terrace 
house  - SU408  882  18  indoors 
Garden  - SU408  883  8  calm  dry 
Limestone  area  - SK175  808  5  1·  snow  on 
ground 
Organic soil on 
rock  Chernobyl  SD165  988  5  6  heavy 
Deep  boggy 
moorland  Chernobyl  SD177  967  6  4  showers 
Sandy,  pebbly 
beach  Sellafield  NY037007  8  2  dry 
Silt estuary  Sellafield  SD083  967  5  2  drizzle 
NRPB  shielded 
steel room  (1)  SU473  865  18  indoors 
I 
(1)  This is a  low  background room  heavily shielded with low  activity steel 
plate.  The  radiation field inside is almost all relatively penetrating 
cosmic  radiation as  environmental  1  radiation and the less penetrating 
cosmic  fraction are heavily attenuated. 
- 93  -Table  2 
Summary  of measured  doserates  (nGy  h- 1 ) 
Au tomes  Mini 
Site  Szintomat  Bicron  6-80  MAB- RS-
6134A  605  112 
22sRa  137Cs 
(a)  brick terrace house  93  73  120  142  *  125 
(b)  garden  47  36  63  75  *  69 
(c)  limestone area  73  60  93  111  82  97 
(d)  organic soil on rock  85  78  108  129  101  121 
(e)  deep  boggy  moorland  67  56  72  86  72  86 
(f)  sandy pebbly beach  105  88  114  135  121  126 
(g)  silt estuary  271  146  177  210  *  215 
(h)  NRPB  shielded room  17.5  14.1  21  24  22  24 
* The  MAB  instrument had failed because of a  damaged  battery charging lead 
and associated blown  fuse,  which  could not be  repaired in the field. 
- 94  -Table  3 
Time  Taken  To  Perform A Measurement  of the Dose  Rate 
In A Low  Natural  Background  Area 
To  A Statistical Uncertainty of  10%  (2a) 
Instrument  Time  (s)  Comment 
Szintomat  360  Based on  an  increment in the dose 
register of 0.01  lJSV 
250  Based  on the dose rate function 
Bicron  200  Based on the average of 10  readings 
at 20  s  intervals 
Mini  6-80  600  The  lowest preset counting time  which 
satisfies the criterion 
MAB  150  Based  on an increment of 5  nSv 
250  Based on  the dose  rate function 
Reuter  Stokes  1005 
- 95 -Table  4 
Indication 
Instrument  Quantity  Units  Additional  information 
required 
Szintomat  Dose  equivalent  0.01  )JSV  external timer or method 
(exposure)  of averaging 
Bicron  Dose  equivalent  0.01  )JSV  h- 1  method  of averaging 
(ambient) 
Mini  6-80  Counts  counts/600  calibration factor 
MAB  Dose  equivalent  1  nSv  external timer or method 
(exposure)  of averaging 
Reuter  Stokes  Exposure  0.1  llR  h- 1  none 
Table  5 
Display Visibility 
Visibility 
Instrument  Display 
Strong sunlight  Overcast 
Szintomat  (1)  dose:  LED  digital  poor  good 
(2)  rate:  moving  coil analogue  good  adequate 
Bicron  moving  coil analogue  very good  good 
Mini  6-80  (1)  counts:  liquid crystal digital  very good  adequate 
(2)  rate:  moving  coil analogue  good  adequate 
MAB  (1)  dose:  LED  digital  poor  good 
(2)  rate:  moving  coil analogue  very good  good 
Reuter  liquid crystal digital  good  poor 
Stokes 
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Table  6 
Other  Equipment  Required 
Instrument  Equipment  required 
Szintomat  Timer  or calculator  (averaging) 
Bicron  Calculator  (averaging) 
Mini  6-80  Calculator  (using calibration factor) 
MAB  Timer  or calculator  (averaging) 
Reuter  Stokes  None 
Table  7 
Ease  of Setting-up 
Instrument  Process  Estimated  Problems 
time  (s) 
Szintomat  Erecting tripod,  not  supplied,  100  Requires  specially 
removing  probe  from  instrument  fabricated probe 
body  and clamping to the tripod  to tripod clip. 
Cable very short. 
Bicron  Hold  the  instrument  1  m above  30  None 
ground level 
Mini  6-80  Erecting tripod,  fitting probe  100  None 
clip,  ratemeter carrier, 
connecting cable to probe  and 
ratemeter,  clipping probe  to 
clip and hanging ratemeter  on 
clip 
MAB  Erecting tripod,  not  supplied,  200  Requires  specially 
removing  probe  and  ratemeter  fabricated probe 
from  case,  clamping probe to  to tripod clip. 
tripod and connecting  two  The  cables  are 
cables  difficult to 
connect. 
Reuter  Erecting tripod,  fixing  300  Awkward  cable 
Stokes  detector  connectors,  heavy 
detector,  awkward 
detector to tripod 
fixing 
- 97  -Table  8 
Packing  and  Unpacking  Instrument 
Instrument  Packing  Time  (s) 
Szintomat  Box  30 
Bicron  None  0 
Mini  6-80  Medium  size case  60 
MAB  Aluminium  box  60 
Reuter  Stokes  Box  for detector and  soft case  120 
for  the ratemeter  and  accessories 
Table  9 
Rain Resistance 
Instrument  Exposed  Ease  of keeping  Ratemeter  sealing 
connectors  connectors  dry 
Szintomat  None  or  2  can be  permanently  Good 
fixed 
Bicron  None  - Good 
Mini  6-80  2  Easy  Good  - close to 
waterproof 
MAB  4  Difficult  Poor 
Reuter  2  Difficult  Good,  with cover 
Stokes  closed''t 
* Access  to controls and  display requires  the opening of a  cover. 
This  expresses poor  sealing along one  edge  of the battery access. 
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Table  10 
Wind  Resistance 
Instrument  Stability on 
tripod 
Szintomat  Poor  if the  probe  is 
mounted  pointing down 
without an extra 
balance weight 
Bicron  Best held in the hand 
or clipped to tripod 
with elastic straps 
Mini  6-80  Good 
MAB  Poor,  if the probe is 
mounted  pointing down 
without  an extra 
balance weight 
Reuter  Very  good 
Stokes 
Likelihood of  damage  by 
tipping onto grass 
Possible damage,  not  easy to 
protect further 
Robust,  but not easy to protect 
further 
Possible,  in standard form,  but 
the probe can easily be  given 
additional protection 
Possible damage,  not easy to 
protect further 
Unlikely event,  but could 
easily damage  detector to 
tripod mounting if it occurs 
Table  11 
Cost 
Instrument  Approximate  cost 
(UK)  £ 
Szintomat  9000 
Bicron  1200 
Mini  6-80  624 
MAB 
Reuter  Stokes  7000 
- 99  -Table  12 
Battery Life in Field Conditions 
Instrument  Life  Battery  Battery  Ease  of 
(ho.urs)  Type  Availability  Charging 
Szintomat  62  R20  Everywhere  Very 
Bicron  76  6LR61  Everywhere  Very 
(Spare  in 
instrument) 
Mini  6-80  >460  R14  Everywhere  Very 
MAB  18  Sealed  - Easy 
lead-acid 
rechargeable 
Reuter  Stokes  135  Sealed  - -
lead-acid 
rechargeable 
Table  13 
Weight  and  Volume 
Weight  of  Approximate 
Instrument  complete kit  volume  (1)  Comment 
(kg) 
Szintomat  5,."  10*  -
Bicron  1.4-.'t  5,'t  Very portable 
Mini  6-80  3  15  Very portable 
MAB  7-.'t  18*  -
Reuter  Stokes  19  40  Cumbersome, 
occupies 
large volume 
* excluding any  tripod used in the measurements. 
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Table  14 
Obtrusiveness  and  Curiosity Value 
Instruments  Comments 
Szintomat  Bright colour 
Bicron  Unobtrusive 
Mini  6-80  Unobtrusive,  easily mistaken 
for  road survey equipment 
MAB  Fairly unobtrusive 
Reuter Stokes  Large  and  obtrusive 
- 101  -Table  15 
Data  from  the MAFF/NRPB  Cs  Monitor 
Mini  6-80  MAFF/NRPB  Cs  Monitor 
Site  Doser ate  (nGy  h-
1
)  Counts/lOCOs 
zz'Ra  137Cs  Channel  A  Channel  B  Ratio 
(600-900  keV)  (900-1200  keV)  A/B 
(a)  brick terrace house  120  142  7404  4450  1.7 
(b)  garden  63  75  3030  1456  2.1 
(c)  limestone area  93  111  5400  2318  2.3 
(d)  organic soil on  rock  108  129  13200  2215  6.0 
(e)  deep  boggy  moorland  72  86  8000  880  9.1 
(f) sandy pebbly beach  114  135  27700  2880  9.6 
(g)  silt estuary  177  210  12840  3050  4.2 
(h)  NRPB  shielded room  21  24  197  59  3.3 
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- 103  -1  Introduction 
In the  immediate  aftermath of an accidental  release of radionuclides 
into the environment,  measurements  of activity concentrations of 
individual radionuclides  are required rapidly as  a  basis for  decisions  on 
the need  for countermeasures.  For accidental  releases from  nuclear  power 
plants,  most of the radionuclides of potential radiological  importance 
emit 1-rays and  so their activity concentrations can be  determined 
directly with the minimum  of sample preparation,  while others such as 
strontium-89  and -90 and  the aetinides require radiochemical  separation 
prior to measurement.  Releases  of actinides  alon~ might  occur  following 
the re-entry qf an isotope-powered satellite or an accident at a 
reprocessing plant, while  strontium-90 was  the principal radionuclide 
released after an explosion in a  tank of treated effluent at Kyshtym  in 
the  USSR  in the  1950s.  For  any accidents  involving a  release of 
radionuclides into the environment,  there will be  a  need for at least some 
radiochemical analyses to be  carried out.  If, at an early stage,  activity 
concentrations of strontium-89,  -90  and  the actinides in the deposition 
can be  shown  to be  small  compared  to the values  for 1-ray emitting 
radionuclides  such as  caesium-137,  then the commitment  of  large amounts  of 
effort to radiochemical  analysis  can be  avoided.  As  an  example,  in 1986, 
the  Ris~ National  Laboratory obtained an engine filter from  a  ship that 
had sailed through the cloud of contamination from  Chernobyl.  They  also 
collected dust from  a  lorry that had returned from  the Ukraine  just after 
the accident.  This  type of  sample  was  of little direct use  for  dose 
assessment  purposes but did allow the  radionuclide composition of the 
Chernobyl  deposit to be  determined.  The  analyses  showed  that the 
proportions of strontium-89,  -90  and  actinides were  small  compared  to 
iodine-131  and caesium-134  and -137(1)  and  so subsequently effort could be 
concentrated on measurements  of 1-ray  emit~ing radionuclides. 
For  many  years,  the trend in environmental  radionuclide analysis has 
been towards  improvements  in sensitivity, i.e.  the detection limits that a 
particular procedure can achieve.  Consequently,  many  procedures currently 
employed  for the determination of a- and  B-particle emitting radionuclides 
are protracted and  labour-intensive.  Such procedures are therefore not 
well-suited to the circumstances  encountered in the  immediate  aftermath of 
an accident.  Furthermore,  the selectivity of these procedures,  i.e. their 
ability to differentiate between  radionuclides,  may  not  be  adequate  for 
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the  complex  mixture of radionuclides  that could be  released.  In the 
development  of methodology  for  application in the  event of  an  accident, 
the selectivity of the procedure  and  the  speed with which it can  be 
completed are  important considerations.  However,  activity concentrations 
at which  countermeasures  or restrictions might  be  imposed  are  high 
compared to the detection limits that many  techniques  can achieve,  and 
therefore sensitivity is not an  important factor.  This  report sets out 
the methodological  arguments  which should be  considered when  developing 
radiochemical  separation procedures  for use in the  immediate  aftermath of 
an accident.  The  radionuclides considered were  strontium-89  and  -90, 
alpha-particle emitting isotopes of plutonium and  curium and  americium-241 
since these could be  of primary ·radiological  importance.  Others  which 
might  be released under  various accident scenarios are set out in a  recent 
report by the  International Atomic  Energy Agency  (IAEA)(2).  The 
procedures set out in Appendix  1  of this report are  those that this 
laboratory would  employ  in the event of an accident,  but this  does  not 
imply that other  laboratories are  obliged to adopt  them.  Instead,  the 
methodological  arguments  used in the development  of these procedures 
should be  applied to individual circumstances.  A laboratory should be 
free  to adopt  any procedure,  with the proviso that it has  been adequately 
validated in advance.  The  immediate  aftermath of an  accident  is not  a 
time to begin the development of novel  procedures. 
The  information used in this project was  gathered from  the literature 
and by seeking opinions  from  established radioanalytical  laboratories in 
Europe,  Scandinavia and  the  USA.  The  contributions  from  those  who 
responded are  acknowledged  in Section 10.  The  most  promising procedures 
have  been tested in the  laboratory and  these evaluations are described in 
detail later in this report. 
2  Objective of the  sampling and measurement  programme 
In the aftermath of an accidental release,  the  unde~lying objective 
should be to make  measurements  that can be used to estimate the doses  that 
people could receive.  Consequently,  protocols  for  the collection of 
different environmental materials can be  specified.  It is not  the 
intention in this report to discuss methods  of sample  collection,  but the 
protocols that the  Board  considers appropriate are described briefly in 
Appendix  2.  The  purposes  for  which  each material is collected are 
- 105  -summarised in Table  1,  since these  may  also affect the way  in which  the 
sample  is treated and  subsequently analysed. 
3  Role  of the measurement  laboratory 
In the event of  a  release of activity to atmosphere,  samples  of 
airborne activity are  likely to be  the first type  of material  received by 
the measurement  laboratory.  When  the plume  of contamination has  passed, 
samples  of grass, soil and rainwater will begin to arrive.  The  primary 
objectives should be:  to establish the composition of the contamination so 
that analytical effort can be  deployed more  effectively;  to· determine 
activity concentrations in air or amounts  of deposited activity so that 
predictive models  ~an be used-to make  an early evaluation of radiological 
impact.  Predicted values in foodstuffs  such as vegetables  and milk will 
be  supplanted by measurements  within 24-48 hours.  Above-ground vegetables 
will be  contaminated immediately via direct deposition of activity, 
whereas  peak activity concentrations in milk after a  single deposition 
event will not be  reached until a  few  days  later.  After the Chernobyl 
accident in 1986,  the  time  between deposition and maximum  concentration in 
milk was  about  2  days  for  iodine-131  and  caesium-137(3), while predicted 
peak values  for  strontium-89  and  -90 occur at about  5  days(4).  However, 
restrictions on the distribution of milk or vegetables  take time to 
implement.  The  measurement  laboratory will therefore be  called upon  to 
generate results  from  both direct measurements  and  radiochemical  analyses 
on  a  wide  range  of materials within 24  hours  of the deposition occurring. 
4  Specification of detection limits 
From  the analytical viewpoint,  in the United Kingdom  the most 
demanding  limits on activity concentrations are those which would  be 
imposed on  foodstuffs  by the Commission of the European Communities  (CEC). 
These  limits are summarised in Table  2.  The  evaluation in this report was 
carried out on  the premise that a  suitable procedure should be  able to 
achieve detection limits in foodstuffs  of  10  Bq  kg-
1  fresh weight  for 
strontium-89  and  -90  and  1  Bq  kg-
1  fresh weight for  americium-241  and 
alpha-emitting isotopes of plutonium and  curium.  These values are more 
than an order of magnitude  lower  than those given in Table  2. 
For  other materials,  the most  restrictive values given in reference 4 
for  various  countermeasures  have  been used to calculate corresponding 
activity concentrations.  The  calculated values  are  for  the purpose  of 
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this project only;  they cannot  be  accorded the  status of Derived Levels. 
For airborne particles,  the integrated activity concentrations at which 
sheltering would  be  considered have  been  taken with the  assumption that a 
release persists for  4  hours.  This  enables  average activity 
concentrations to be  calculated,  and  these are also shown  in Table  2.  The 
detection limits which  procedures  should achieve to be  considered suitable 
were  then chosen to be  1 10'  Bq  m· 3  for  strontium-89,  1  103  Bq  m· 3  for 
strontium-90 and  0.5  Bq  m· 3  for actinides,  which  are at least an  order of 
magnitude  lower  than the values given in Table  2.  The  assumptions used in 
the calculation of values  for  the remaining materials are given in 
footnotes  to Table  2. 
S  Sample  collection and preparation 
Under  normal  circumstances,  the  sample  sizes required to make 
meaningful  measurements  are  large.  For foodstuffs  and  vegetation,  the 
mass  of sample  required is often of the order of several kilogrammes  fresh 
weight.  The  sample  sizes required to achieve  the detection limits 
specified in section 4  are much  less,  and  can be  estimated from 
appropriate  instrumental detection limits together with cautious 
assumptions  about  chemical  recovery.  These  values are set out in Table  3. 
However,  collection of samples  of this size directly from  the field would 
be  most  unlikely to produce  results that were  adequately representative. 
Suitable sample  sizes for  different materials are given in Appendix  2. 
Consideration then has  to be  given to producing a  uniform distribution of 
activity throughout  the  sample. 
5.1  Homogeneity 
A common  practice under normal  circumstances would  be  to carry out 
direct measurements  by 1-ray spectrometry on  as  large a  sample  as possible 
and  then to take the same  sample  into solution for radiochemical analysis. 
Subsequantly,  different radionuclides would  be  determined either from  a 
sequential analytical procedure  or from  an aliquot of  ~he solution.  By 
these means,  problems  of inhomogeneity can be  avoided.  However,  this 
approach would  not be  suitable in the aftermath of an  accident because  a 
1-ray spectrometry facility would  be  under  extreme  pressure and  there 
might  be  a  considerable delay before the  sample  was  returned to the 
chemistry laboratory.  In an emergency,  different analyses need to begin 
as  soon as possible after the  sample  has  been  received.  Consideration 
should therefore be  given to ways  in which  the activity can be  distributed 
- 107  -uniformly throughout  the starting material  so that  sub-samples  of  the 
material itself can be  used.  The  chosen method  should be  able to 
accommodate  the total amount  of material collected to ensure that 
resultant measurements  are adequately representative. 
Liquid samples  pose no  problems  with regard to homogeneity,  since 
these can be well-mixed  simply by  shaking before aliquots are  removed. 
Attention is however  drawn  to liquid samples  containing suspended solids. 
In these cases it may  be  necessary to filter the  samples  and treat the 
solid phase separately (see Appendix  2  section 4). 
After an accidental release of radionuclides.to atmosphere,  the 
resultant distribution of activity in certain types  of vegetables is most 
unlikely to be uniform.  Methods  must  therefore be  found  which  can mix 
about  1  kg of fresh vegetation adequately.  Liquidising was  considered, 
since this would  produce  a  sample  for which  homogeneity could be  assured. 
However,  the next step of any analysis  involving radiochemistry would  be 
dry ashing in a  furnace to destroy organic material  and  liquidised samples 
would  take  longer to ash.  The  preferred method  is to use  a  food processor 
to chop  the starting material finely and  then to mix  the  sample 
mechanically.  The  capacity of domestic  food  processors is in the range 
1-2 litres, while  those used in the catering industry can accommodate  3-5 
litres.  Domestic  versions  are  the more  readily obtainable,  but their 
capacities are unlikely to be sufficient for all types  of vegetation. 
Soils are amenable  to mechanical  mixing after they have  been allowed 
to dry in air for  a  few  hours at room  temperature.  Only  after mixing 
should a  portion of the  sample  be taken to determine  the ratio of oven dry 
weight to air dry weight.  This portion should not be  used for  any 
subsequent radionuclide analysis because  of the possibility of  loss of 
volatile radionuclides during oven drying. 
Air filters are an exceptional case,  since  we  have  found that the 
activity may  not be  distributed uniformly across  the whole  filter.  For 
this reason,  cutting the filter into sections for different analyses is 
not recommended,  and 1-ray spectrometry must  be  carried out  on  the entire 
sample prior to radiochemistry.  However,  air filters are  likely to be 
among  the first samples  received after an  accident,  and since the data 
they provide  form  the basis for early predictions of radiological  impact, 
they should be  given priority for 1-ray spectrometry.  Counting times  for 
direct measurements  are likely to be short,  of the order of  30  minutes, 
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and  so  there need not  be  an  inordinate delay before  radiochemical  analysis 
can commence. 
6  Sample  pretreatment 
6.1  Foodstuffs  and  vegetation 
Under  normal  circumstances,  several kilogrammes  of foodstuffs  and 
vegetation may  be  required in order to make  meaningful  measurements. 
Consequently,  one  of the  most  time-consuming parts of the analytical 
procedures is the drying and ashing process,  which  may  take several days 
or even weeks  to complete.  The  merits of various methods  of rapid drying 
and  ashing have  therefore been evaluated,  based on  the sample  sizes given 
in Table  3. 
Methods  of drying that are in common  use  include heat  lamps, 
conventional  and  microwave  ovens,  furnaces  and  freeze-driers.  Of  these, 
freeze-driers are relatively slow and  the capacity of microwave  ovens is 
limited even when  using small  sample  sizes.  Samples  of vegetation are not 
amenable  to drying by  heat  lamps,  and with liquids such as  milk there is a 
danger of spattering with the consequent problems  of  loss of determinand 
and  potential cross-contamination.  Conventional  ovens  and  furnaces 
provide  the most  convenient means  of drying  large numbers  of samples 
simultaneously. 
Ashing can be  achieved by either wet  or dry techniques,  or a  mixture 
of both.  For  wet  ashing,  samples  are  simmered  in an acid solution.  The 
procedure  requires  occasional  supervision,  and would  occupy  space  in fume 
cupboards  which  could be  used more  profitably for  other stages of 
radiochemical  analyses.  Milk has  been ashed by drop-wise addition into 
either boiling concentrated nitric acid(6)  or into a  red-hot steel 
crucible(7).  The  disadvantage of the nitric acid method  is that the 
volume  of sample  which  must  subsequently be  taken to dryness  is large and 
as  a  result ashing is often  !~complete.  The  red-hot crucible procedure 
requires continued supervision in order to achieve  a  high throughput  of 
samples. 
The  most  attractive procedure  combines  the processes of drying and 
ashing and  makes  use of a  muffle  furnace.  In one  study,  up  to 500  g  of 
foodstuffs,  including milk,  were  ashed without prior drying(S).  The 
samples  were  placed in a  preheated oven in stainless steel trays.  Such 
receptacles are not in common  use,  and  so as  part of this project the 
utility of the  technique  has  been  investigated using borosilicate beakers. 
- 109  -Samples  were  introduced into a  muffle  furnace  ~hich was  already 
established at 500°  celsius.  Rapid  ashing could be  carried out  provided 
that beakers  of  2  litre volume  were  employed.  If in addition borosilicate 
watch glasses were  placed on  top of each beaker,  loss of  sample  by 
spattering could be  avoided.  Ashing was  completed more  quickly if the 
samples  were  removed  after about  90  minutes,  cooled,  wetted with 
concentrated nitric acid and returned to the  furnace.  For milk samples  of 
up  to 100 ml,  a  further  30  min  in the furnace  then produced a  residue that 
readily dissolved in concentrated nitric acid.  For  grass  and vegetable 
samples,  a  further  2-21 hours  were  required for  sample  sizes of 50  g  fresh 
weight.  The  vegetables tested in this evaluation were  carrot to represent 
dense  root crops  and  cabbage to represent  leafy vegetables.  For  both 
carrot and cabbage,  coarsely-grated or sliced material  ashed more  rapidly 
than that which  had been finely grated,  probably as  a  result of better air 
circulation within the coarser material.  However,  it is difficult to 
ensure  adequate  mixing of coarsely-grated or sliced material to achieve 
homogeneity,  and so on  balance the finely-grated material is recommended. 
For all the materials tested, it was  possible to omit the nitric acid 
treatment if ashing could be  continued overnight  (more  than  12  hours). 
However,  this  luxury may  not  be  available in the  aftermath of a  major 
accident.  The  values  shown  in Table 4  therefore refer to procedures  that 
include treatment with nitric acid. 
6.2  Soil 
From  Table  3,  a  sample  size of only 5  g  is required for  individual 
radionuclide analyses.  In the circumstances that will prevail after an 
accident, it is unlikely that there will be  time to ensure that such a 
small  aliquot is truly representative.  However,  ashing  times  for soil 
samples  of up  to 50 g  are short,  typically 2  hours,  and  in most  cases  no 
treatment with concentrated nitric acid is required.  The  exceptions  would 
be soils with a  high organic content,  such as  woodland  soils or peats.  It 
is therefore recommended  that soils be  ashed and  subsequently leached in 
50  g  quantities  and  appropriate aliquots  taken  from  the resultant 
solution. 
6.3  Air  filters 
The  filter material could be  polycarbonate,  polystyrene or glass 
fibre.  It is not  recommended  that the rapid ashing technique applied to 
vegetation should be  used  for air filters made  of  organic material,  since 
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this  can result in flaring  and  the  consequent  loss  of  sample  and 
determinand.  The  filter material will normally have  been  compressed  into 
a  standard geometry for r-ray spectrometry,  and  returned to the chemistry 
laboratory after measurement.  Compressed filters are not  amenable  to wet 
ashing techniques.  The  recommended  procedure is that which  is applied in 
normal  circumstances,  that is,  a  slow increase in temperature  over  several 
hours  to a  maximum  of 450-500° celsius.  Ashing  should be  completed within 
24  hours.  One  of the purposes of collecting activity associated with 
airborne particles is to assess doses  from  inhalation.  It ·is essential 
therefore that all the particulate material is completely dissolved.  This 
will require the use of hydrofluoric acid,  and  the presence of fluoride 
ion in the resultant solution must  be taken into account in the subsequent 
radiochemical isolation of plutonium.  (Section 8.1). 
Glass  fibre filter papers  do  not normally require ashing.  Instead 
they are dissolved using hydrofluoric acid.  The  residue is taken into 
solution by repeated treatment with hydrofluoric  and nitric acids.  Again, 
the  fluoride  ion present in the resultant solution must  be  taken into 
account in the subsequent  radiochemical  isolation. 
7  Radiochemical  isolation 
7.1  Strontium-89,  -90 
At  the activity concentrations encountered under  normal 
circumstances,  strontium-90 is determined  from  the  decay of its daughter 
yttrium-90 after a  period of  ingrowth of about  3  weeks.  Such  a  procedure 
is clearly unacceptable for  the purposes  of emergency  response. 
Furthermore  strontium-89  may  also be present,  as  well  as  other fission 
products  which also decay via beta-particle emission.  A suitable method 
must  therefore be  able to isolate radiostrontium and be  able to 
differentiate between strontium-89  and -90. 
Ion-exchange chromatography has  been used extensively in the 
past~
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14 ),  but in most  cases,  the  sample  solution required chemical 
manipulations before it could be  applied to the  ion-exchange  column.  In 
one  instance,  milk was  applied directly to an  ion-exchange  column{l2),  but 
several  steps were  required after elution to produce  a  sample  suitable for 
counting.  Moreover,  other workers  have  found great difficulty in passing 
milk through such columns,  although simply stirring the milk and resin 
together  may  be  a  useful  alternative(lS).  On  balance however,  the  number 
- 111  -of steps required either before or after ion exchange  suggested that the 
procedure  ~as not well-suited to the  response  required after an accident. 
Several  methods  that make  use  of solvent extraction have  also been 
published(16- 21).  Most  of these methods utilise macrocyclic  or crown 
ethers,  although other complexing agents  such as  di(2-ethylhexyl) 
phosphoric acid and thenoyltrifluoroacetone have  been used.  Crown  ethers 
are expensive and unstable,  and their use  in an emergency is not 
recommended  unless  they are already employed  under  normal  circumstances. 
Some  of the other extractants require  long settling times  before the 
phases  separate,  and  most  require additional chemistry before the 
extraction can begin.  Unless  such techniques  are already in use,  the 
solvent extraction method  is not considered suitable for use after an 
accident. 
The  isolation of strontium as nitrate in fuming  nitric acid is a 
commonly  used procedure whose  specificity has  been thoroughly 
evaluated(22).  Barium  has  been found  to be  the only significant 
interfering ion,  so that in the event  of an accident barium-140 would  be  a 
possible contaminant.  However,  barium can be  conveniently removed  by 
redissolving the precipitate and adding  chromate:  barium then 
precipitates,  leaving strontium in solution.  This  method  is relatively 
simple and rapid,  and  is considered the most  appropriate to adopt in the 
event  of an emergency. 
7.1.1  Chemical  recovery 
Under  normal  circumstances,  chemical  recovery would  be  estimated 
using  the 1-ray emitting isotope strontium-85.  However,  in an emergency, 
it is likely that a  1-ray spectrometry facility would  already be  fully 
occupied.  Unless  a  gamma-counter  is available, it is therefore 
recommended  that chemical  recovery should be estimated gravimetrically. 
After  the initial dissolution of the starting material,  a  known  mess  of 
strontium,  as nitrate,  should be  added.  At  the end of the radiochemical 
isolation,  strontium can then be precipitated as  carbonate in a 
scintillation vial  (see Section 7.1.2)  dried and weighed. 
7.1.2  Measurement 
The  final  sample  may  contain strontium-89  as  well  as  strontium-90. 
Once  the strontium is isolated,  counting should proceed quickly in order 
to avoid problems  due  to the  ingrowth of the  decay product yttrium-90. 
The  two  strontium isotopes  can be  determined separately using  a  Geiger 
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proportional counters(23).  However,  the  liquid scintillation technique 
has  been used most  extensively(22 , 24- 31).  Such  instruments  are widely 
available and  permit  large numbers  of samples  to be  counted automatically. 
They  are therefore the preferred instrument for  emergency  response.  The 
.precipitate from  the radiochemical  isolation procedure can be  dried and 
weighed in the vial to be  used for counting  (Section 7.1.1).  The 
precipitate can then be  dissolved in dilute nitric acid,  taken to dryness 
and then redissolved in 2  ml  of distilled water.  The  use or a 
scintillation vial as  a  ~eaction vessel is not new  but it is useful  to 
note that the commercial  plastic vials that are now  in common  use  are able 
to withstand prolonged heating at 110°  celsius and centrifugation. 
Using  a  liquid scintillation counter,  strontium-89 can be  determined 
directly in aqueous  solution from  the emission of Cerenkov radiation. 
After the addition of a  suitable  liquid scintillant, the  sample  can be 
recounted and the strontium-90 content estimated.  Methods  of calculating 
strontium-90 content in the presence of strontium-89  have  been 
published(31).  For  reactor accidents,  strontium-89 activity 
concentrations are  likely to exceed those  for  strontium-90.  In the 
release  from  Chernobyl,  the  isotopic ratio was  about  20(1).  In order to 
minimise  problems  due  to ingrowth of yttrium-90  (Ti,  64  hours),  it is 
recommended  that batch sizes  do  not exceed  6  samples  and  that delay 
between the final  separation of yttrium-90  from  its parent and start of 
counting is minimised. 
This  analytical technique,  which  is based on that described in 
reference  25,  is described in detail in Appendix  1.  The  times  taken to 
complete different stages of the procedure are  summarised in Table  4. 
7.1.3  Method  validation 
The  proposed method  has  been tested for milk and water.  Known 
amounts  of strontium-89  and  -90 were  added to appropriate volumes  of each 
material,  the activities being chosen to give  strontium-89:  strontium-90 
ratios of 1:1 and  20!1.  Radiochemical  isolation was  carried out according 
to the procedure in Appendix  1  and  the activities in the  final  samples 
determined using a  liquid scintillation counter.  Counting efficiencies in 
the Cerenkov region were  36%  and  1.5%  for  strontium-89  and  -90 
respectively;  both the corresponding values  for  the  liquid scintillation 
count approached  100%.  Chemical  recoveries,  which were  estimated 
- 113  -gravimetrically,  were  typically 85%  for  water  and  75%  for  milk.  The 
results are  shown  in Table 5.  In most  cases,  the measured activities were 
within± 5%  of the nominal  values.  The  exceptions were  the strontium-90 
determinations when  the  isotopic ratio was  20:1,  for  which  the nominal 
values  exceeded the measured activities by  10-20%.  Such  differences  are 
outside the  bounds  of the counting uncertainties but  are considered 
acceptable  for  the purposes of emergency response. 
For  strontium-89,  the  instrumental minimum  detectable activity 
calculated at the  95%  confidence  level  was  0.12  Bq,  based on  a  counting 
time  of  20  minutes  and  using the Cerenkov region  ..  For  a  50  g  sample  of 
starting material ·and  a  chemical  recovery of 50%,  this corresponds to an 
activity concentration of 5  Bq  kg-
1
•  Minimum  detectable activities for 
strontium-90 are dependent  upon  the ratio of the  two  isotopes.  With  a 
strontium-89:  strontium-90 activity ratio of  20  and  a  counting time  of 
20  minutes,  the minimum  detectable activity of strontium-90 at the  95% 
confidence  level was  0.22  Bq.  This  corresponds to an activity 
concentration of about  9  Bq  kg-
1  for  a  50  g  sample  of starting material 
and  a  chemical  recovery of 50%.  The  detection limit improves  as  the 
isotopic ratio decreases.  Typical  detection limits for different 
materials  are summarised  in Table  3. 
7.2  Determination of actinides 
7.2.1  Radiochemical  isolation 
Inspection of compendia  of analytical procedures  such as  reference  7 
illustrates the different approaches  that can be  taken to the 
radiochemical  isolation of alpha-emitting isotopes of plutonium,  americium 
and  curium.  However,  all of the procedures  are relatively complex  and 
none  offer any particular advantages  in terms  of speed.  This  view was 
endorsed by the respondents to our enquiries to established laboratories 
around the world  (see for example  reference 32).  The  general 
recommendation with regard to actinide analyses is therefore that 
laboratories should keep  to their own  established,  validated methods. 
However,  consideration should be  given to the implications of using  small 
sample  sizes,  and the possibility of analysing unusual  materials  and the 
potential use of automated equipment(33).  Interference effects from  the 
presence of stable elements  in the starting material can be sensitive to 
sample size,  and  in many  cases  steps  taken normally to remove  the 
interference can be  omitted for  the  sample  sizes necessary in an 
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example  of a  matrix interference effect,  but  with the  sample  sizes 
required for  emergency  response,  it may  not always  be  necessary to take 
steps to remove  it.  The  analyses of materials that a  laboratory does  not 
normally encounter may  also introduce analytical problems.  The  use of 
hydrofluoric acid to dissolve airborne particles has  already been noted 
(section 6.3),  together with the implications for  the  subsequent isolation 
of plutonium.  Steps required to overcome  this problem are 
well-documented(')· 
Because of the  recommendation that laboratories should make  use of 
their established procedures  for the determination of actinides,  no 
detailed analytical method  has  been included in this report.  ·However,  the 
foregoing  discussion suggests that some  minor  modifications  may  be 
necessary.  It is essential that such modifications  are assessed and 
validated as part of contingency planning and not introduced untried in 
the event of an accident. 
7.2.2  Measurement  and estimates of chemical  recovery 
It is essential that the isotopic composition of the deposit is 
determined,  since this may  provide  a  means  by  which  the  influence of the 
accident can be  distinguished from  that of earlier deposits.  Furthermore, 
chemical  recovery must  be  determined by the addition of alpha-emitting 
isotopes  of plutonium and  americium that are not  likely to be  encountered 
in the deposit(')·  Some  form  of spectrometric measurement  is therefore 
essential.  Techniques  based on  mass  spectrometry can provide  such 
information,  but the equipment  required is expensive  and  in consequence 
only a  few  laboratories have  such a  capability (see for example 
reference 34).  These  techniques  may  still require some  radiochemistry 
prior to measurement  in order to separate isobares.  Counting  times  are 
ho«ever very short so that such techniques are potentially of great use in 
an accident.  The  most  commonly-available a-spectrometric technique makes 
use of silicon surface-barrier detectors operating in vacuo.  To  ensure 
good spectral quality,  the radionuclides  of interest must  be  in the  form 
of a  microlayer.  Most  procedures  achieve this using electrodeposition(7), 
although coprecipitation procedures  have also been used(3S). 
The  times  taken to complete these analyses are shown  in Table  4.  The 
detection limits that these procedures  can achieve are shown  in Table  4 
and are  well  below  those specified in Section 4.  These estimates  have 
- 115  -been based on  a  counting time of  100  min  and  a  chemical  recovery of  30%. 
In practice chemical  recoveries  normally exceed  60%. 
8  Direct measurements  of plutonium and  americium 
High-purity germanium  detectors that are  capable of measuring 
low-energy photon emissions  have  become  increasingly common  in recent 
years.  These  have  the potential to determine activity concentrations of 
americium  from  its 59.5 keV  photon emission and  plutonium  from  the X-rays 
emitted by_its uranium  decay product.  Even if counting times of several 
hours  were  required,  direct measurements  could be  of value  in an 
emergency.  The  feasibility of using such measurements  has  therefore  b~en 
evaluated.  Detection limits  have ·been  estimated for plutonium and 
americium  for  two  situations:  a  pure actinide release;  a  release of 
actinides in combination with a  mixture of 1-ray emitting fission 
products.  For the latter case,  europium-152  was  used to provide several 
1-ray emissions  over  a  range  of energies,  the activity being chosen to 
correspond approximately to the total 1-ray activity observed on air 
filters collected at the  Board's  laboratory  afte~ the  Chernobyl  accident. 
Detection limits were  estimated for  counting times  of  15  and  1000  min,  and 
were  derived for  a  sample  geometry of  90  mm  diameter  and  10  mm  depth. 
This  corresponds  to a  commonly-available petri dish which could be  used 
for  solid samples  and  to a  typical partially-filled bottle for  liquids. 
Larger  sample configurations  were  not considered worthy of study because 
of increased attenuation of the  photon emissions  by  the sample itself. 
The  estimated detection limits  for  different materials are  shown  in Tables 
6a  and  6b.  Comparison  with the  limiting activity concentrations in Table 
2  shows  that direct measurements  of plutonium would  only be  useful  for 
rainfall and grass,  and  then only if long counting times  were  employed. 
Such  a  practice might  therefore be  justified in the event of a  pure 
actinide release,  but if the accident also involved fission-products,  long 
counting times could not  be  tolerated.  For  americium,  direct measurements 
would  provide  adequate detection limits  for deposition on soil, in 
vegetation and in rainwater using counting times  of 15  minutes.  For 
airborne particles, direct methods  would  only be  worthwhile  in the  event 
of a  pure  actinide release,  and  then only with counting times of  1000 
minutes.  The  procedure is not suitable for foodstuffs.  Laboratories 
having suitable equipment  should therefore evaluate the determination of 
americium-241  by  direct methods  since  in some  circumstances  these could 
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provide  an early indication of the  need to consider countermeasures. 
However,  the determination of activity concentrations  from  low-energy 
photon emissions,  is complicated by  both the density of the matrix and its 
chemical  composition,  since each can influence self-attenuation. 
Consequently,  it is recommended  that decisions  about  sample 
configurations, calibrations for different materials and  the estimation of 
detection limits be  made  as part of contingency planning. 
9  Summary  and  recommendations 
Activity concentrations at which  countermeasures might be considered 
or regulatory restrictions imposed  are high compared to the detection 
limits that commonly-available measurement  techniques can achieve.  The 
detection limits that laboratories will need to achieve during a  response 
to an accident should be  specified in advance  in order that sample sizes 
can be  decided.  This is of fundamental  importance since the  time required 
for  ashing  and  dissolution is dependent  on  sample  size. 
Although the  amount  of sample  required for  analysis is much  less than 
that taken under  normal  circumstances,  there is still a  need to ensure 
that the amount  of starting material collected is adequately 
representative.  For  example,  at least 1  kg  fresh weight of vegetables 
should be  collected.  In an emergency,  it is essential that different 
analyses  proceed simultaneously,  and so it is necessary to develop 
techniques  to homogenise  materials  such as  root crops,  leafy vegetables 
and herbage.  This  is a  fundamental  change  from  the methodology applied 
under  normal  circumstances,  and  should be  evaluated as part of contingency 
planning. 
The  rapid determination of strontium-89  and strontium-90 requires  a 
method  that is not used under  normal  circumstances.  A published procedure 
has  been evaluated and  works  well,  but it should be validated by  each 
individual  laboratory before operational use.  For  most  materials,  a 
result can be obtained within 15  h  of the receipt of the sample.  It is 
recommended  that gravimetry,  or another method  based on  the determination 
of stable strontium,  should be  used used to estimate recovery. 
Different methods  of radiochemical  analysis of the actinides have 
been assessed;  none  are markedly superior in terms  of speed.  In view of 
the complexity of these procedures it is recommended  that,  in the event of 
an accident,  laboratories continue to use their established,  validated 
procedures.  However,  there may  be  a  need to review their applicability 
- 117 -for  smaller sample  sizes or materials  that are  not normally encountered. 
For  example,  smaller sample  sizes may  enable steps to remove  matrix 
interference effects to be  omitted.  This  type  of review should also take 
place as part of contingency planning.  Using  methods  that are currently 
in use at this laboratory,  a  determination of plutonium can be completed 
within 20  hours of the receipt of the  sample;  results for  americium and 
curium would  be  available about  15  hours  later. 
Direct measurements  of plutonium via  low-energy photon emissions  are 
not  likely to be  of practical use  except in the event of a  pure actinide 
release.  For selected materials,  determination of americium  by direct 
means  can achieve detection limits that are  adeq~ate for  the purposes  of 
emergency response.  However,  measurements  made  using  low-energy photon 
emissions  are complicated by self-absorption within the  sample matrix,  and 
suitable calibration procedures  must  be  developed as part of contingency 
planning. 
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Objectives of measurements  of different environmental  materials 
Material  Objective 
Airborne activity  Assess  doses  due  to inhalation of 
radionuclides either after release to 
atmosphere  or following resuspension of 
deposited activity 
Predict subsequent deposition to ground 
Rainwater  Estimate deposited activity 
Drinking water  Estimate intakes of activity 
Surface waters  Predict consequences of use  for 
irrigation,  agriculture and fisheries 
Grass  Estimate deposited activity 
Predict onward  transfer to animal  products 
such as  milk and  meat 
Soil  Estimate deposited activity 
Predict subsequent transfer to plants 
Foodstuffs  Estimate dietary intakes of activity 
Demonstrate  compliance with statutory 
limits 
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 Table  3 
Sample  sizes and  typical minimum  detectable activities 
Minimum  detectable activities 
achievable 
Sample 
Material  size  Units  Sr-89  Sr-90  Actinides 
Airborne  1  m 3  Bq  m· 3  0.3  0.45  0.003 
particles 
Water  1  1  Bq  1- 1  5  9  0.1 
Soil  5  g  Bq  kg-
1*  325  575  0.3 
Grass  50  g  Bq  kg· 1t  5  9  0.1 
Milk  SO  ml  Bq  1- 1  s  9  0.1 
Vegetables  50  g  Bq  kg· 1t  5  9  0.1 
Estimates of minimum  detectable activity were  based on  the  95% 
confidence  level 
*denotes  activity concentration on  a  dry weight basis 
tdenotes activity concentration on  a  fresh weight basis 
- 124 -Table  4 
Time  taken for  the  analysis  of  sample  batches  of  6 
Approximate  time  taken in hours 
Sample  Ash  Determinand  Analysis  Count  Total 
Air filter  24  Sr isotopes  6  4  34 
Pu  isotopes  12  2  36 
Am/Cm  24  2  53 
Water  0  Sr isotopes  6  4  10 
Pu  isotopes  8  2  10 
Am/Cm  24  2  29 
Soil  2  Sr isotopes  6  4  12 
Pu  isotopes  12  2  16 
Am/Cm  24  2  31 
Grass  4-5  Sr  isotopes  6  4  15 
Pu  isotopes  12  2  19 
Am/Cm  24  2  34 
Milk  2  Sr  isotopes  6  4  12 
Pu  isotopes  8  2  12 
Am/Cm  24  2  31 
Vegetables  4-5  Sr  isotopes  6  4  15 
Pu  isotopes  12  2  19 
Am/Cm  24  2  34 
- 125  -Table  5 
Validation of the  rapid method  for  the determination of radiostrontium 
Chemical  Activity  Activity 
Sample  Nuclide  recovery  added,  Bq  Measured,  Bq 
Milk  1  Sr-89  75.6%  101.0  104  ± 2 
Milk  1  Sr-90  75.6%  104.6  101  ± 2 
Milk  2  Sr-89  72.7%  807.6  841  ± 4 
Milk  2  Sr-90  72.7%  41.8  37  ± 4 
Water  1  Sr-89  84.6%  101.0  105  ± 1 
Water  1  Sr-90  84.6%  104.6  102  ± 2 
Water  2  Sr-89  83.2%  807.6  834  ± 3 
Water  2  Sr-90  83.2%  41.8  34  ± 4 
The  quoted uncertainties represent the bounds  of the  95%  confidence 
interval. 
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Table  6a 
Estimated detection limits  for direct measurements  of plutonium 
Pure  actinide release  Actinide/fission 
product  release 
15  min  1000  min  15  min  1000  min 
count  count  count  count 
Vegetation*,  Bq  kg- 1  19,000  2,300  200,000  23,000 
Water,  Bq  1-1  10,000  1,300  110,000  13,000 
Airborne particles,  500  60  5,000  600_;  .. 
Bq  m- 3 
Soil,  Bq  kg- 1  21,000  2,600  220,000  26,000 
Table  6b 
Estimated detection limits  for direct measurements  of americium 
Pure  actinide release  Actinide/fission 
product release 
15  min  1000  min  15  min  1000  min 
count  count  count  count 
Vegetation*,  Bq  kg- 1  80  10  1,250  155 
Water,  Bq  1- 1  25  3  360  45 
Airborne particles,  1  0.2  16  2 
Bq  m- 3 
Soil,  Bq  kg- 1  25  3  360  45 
*includes foodstuffs 
- 127  -Appendix  1 
Proposed method  of  analysis  for  radiostrontium 
1  Preliminary treatment 
1.1  Air filters 
1  After ashing,  quantitatively transfer the  residue using 8  H nitric 
acid to a  PTFE  beaker.  Dislodge  any  stubborn particles using an 
ultrasonic bath or a  rubber policeman and  rinse at least three  times 
with 8  M nitric acid. 
2  Evaporate to dryness  under  an infra-red lamp. 
3  Dissolve in 5  ml  of 40%  hydrofluoric acid and  heat to dryness. 
4  Repeat  st~p 3  twice. 
5  Add  10  ml  of concentrated nitric acid and a  few  mg  of solid aluminium 
nitrate and beat to dryness. 
6  Add  a  further  10  ml  of concentration nitric acid and  heat to 
dryness. 
7  Dissolve in a  minimum  volume  of  8  M nitric acid. 
8  If actinide analysis is to be  carried out on this same  sample, 
transfer to a  suitable volumetric  flask and  dilute to the mark  with 
water.  Transfer half the  solution to a  250  ml  beaker,  add  an 
accurately known  weight  of strontium carrier,  about 50  mg,  and 
proceed with the purification.  If actinide analysis is not to be 
carried out,  the whole  solution can be  used. 
1.2  Water 
1  Acidify the aliquot taken with 10  ml  of hydrochloric acid and dilute 
to about  200  ml.  Add  an accurately known  amount,  typically about 
50  mg,  of strontium carrier and stir. 
2  Adjust the  pH  to 10 ± 0.5  with  5%  sodium hydroxide. 
3  Add  4  g  of  ammonium  carbonate with stirring.  Continue  to stir for at 
least 10  minutes after all the reagent bas dissolved. 
4  Filter with suction through a  No  42  Whatman  paper and  wash  the 
precipitate with 5%  ammonium  carbonate solution.  Reject the filtrate 
and  washings. 
5  Remove  from  suction and  wet  the filter paper with 8  H nitric acid to 
dissolve the precipitate.  Reapply  suction and  wash  through with 8  M 
nitric acid. 
6  Transfer the solution to a  250  ml  beaker  and proceed with the 
purification. 
- 128 -1.3  Milk 
1  Dissolve  the ash  in a  minimum  volume  of  8  M nitric acid and  add 
accurately about  50  mg  of strontium carrier. 
2  Transfer quantitatively to a  250  ml  beaker and  proceed with the 
purification. 
1.4  Soil 
1  Add  100  ml  of aqua  regia to the ashed 50  g  of soil and  digest at near 
boiling for  2  hours. 
2  Cool  and  filter through a  Whatman  GF/B,  washing  with concentrated 
hydrochloric acid and  then·water. 
3  Make  up  to a  known  volume  in a  suitable volumetric flask.  Mix  well. 
(This  stock solution would  also be used for the actinide analysis). 
4  Place an aliquot of one  tenth of the solution in a  250  ml  beaker,  add 
accurately about  50  mg  of strontium carrier and  evaporate to near 
dryness. 
5  Add  50  ml  of concentrated nitric acid and evaporate  to near  dryness 
again. 
6  Add  50  ml  of  8  M nitric acid and  proceed with the purification. 
1.5  Grass  and  vegetables 
1  Digest the ash with  100  ml  of concentrated nitric acid at near 
boiling until the residue has  dissolved or for  2  hours,  whichever  is 
shorter. 
2  Filter through  a  glass fibre filter paper,  wash  with 8  M nitric acid 
and  then water.  Reject  the residue. 
3  Transfer to a  250  ml  beaker and proceed with the purification. 
2  Purification of strontium 
1  Evaporate  on  a  hot plate until salting out begins. 
2  Immediately  add  20  ml  of water. 
3  Cool  in an  ice bath and  add,  wi:h stirring, 67  ml  of  fuming  nitric 
acid.  Continue stirring for  30  minutes. 
4  Filter with suction through a  glass fibre filter paper  and  wash  with 
fuming  nitric acid.  Reject the filtrate and  washings. 
5  Remove  from  suction and  wet  the precipitate with water to dissolve. 
6  Reapply  suction and  wash  through with water,  keeping the volume  to a 
minimum. 
7  Transfer to a  50  ml  centrifuge tube  and  add  20  mg  of barium carrier, 
1  ml  of  6  M acetic acid and  2  ml  of  6  H ammonium  acetate solution. 
- 129 -8  Adjust  the  pH  to 5.5 with dilute  ammonia  or dilute hydrochloric 
acid. 
9  Heat  to 90°C  in a  water  bath,  and  add,  dropwise with stirring,  1  ml 
of 0.3 M sodium  chromate  solution.  Heat  in a  boiling water  bath for 
30  minutes. 
10  Cool  in an ice bath and centrifuge.  Decant  the supernate carefully 
into a  clean tube  and  reject the precipitate. 
11  Add  5  mg  of ferric chloride.  Mix  and  add  concentrated ammonia 
solution dropwise until the  solution is alkaline.  Centrifuge  and 
decant the supernate into a  clean tube.  Note  the ·mid-time  of the 
centrifugation.  Reject the precipitate. 
12  Add  2  g  of  ammonium  carbonate  and  digest in a  water bath to coagulate 
the precipitate. 
13  Cool  and transfer to a  tared liquid scintillation vial,  in stages  as 
necessary,  and  centrifuge.  Carefully decant the supernate and 
reject. 
14  Wash  with water  and  centrifuge.  Reject the washings. 
15  Dry  in a  drying oven at ll0°C to constant weight.  Record  the weight 
of strontium carbonate to calculate chemical recovery. 
16  Dissolve in 2  ml  of 8  M nitric acid and heat to dryness. 
17  Dissolve in 2  ml  of water  and  count on  a  liquid scintillation counter 
at the previously determined Cerenkov settings for  20  minutes. 
18  Add  10  ml  of scintillant and  recount at the previously determined 
strontium-90/strontium-89 settings.  Record  the mid-count  time to 
calculate the  ingrowth of yttrium-90 from  step 11. 
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Appendix  2 
Sample  Collection 
The  collection of samples  is an  important aspect of any  monitoring 
programme,  since no  amount  of analytical effort can redress  the  problem of 
an  inappropriate sample.  The  way  in which  a  sample  is collected and 
treated depends  upon  the objective of the measurement  programme.  After an 
accident,  the objectives are to provide data on  which  to base  dose 
assessments  and decisions on the need for countermeasures.  This  appendix 
contains a  brief description of the protocols that this laboratory would 
use  for these purposes,  and  which  are being  reco~ended for  use  throughout 
the United Kingdom.  In an  emergency,  many  different organisations  wo~ld 
carry out  sampling and  measurements,  and  it is essential that results are 
directly comparable.  Analytical expertise can be  conveniently assessed 
from  intercomparison exercises,  but the quality of sample  collection 
cannot  be  checked easily.  It is recommended  therefore that sampling 
protocols are agreed in advance  by  all organisations who,  in an  emergency, 
could carry out environmental  measurements.  In such circumstances,  an 
analytical  laboratory would  be  under great pressure and  could justifiably 
discard samples  of dubious  origin or quality. 
1  Airborne  radionuclides 
Objectives:  to assess  doses  due  to inhalation of airborne 
radionuclides,  to predict subsequent deposition on  to ground;  to assess 
doses  due  to the resuspension of deposited activity. 
The  radionuclides  of interest in this study would  be  associated 
exclusively with particles and  can therefore  be  sampled  by  drawing  a 
kno~~,  large volume  of air through a  filter.  The  filter material  can be 
of glass fibre,  polystyrene or polycarbonate with a  retention capability 
of at least 99%  for 0.45 ~  particles.  The  choice  of filter material  is 
sometimes  limited to what  is available at the time,  although it should be 
borne  in mind  that organic filters are easier to decompose  during 
subsequent analysis.  The  equipment  should be  sited so that the  sampling 
head is 1-2 m from  the ground in a  flat open  area at least 20  m away  from 
buildings.  The  exhaust must  be  arranged so that air is not recycled.  It 
is recommended  that flow  rates should not be  less than 0.1 m 3  min- 1 •  The 
sampling period is likely to vary as  an emergency situation develops,  but 
for  the purposes  of this project a  minimum  sampling period of  15  minutes 
has  been assumed. 
- 131  -2  Rain"·~ter 
Objective:  to estimate deposited activity. 
Samples  should be  collected using a  plastic funnel  of known  diameter 
leading to a  plastic reservoir.  The  funnel  should be  positioned in an 
open  area  away  from  overhanging trees,  buildings,  walls,  power  lines etc. 
The  top of the  funnel  should be  raised above  ground  level  so that melting 
snow  is not collected.  It is important  that collected radionuclides  do 
not adsorb on to the container,  so,  for  short sampling periods of up  to 5 
days,  a  small  quantity of nitric acid should be  added before collection 
begins;  S  ml  of concentrated acid for every litre of reservoir volume  is 
adequate.  For the purposes  of this study,  samples will probably not be 
left standing over·  S  days,  but where  this is unavoidable,  or as  an 
alternative to the acid,  a  cocktail of different cations  should be  used. 
A suitable cocktail is given in reference Appl.  Where  samples  have  to be 
stored between collection and  measurement,  the bottle should be  tightly 
stoppered and  kept in a  cool  place.  The  total activity in the sample 
should be  estimated in order to calculate the activity deposited over  the 
area of the collector funnel  in the  time  of collection. 
3  Drinking water 
Objective:  to assess  the  intakes of  radionuclides  from  ingestion of 
drinking water. 
At  least 1  litre of tap water  should be  collected in a  plastic 
container.  Treatment of  the  sample  with acid and  storage,  if necessary, 
should be  carried out as  in Section  2.  If the sample  is taken directly 
from  an  open  lake used as  a  reservoir,  any particulate material  should be 
filtered off and  the activity concentrations  determined separately.  The 
results  for  aqueous  and particulate phases  can  then be  combined  to give 
the total activity concentrations per unit volume  of sample.  The 
filtration step is described in Section 4. 
4  Surface waters 
Objective:  to predict the radiological  impact  of the use of surface 
waters  for  irrigation or agricultural purposes. 
Surface waters  should be  collected directly into a  plastic bottle. 
The  sample  should be  filtered shortly after collection through a  filter of 
pore size 0.45  pm  to remove  particulate material  on which radionuclides 
may  adsorb.  Acid  should not be  added until after filtration so that 
previously adsorbed material is not re-dissolved.  The  particulate loading 
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(dry  ~eight per unit volume  of sample)  should be  determined.  The 
activities of  the  aqueous  and  particulate phases  should be  determined 
separately.  Storage  requirements  for  the  aqueous  phase  are as  described 
in Section 2.  The  solid phase  should be  stored in a  sealed container at 
ambient  temperature. 
5  Grass 
Objectives:  to estimate deposited activity;  to predict transfer to 
animal  products  such as milk and  meat. 
For deposition,  grass  should be  cut to within 10  mm  of the ground 
from  a  known  area,  usually 1  square metre,  using garden shears.  If this 
is not sufficient to provide a  large enough  sample,  then a  larger area  may 
be  used provided that the  area is measured  and recorded.  The  site chosen 
for  sampling should be  away  from  trees,  roads,  tracks  (including obvious 
animal  tracks),  hedges  and  buildings.  Roadside  verges  are not  acceptable 
since  these may  also include secondary deposition from  run-off  from  the 
road  surface  and  splash from  vehicles.  Estimates of total deposition 
should include measurements  of the associated soil  (Section 6). 
Samples  of grass used to estimated transfer to animal  products must 
be  taken from  the  area currently grazed by  the  animals.  The  criteria 
concerning the site of sampling are as  before,  and  the sample  is again 
normally taken from  an  area of  1  square  metre  (in practice the  same  sample 
is often used  for both deposition and  transfer estimates).  There  may  also 
be  a  requirement to take samples  from  fields  reserved for producing silage 
or hay so that estimates of future  intakes can be  made. 
If necessary grass  samples  can be  in a  deep freeze. 
6  Soil 
Objectives:  to estimate deposition of activity,  in conjunction with 
overlying grass  (Section 5);  to predict onward  transfer to plants.  For 
deposition,  a  soil sample  is taken from  the  approximate centre of the  area 
from  which  the grass  has  been cut.  Soil collected to estimate transfer to 
plants  should be  taken from  those areas currently under cultivation,  and 
well  away  from  trees,  hedges,  buildings and  areas susceptible to flooding. 
The  soil sample  should be  sampled to a  depth of  150  mm  and  from  a  known 
area of not  less than 40  mm  diameter.  It is recommended  that a  purpose 
built percussion corer be  used,  garden tools not being considered 
acceptable. 
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Objectives:  to demonstrate  compliance with statutory limits;  to 
assess dietary intakes of activity. 
Samples  may  be  collected at the point of production or at a  retail 
outlet.  In either case,  the  samples  should be  ready for  consumption,  and, 
in order to estimate dietary intakes,  edible parts should be  measured 
separately. 
7.1  Milk  and other fluids 
Milk samples collected directly from  farms  should come  from  the milk 
tank,  not  from  individual animals.  The  volume  collected should be at 
least 1  litre, and  a  small amount  of a  preservative such as  sodium 
metabisulphite should be  added  immediately after collection.  Storage,  if 
necessary,  shou_ld  be  in a  refrigerator. 
For other  food  fluids,  again,  at least 1  litre should be  taken. 
Storage,  if necessary,  should follow the manufacturers instructions,  or if 
there are none,  in a  cool place. 
7.2  Fruit and vegetables 
Immature  fruit and vegetables  should not be measured.  Culinary 
preparation can remove  substantial proportions  of radionuclides  from  some 
fruit  and  vegetables(App2),  so it is  important that,  for estimates of 
dietary intake,  edible parts and non-palatable parts are measured 
separately.  The  results can be  combined  later if required for  regulatory 
purposes.  At  least 1  kg  fresh weight of edible portion should be 
collected.  Storage, if necessary,  should be  in a  refrigerator or deep 
freeze. 
7.3  Meat  and fish 
Again,  at least 1  kg  fresh weight of edible portion should be 
obtained and the edible and non-edible portions  should be  measured 
separately.  Storage, if necessary·,  should be  in a  refrigerator or deep 
freeze. 
7.4  ~ 
At  least 6  eggs  should  b~ collected.  Since the objective is to 
estimate the intake of activity,  the shells should be  removed  and 
measurements  should be made  on  the contents.  Storage, if necessary, 
should be  in a  refrigerator, or,  after homogenisation,  by freeze-drying. 
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7.5  .Other  food  solids 
In general,  at least  1 kg  of these  samples,  such as  tea,  coffee  and 
dried herbs,  should be  collected for  measurement.  The  samples  can be 
stored in a  cool,  dry place. 
8  References 
Appl  Methods  for  the  examination of waters  and  associated materials. 
Determination of radioactivity in water by  multinuclide gamma  ray 
spectrometry 1989.  ISBN  0  11  752220  1.  HMSO,  London  (1989). 
App2  Bradley,  E J, Popplewell,  D S,  and  Wilkins,  B T  The  influence of 
simple culinary preparation on  the radionuclide content of 
vegetables.  Proc.  of Seminar  on  Radioactivity transfer during  food 
processing and  culinary preparation,  Cadarache,  France  (1989).  CEC, 
DGll. 
- 135  -I 
vr.  Investigation  and  improvement  of  methods  for  the  determination 
of  specific activities at laboratory level 
Activity measurements  of  beta  emitting  radionuclides 
In-situ measurements 
by 
U.  Lauterbach 
Physikalisch Technische  Bundesanstalt 
Braunschweig,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
- 137  -!.Introduction 
In  principle methods  for  the  measurement  of  radioactivity  in 
environmental  samples  are  considered  ~o be  well  developed  and 
established.  After  the  Chernobyl  accident,  however,  it became 
evident  that  not  everybody  was  prepared  for  quick  in-situ 
measurements  and  that many  measurement  results especially with 
respect  to  beta emitting  radionuclides  were  questionable.  To 
assess  the  consequences  of  the  fallout,  quantitative data  were 
needed  in  a  reasonably  short  time  on  the  surface-related 
activity of  the  contamination deposited  on  the soil outdoors, 
the activity concentrations  in air  and  water  and  the  specific 
activities of  foodstuffs.  Countermeasures  can  be  only planned 
on  the  basis of  reliable data  on  these quantities. 
The  situation was  rather  complicated  during  the  Chernobyl 
accident  because  the fallout  consisted of  a  mixture  of  various 
radionuclides  - up  to  30  - emitting mainly  gamma  radiation 
and  beta particles.  (Alpha  emitters -actinides- will  not  be 
considered  in  this  context.)  The  composition of  the  conta-
mination  was  continiously  changing  due  to  the  fast  decay  of 
radionuclides with  short half-lives. 
Portable  contamination meters  have  often  been  used  to ascertain 
the  order  of  magnitude  of  the  outdoors  contamination.  These 
instruments,  originally developed  for  contamination measure-
ments  in  laboratories,  were  available  in  large  numbers.  The 
readings  of  such  instruments· were  often  interpreted as  the  true 
values  of  the quantities  to  be  determined  without  taking  into 
account  the  entirely different measuring  conditions  in  these 
situations.  Countermeasures  on  this  basis  were  as  doubtful  as 
the  measured  quantities  th~mselves if  the  readings  of  the 
contamination  meters  were  not  critically screened  and 
evaluated. 
A  discussion of  the  possibilities  and  limits of  in-situ 
measurements  of  beta emitting  radionuclides will  clearly 
- 138  -'I 
II 
demonstrate  the  need  for  the  development  of  rapid  and  reliable 
methods  at laboratory  level.  Portable  contamination meters  can 
be  helpful  in distinguishing  between  more  and  less contaminated 
areas  and  in giving  the tirst indication of  where  samples  for 
measurements  at a  laboratory  level  should  be  collected.  It was 
the  aim  of  this  study  to  investigate  if commercially  available 
contamination meters  are suitable  for  these  tasks.  By  means  of 
intercornparison measurements  the properties of  instruments  have 
been  additionally checked. 
2.In-situ measurements 
2a.  In-situ gamma  spectrometer 
In  accidents  or  other  situations  w~th  rad~onuclides being 
released  into  the  environment  reliable data  on  the  contami-
nation  should  be  obtained within  a  sufficiently short  time  in 
order  to  enable  the  taking  of  appropriate  countermeasures  to 
reduce  the  radiation doses  to  man.  Radionuclides  emitting  gamma 
radiation  can  be  rapidly  and  easily determined  with  a  well 
calibrated  in-situ gamma  spectrometry  system.  Reliable  data 
enabling  the  consequences  of  the  event  to  be  estimated are 
immediately available.  Besides  the  kind  of  radionuclide,  the 
measured  spectra also  furnish  the  values  of  the  surface-related 
activities of  the  contamination deposited  on  the soil,  or  with 
an  appropriate calibration,  values  of  the  specific activity of 
the  soil.  The  disadvantages  of  this method  are  its restriction 
to  gamma  emitting  radionuclides  and  that it can  be  only  used  by 
a  highly qualified staff. 
2b.  Portable  contamination meters 
In  contrast  to  the  sophisticated spectrorntry  system  anyone  can 
turn  on  a  contamination meter  and  take  a  reading  in  units given 
-1  -2  on  the  control  panel  mostly  in  s  or  in  Bq  ern  •  The  detectors 
of  these  instruments  are  GM-counters,  proportional counters  or 
sandwich-scintillators  which  are  sensitive chiefly  to  beta 
particles,  but  less effective  in detecting  gamma  rays. 
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is proportional  to  the  flux  of  charged particles  traversing  the 
sensitive  volume  of  the  detector  and  producing electrical 
signals at  its output.  The  detector  reading  is  therefore  in 
first order  a  measure  of  the  particle flux  at the  point where 
the  detector  is located.  The·relationship  between  the  reading 
and  the  activity of  the  contamination  however  is  rather  complex 
(see e.g.  in  (1), (3)).  While  it is very  easy  to  take  a 
measurement  with  this  kind  of  instrument,  it may  become  very 
difficult to correctly  interpret the  results obtained. 
The  main  aspects  to  be  considered  in  this context  are 
- the  relationship  between  the  number  of particles emitted 
from  the  contamination  and  the  activity 
- the  transfer  of  these particles  to  the meter's detector 
- the different  response  received  from  several  types  of 
detectors  depending  on  the  kind  and  the  energy 
of particles. 
Fig.l Schematic  source  - detector  arrangement with  possible 
paths  of particles emitted  from  a  radioactive  source 
Fig.l  taken  from  (3)  illustrates this  by  showing  the  possible 
paths direct or  indirect,  by  which  particles  from  a  source  may 
or  may  not  reach  the  detector: 
(1)  particles  reaching  the  detector directly; 
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(2}  particles  reaching  the detector  as  result of 
backscattering  from  the  source  or  the  holder; 
(3}  particles  leaving  the  source  in  the direction of  the  upper 
solid angle  2~ sr,  but  not  reaching  the  detector  due  to 
absorption  in air; 
(4}  particles emitted  into  the  upper  solid angle. of  2 'ii sr, 
but not  leaving  the  source  due  to  self-absorption; 
(5}  particles leaving.the  source  in  the direction of  the  upper 
angle  2 7f sr,  but  missing  the detector  due  to  the  geometry; 
(6}  all particles emitted  into  the  lower  solid angle  of 
2 'ii sr,  including  back-scattered particles with  the 
exception  of particles mentioned  in  (2}. 
The  number  of particles  reaching  the  sensitive  volume  of  the 
detector  depends  on  the  properties of  the  source  and  its 
carrier  (due  to  self-absorption and  backscatter),  the 
geometrical  arrangement  of  the  detector  (  due  to·loss of 
particles  and  absorption  in air  )  a~d the properties of  the 
detector  (  due  to absorption  and  backscatter  in  the  entrance 
windows}.  Moreover,  owing  to  its energy-dependent efficiency, 
the  number  of particles actually counted  is less  than  the 
number  of particles entering  the detector.  The  amount  of 
backscatter  of  beta particles depends  mainly  on  the  atomic 
number  of  the  scattering material  and  to  a  lesser extent  on  the 
energy of  the  particles  (6},(7},(8}.  Data  on  the  absorption of 
beta particles  in different materials  are  given  in  (1), (8}. 
The  range  of  beta particles  in solid matter  is  in  the  order  of 
only  a  few  millimeter.  Thi~ must  be  taken  into account  when 
determining  the  specific activity of  environmental  samples. 
Owing  to  the  short  range  of  beta particles,  special prepa-
rations  and  a  special measuring  technique  are  necessary. 
The  complex  relationship  between  the  activity of  a  radio-
nuclide emitting  beta particles and  the  number  of particles 
counted  clearly illustrates the difficulties  in  determining 
the  activity of  a  surface  contamination directly  from  the 
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taken  into  account  in  this  case. 
The  use  of  a  suitably calibrated  instrument  is  therefore  more 
usual  and  convenient.  The  calibration source  should  have . 
properties similar  to  those  of  the  contamination  to  be  measured 
- radionuclide,  carrier with  respect  to  backscatter  and 
selfabsorption  in  the  source -.  Conditions  in  a  laboratory 
usually fulfil  these  requirements  near  enough  for  sufficiently 
accurate  contamination measurements  to  be  carried out  there. 
Nevertheless  the  results  of  such  measurements  should  be 
evaluated  only  by  qualified personnel  considering  the  complex 
relationship  between  activity  and  the  indication of  a 
contamination meter  and  the  further  requirements  necessary  to 
obtain reliable results. 
The  purpose  of  a  survey  carried out  by  the  NPL  (10)  in  1986  was 
to  check  the  accuracy of  surface  contamination measurements  in 
UK  hospitals.  The  analysis  of  the  results,  however,  clearly 
demonstrated  that  there  were  significant errors  and  the 
situation  in  this field  needs  some  improvement. 
In addition  to  their  use  in  laboratories contamination meters 
were  often used  during  the  Chernobyl  accident  to obtain data  on 
the  outdoors  contamination.  Many  instruments  were  operated  by 
unqualified personnel  and  the  evaluation of  the  results  was 
restricted  to  the  report  on  the  readings  in  units given  on  the 
control panel.  Some  confusion  arose  among  the public  as  a 
result of  the  uncritical publication of data  such  as  surface-
related activities  and  without  considering  the physical 
relationships,  such  as  the  specific activities of  environmental 
samples  (1). 
In  incident  or  accident  situations  there  is often little 
knowledge  of  the  mixture  of  the  outdoor  contamination.  The 
measuring  conditions  are  not  well  defined  and  the  composition 
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of  the  mixture  changes  continuously  to  the  radionuclides with 
short half-lives.  In  addition,  the  fallout was  not  only 
deposited  on  the  surface  of  the  soil  but  was  also migrating  in 
it to  a  depth  of  3  ern.  Fig.l clearly demonstrates  that  in  a 
situation like this  there  is  a  poor  relationship  between  the 
activity of  the  fallout  and  the  reading  of  a  contamination 
meter  for  pure  beta  emitting  radionuclides.  Absorption  in  the 
soil,  scatter,  varying  distances  between  source  and  detector, 
absorption  in air  and  different  responses  of particles with 
different energies  are  the  main  parameters  influencing  these 
results. 
This  problem  can  only  be  solved  by  combining  these  measurements 
with  more  reliable methods  at laboratory level,  where  data of 
sufficient accuracy  can  be  obtained.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
contamination meters  are  valuable  tools  in  ascertaining  the. 
degree  of  contamination  and  in deciding  if environmental 
samples  should  be  collected  and  more  precise measurements  at 
laboratory level  be  carried out. 
In  addition  to  assessing  soil contamination  these  instruments 
have  also  been  used  to decide  if vegetables  in  the  field e.g. 
lettuce should  be  banned  due  to  the  "specific activity" 
measured.  The  previous discussion  have  clearly shown  that this 
method  was  very  doubtful  and  completely  unsuitable.  When  the 
"specific activity"  was  determined  using  this doubtful  method 
in many  cases destroying  vegetables  by  ploughing  the  fields 
seemed  to  be  unnecessary  and  expensive  as  farmers  had  to  be 
compensated.  As  has  been  pointed,  out  only activity measure-
ments  at laboratory level  provide  reliable  results  on  which 
decisions  on  countermeasures,  e.g.  ban  of  foodstuffs,  should  be 
based. 
3.  Properties of portable  contamination  meters 
3a.  Comparison  measurements 
In  collaboration with  18  institutes  (local authorities,  nuclear 
power  plants,  fire-brigades,  universities,  hospitals)  and  a 
number  of  physicians  from  the  Lower  Saxony  area,  comparison 
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carried  out  (9).  These  instruments  were  to  be.checked  for  their 
suitability for  use  in  tasks  as  discussed  in section  2.  The 
participants were  asked  to  determine  with  their  equipment  the 
surface-related activities of  four  surface  sources  with  the 
radionuclides  Pm-147,  Co-60,  Cl-36  and  Sr-90/Y-90  calibrated at 
the  Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt.  The  calibration was 
performed  using  a  windowless  large-area proportional  counter 
( 5) • 
The  four  surface  sources  had  an  area  of  150  cm2  and  each 
complied  with  the  recommendations  of  the  ISO  draft on 
"Reference  sources  for  the calibration of  surface  contamination 
monitors  - Beta-emitters  (maximum  beta energy greater  than  0.15 
MeV)  and  alpha-emitters"(4), (5).  The  data  on  these  sources  are 
presented  in 
Table  1. 
Table  1:  Data  on  the  reference  sources 
Radio-
nuclide 
Pm-147 
Co-60 
Cl-36 
Sr-90/ 
Y-90 
Max.  energy 
of  beta 
particles 
keV 
225 
310 
710 
545 
2270 
*)  related  to 10.04.1987 
Surface-
rel~t~d  *) 
actJ.vJ.ty 
-2  Bq  em 
10.51 
12.09 
16.55 
7.74 
Uncertainty 
of  the  reported 
activity 
(confidence-
level  99%) 
10% 
3% 
7% 
5% 
Particle 
flux  den-
sity 
-1  -2  s  em 
5.30 
5.74 
9.26 
9.74 
To  ensure  uniform  geometry  conditions  and  a  constant distance 
between  the  source  and  the  entrance  windows  of  the detectors 
the  special  device  of  acrylglas  was  constructed  shown  in Fig. 
2.  Frames  of  different sizes  were  used  to fit  all areas  of  the 
- 144 -II 
entrance  windows.  The  distance  between  source  and  window  in 
this  arrangement  was  in each  case  in  the  order  of  1  mm  • 
Fig.2 
reference source:  150 mm  X  100  mm 
Schematic  diagram of  the  distance device 
(1)  support for  the  surface  source, 
(2)  exchangeable  frame  ) 
A staff member  of  the  Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt 
visited all participating institutes with  this set of  four 
sources  and  the distance-device,  protocolled  the  technical data 
of  the  equipment  and  asked  the participants  to determine  the 
surface-related activities of  the  four  sources.  Because  there 
were  several  uncal~brated instruments,  the  number  of activities 
reported  for  the  source  set is below  that of  the  equipment 
tested.  In  each  case  the  count  rate  was  protocolled. 
3b.  Results  of  the  comparison 
A  total  of  68  instruments  were  tested  in  the  comparison 
measurements.  The  instruments  contained  proportional  counters, 
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no  information _was  given  on  the  detector  type.  Table  2  shows 
the  number  and  the  classification of  the  instruments  according 
to  the  detector  types.  Additional  information  is given  on  the 
number  of  instruments  tested with  a  specific  radionuclide. 
The  instruments  were  mostly  calibrated with  Sr-90/Y-90 
reference  sources. 
Table  2:  Number  and  classification of  the  instruments 
Detector  type  Number  of 
instruments 
Number  of  instruments with data 
for  a  specific radionuclide 
Pm-147  C0-60  Cl-36  Sr-90/Y-90 
Large-are·a  pro-
portional  counter 
Filling gas: 
Butane 
Butane/Propane 
Xenon 
Methane 
8 
21 
21 
8 
3 
5 
14 
2 
3 
5 
13 
2 
2 
4 
8 
2 
6 
16 
12 
2 
GM  counters 
Scintillation-
detectors 
Not  known 
4 
3 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1  1  1 
2  2  3 
1  1  1 
Total  number  68  28  27  20  41 
Fig.l demonstrates  that theoretically the  fraction  of  the 
particles emitted  from  t~e source  and  reaching  the  detector  is 
50%,  if backscatter  on  the carrier of  the  source  is neglected. 
A careful  evaluation  of  the  count  rates  of all detector  types 
and  a  comparison  of  the  evaluated  surface-related activities 
with  the  values  given  in Table  1  shows  that only  a  fraction  of 
about  20%  for  low  energy  particles  from  Pm-147,  about  26%  from 
Co-60,  about  38%  from  Cl-36,  and  about  40%  from  Sr-90/Y-90 
is  in  the  mean  detected  by  an  instrument. 
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The  absorption  of particles  in  the  entrance  window  was  shown  to 
qe  most  important. 
Table  3  in  the  annex  contains  mean  activity data  from  measure-
ments  with  the different detector  types  and  radionuclides.  The 
maximum  and  minimum  values  measured  are  also  included  in this 
table  to demonstrate  the  spread  of  the  results.  The  reference 
values  of Table  1  are  given  in  the  last row  for  comparison.  In 
Table  4  a  summary  illustrates  the  main  results of  the  compari-
son  measurements  (see also Fig.3  and  Fig.4).  Some  results 
reported  by  the  participants were  omitted  when  all data was 
screened.  Malefunctioning  of  the  equipment  or  misinterpretation 
of  the  readings  must  be  the  reason  for  reported activities 
beyond  all reasonable  values. 
Table  4:  Mean  measured  surface-related activity A  for 
the  various  radionuclides  together  with  minimum 
and  maximum  values  A  .  and  A  measured  m1n  max 
Radio- Number  of  A  A  A  Reference+)  min  nuclide  value_2  measurements  max 
Bq  em  Bq  em -2  Bq  em -2  Bq  em -2 
Pm-147  10.51  +  1.05  27  9.21  2.50  14.74 
Co-60  12.09  +  0.36  25  11.68  5.90  22.99 
Cl-36  16.55  + 1.16  18  15.65  7.99  23.55 
Sr-90/  +  Y-90  7.74 - 0.39  39  10.46  4.30  20.80 
+)  The  confidence  level  for  the  uncertainties of  the 
reference  values  is  99% 
Fig.  3  shows  that  the  spread  of  the  measured  values  is 
independent  of  the particle energy  and  they  always  vary  by  a 
factor  of  about  4  to  5. 
- 147 -----------------------------, 
! 
-2 
Bq  em 
26 
' 
eo  38 
Co  Cl 
90 
>t  201 
Sr  - :E  147  -
Pm 
0 
::r 
as 
"0 
G)  - as 
"i  ... 
I 
CD 
0  as  - I 
...  = 
I  co 
l 
"0 
:r 
CD  ...  =  co  ca 
CD 
E 
200  225  310  645  710  keV  750 
max. beta-energy -
Fig.3  Measured  surface-related activities for  surface  sources  with 
Pm-147,  Co-60,  Sr-90/Y-90,  and  Cl-36  versus  the  maximum  beta 
energy of  the  radionuclides.  The  extension of  the  bars  comprises 
all measured  values.The  black  square  in  the middle  of  each  bar 
indicates  the  mean  value. 
In Fig.4  the  measured  activity  values  are plotted versus  the 
reference  values  of  the  four  reference  sources.  The  dashed  line 
indicates  the position of  equal  measured  and  reference  values. 
The  horizontal width  indicates  the  uncertainty of  the  reference 
values.  In  the  case  of  Sr-90/Y-90  and  Co-60  the  mean  values  are 
shifted to  the  minimum  values.  For  Sr-90/Y-90  the  explanation 
may  be  that  some  of  the  participants  reported  the  total acti-
vity of  the  Sr-90/Y-90  source  instead of  the  activity 
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of  Sr-90  only  which  they  were  asked  for.  The  radiation field  of 
the  Co-60  source  was  a  mixture  of  beta particles and photons 
which  may  have  some  influence  on  the  results. 
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Fig.4  Measured  surface-related activities for  surface  sources with 
Pm-147,  Co-60,  Sr-90/Y-90,  and  Cl-36  versus  the  reference  values 
of  the  surface sources.  The  extension of  the  bars  comprises all 
measured  values.  The  black  square  in  the  middle  of  the  bar 
represents  the  mean  value.  The  horizontal  width  of  the  bars 
corresponds  to  the  uncertainty of  the  reference  values. 
Mean  values  of  detector  responses  are  calculated  from  the 
results obtained  fo~ all detectors  and  given  in Table  5. 
Minimum  and  maximum  values  are  also  shown.  These  data 
illustrate that  the  responses  of  all  kinds  of  portable 
- 149 -instruments  cover  one  order  of  magnitude.  But  the  same  is  true 
if only  the  data  from  one  detector  type  are  screened.  This 
result  is disappointing especially if one  considers  the  well 
defined  me~suring conditions prevailing  in  the  comparison 
measurements.  These  values  also clearly demonstrate  that within 
the  range  of particle energies  considered  the  response differs 
by  a  factor  of  about  2. 
Table  5: 
Radionuclide 
Pm-147 
Co-60 
Cl-36 
Detector  responses  calculated  from 
the data  of  all detectors 
Detector  response  Max.energy  of 
beta particles  Mean  value  Min.  value  Max.  value 
keV 
225 
310 
710 
-1  -1  s  Bq 
0.11 
0.15 
0.22 
-1  -1  s  Bq 
0.006 
0.02 
0.03 
0.20 
0.26 
0.34 
4.  Discussion  and  conclusions 
The  comparison  measurements  discussed  in section  3  were  carried 
out  in order  to  obtain more  information  on  the properties  of 
portable  contamination meters  used  in  in-situ measurements  of 
the activity of  beta-emitting  radionuclides.  The  measuring 
conditions  were  fixed  in order  to  reduce  the  influence  of  the 
geometrical  arrangement,  the  varying  absorption  in air,  the 
scatter of  beta particles  in  the  environment etc.  Reported  data 
with  significant errors  due  to  malefunctioning  equipment  or  to 
misint~rpr~tation of  the  readings  have  been omitted  in this 
assessment. 
The  reported  results  for  the  activities of  the  reference 
sources differ  not  only  for  different detector  types  but  for 
detectors  of  the  same  type,  too.  The  responses  of  the detectors 
types  investigated  vary  by  a  factor  of  about  2  in  the  energy 
- 150 -range  considered.Due  to  this  energy  dependence  the  contribution 
of  the different radionuclides  of  a  mixed  contamination  to  the 
count  rate of  the  the  detector  may  differ significantly from 
their  contribution  to  the  real particle flux  from  the  contami-
nation. 
In  the  calibration of  an  instrument  the  count  rate  is measured 
in  the field of  a  well-specified  reference  surface  source  with 
a  given activity  an~ a  well-defined  geometrical  arrangement. 
The  indicated  count  rate  is proportional  to  the particle flux 
at  the  location of  the detector.  The  unknown  activity of  a 
contamination  is determined  by  comparing  the particle flux  with 
that of  the  calibration source.  To  get  reliable results,  the 
following  conditions  should  be  satisfied: 
- the  ge9metrical  arrangement  should  correspond  to  that 
used  in  the  calibration procedure 
- the  relationship between  the particle flux  and  the  activity 
of  the  unknown  source  should  be  similar  to  that of  the 
reference  source. 
Only  laboratory conditions will  fully  comply  with  these 
requirements  for  carrying out contamination measurements.  The 
conditions prevailing  in in-situ measurements  outdoors  are 
often  completely obscure,  especially when  unknown  mixtures  of 
radionuclides  emitting different  kinds  of particles  - beta 
particles and  photons  - with different energies are  taken  into 
account.In  such  cases  reliable  results  cannot  be  expected. 
As  mentioned·in section  3b  even  instruments  of  the  same  type 
show  a  wide  variation  in  the  indicated  values.  These 
discrepancies  may  be  caused  by  ~ifferences in  the  technical 
properties of  the  individual  instruments. 
In  consideration of  the  physical  conditions  and  the  technical 
features  of  the  instruments  investigated  the  conclusion  reached 
- 151  -here  is that contamination meters  are mostly  not  suitable  for 
the  determination  of  the  activity of  outdoor  contamination  in 
accident or  incident situations.  They  are,  however,  valuable 
tools  in ascertaining  the  degree  of  contamination  and  in making 
decisions  where  samples  for  measurements  in  a  laboratory  should 
be  collected. 
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VI I.  INTERPRETATION OF READINGS FROM ALARM MONITORS. 
Ole Walmod-Larsen, Henrik Ahlers, Joergen Lippert,Flemming Nielsen 
Risoe National Laboratory, University Center of Alborg 
1.  Objectives of  the project: 
Development of instruments and methods as  alarm monitors providing improved 
sensitivity at environmental dose-rate levels and the ability of  discriminating against 
short-term variation of natural radiation exposure related to the natural content of 
radon in the air. 
A system of  11 nationwide early warning stations should be capable of  detecting and 
warning on such low levels of increase in the ambient background radiation as the 
10% measured at Risoe on the "First Chernobyl peak" originating from man-made 
radioactivity. 
The system should enable the competent authority to  give  precise  and relevant 
information to the public within few hours after manmade radioactivity had entered 
Danish terri  tory. 
2.  CommeniB on the progress of the project: 
At the time  of the project proposal negotiations, it was  expected that our group 
would be entrusted to construct and operate the above  mentioned 11  nationwide 
early warning stations, so that  experience from these stations could be utilized in the 
project work within the time frame of the project. 
The competent authority was  at that time the Danish Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). 1st Jan 1988, the authority was transferred to the Civil Defence and 
Emergency Planning Agency (CDEPA) under the Ministry for Interior. This move 
·gave rise to a delay in the planning and ordering of the system in question. 
The ordering was  delayed  until summer 1989.  It was  then demanded,  that the 
stations should be ready for test operation 1st Jan 1990. 
3.  InstrumeniB applied in the project work: 
A test station was constructed at our site with the aim of measuring the ambient 
gamma background radiation. 
- 157 -Two radiation detectors are applied: 
1)  A Reuter-Stokes pressurized ionization chamber with a dynamic range of0.01 
microSv/h- 100 mSv/h with on-line data recording. 
2)  A 3"x3" Nal crystal equipped with a 256 channel analyzer with an energy 
range of 100 keV- 3 MeV. The spectrum is read out each hour. 
3)  Detailed meteorological data incl. precipitation are obtained from the Ris¢ 
meteorological station, available from Jan. 86. 
Regarding (1): 
Regarding (2): 
Regarding (3): 
The ionization chamber was  in operation already in March 
1986, i.e. through the initial Chernobyl accident period. Since 
then data have been obtained with minor interruptions. 
Data  have  been  obtained  from  Dec.  86  with  minor 
interruptions. 
From rain intensity gauges at the 11 stations, continuous data 
were available after Dec. 1989, giving signals with a sensitivity 
of0.1 mm/h. 
On-line data transfer was established from the test station to a computer in the 
laboratory. From Dec.  1989  a central computer was serving the 11 stations in the 
nationwide early warning monitoring system mentioned above. 
4.  Main Tasks: 
After an initial evaluation, the investigation within the project was concentrated on 
the following main tasks: 
A.  To search for a set of alarm criteria based on the coupling of data from the 
ion chamber reading (1) and precipitation data (3). 
B.  To  utilize  the  information  from  the  spectrometer  (2)  and  from  the 
meteorological data (3)  to exclude the increases in readings due to higher 
Radon daughter concentrations during and after precipitation. 
C.  To apply data technique in the handling of the information obtained by (1), 
(2) and (3) for the separation of  Radon daughter radiation and radiation from 
man-made radioactivity. 
- 158  -II 
II 
4.1  Description of  the work on task A: 
From March 1986 to September 1988 a total of 15,581 one-hour, time correlated 
measurements of both ambient radiation dose rate from (1)  and precipitation rate 
(3) have been recorded and analyzed. 
Fig. 1 illustrates both the ion chamber dose  rate readings (upper curve) and the 
precipitation rate (lower curve) as a function of time in April and May 1986. The 
increase, marked I, is caused by Radon-daughters washed out by precipitation. The 
increase, marked IT,  is the passage of the first cloud from Chernobyl on 27th April. 
The increase, marked ill, is due to Chemobyl activity deposited by precipitation on 
7th May. 
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Fig. 1.  Ion chamber dose rate and precipitation rate measured at the test station at 
Risoe National Laboratory in April and May 1986. 
The increases marked I - V are described in the text. 
Analyses of  the 15,581 data set indicated, that a way to detect events like Chernobyl 
was to concentrate upon the increase rate in the ionization chamber reading. 
- 159 -When the first Chernobyl cloud, marked II in fig.  1,  reached Ris¢,  the reading at 
1407 hours showed  an increase of 5.55  % or 0.41  microR/h compared  with the 
reading one hour before. 
A search for data with increases> 5 %/hour gave 61 such data sets, 15,519 with <5 
%/hour, and one initial data set. 
An analysis of the 61 data set separated them into two groups: 
55 with an increase to a level above the "normal level" 
6 with an increase to the normal level from an unusually low  1  eve  1  in  the 
preceding hours. 
The "normal level" is here understood as the mean value of the preceding 8 hours. 
The need to exclude  the 6 last mentioned data set led to the formulation of an 
algorithm for sorting out the relevant events for alarm: 
•Attention is necessary if  a reading increases more than 5 '17 
both compared with the last hour and with the mean value of 
the last 8 hours•. 
Of the 55 increases, 51 were found to be coupled with precipitation in the same or 
in the preceding three hours. 
The remaining 4 increases during dry weather were given closer consideration. 
With the standard deviation (SD) available the data sets could be further sorted. 
The sampling time of these data was set to 40 sec. The mean values of 90 
samplings (one hour) and the SD were collected. 
The SD of the 15,581 data set could be divided into two groups: 
15,578 with SD  < 10 % and 3  - - > 10 %. 
These 3 increases were found to be 3 of the 4 dry weather increases mentioned 
above. 
- 160 -II 
Further checks showed that in the 3 situations both the reading and the SD were 
normal one hour before and one hour after, wherefore they were discarded as 
non-valid readings, probably caused by disconnections/faults in the system. 
The only dry weather increase left to be considered proved to be the arrival of the 
first Chernobyl cloud on 27th April 1986 at 1407 hours, marked ll in fig.  1. 
Analysis of the 51 ion chamber readings with precipitation led to the formulation 
of the "Precipitation" part of the 
algorithm: 
"Attention is necessary if  a reading has increased more than 20 'JJ 
both compared with the last hour and compared with the mean value of 
the last 8 hours•. 
Applying this part of the algorithm to the data sets separated one data set with 
an increase of > 20 %/hour. 
This data set appeared to be the second Chemobyl increase (in fig.  1 marked ill), 
which arose during precipitation on Wednesday 7th May 1986. 
The algorithm is shown in fig. 2. 
no 
no 
yes 
Dry  weather  alarm 
no 
yes 
Precipitation  alarm 
U.-.OI.ti.TE1. 
A:\IIIUICIWV\WAlM0-180nt 
Fig. 2. Algorithm developed to detect increases in ambient ion  chamber dose 
rate due to manmade radionuclides. 
- 161  -From this part of the work it can be concluded, that application of the algorithm 
to the data sets from instruments (1) and (3) can detect an increase in the 
ambient dose rate level caused by man-made radionuclides of a minimum of ca. 5 
%in dry weather and ca. 20% in connection with precipitation. 
Examples of increases caused by Rn-daughters in connection with precipitation, 
which are excluded from alarm by the algorithm, are found in fig.  1, marked I, IV 
andV. 
Data on the five increases shown in fig.  1 are summarized in the table, fig. 3. 
Increase  Precipitation 
no  micro  Rib  mm/h 
I  0.65  8.89  5.9 
II  *  0.41  5.55  0 
m  *  2.22  29.4  3.65 
IV  0.60  7.08  2.9 
v  0.51  6.29  1.9 
*:  Separated by the algorithm. 
Fig. 3. Summary of data on the increases shown in fig.  1. 
4.2  Description of  the work on tasks B and C : 
Since Dec.1986 256-channel-spectra from the 3" Nal (Tl) detector have been 
recorded with only minor interruptions. 
After one hour's counting time the data are automatically transferred to the 
memory of a computer, and the spectrometer is reset and restarted. 
The computer handling of the spectrometer data (including system information 
such as high voltage, temperature etc.) are a.o. comprised of an automatic energy 
calibration of the 256 channel spectra from the 3" Nai (Tl) detector (The position 
of the ever present K-40 is here utilized as a reference). 
- 162 -If 
II 
The contribution from the different radionuclides to the dose rate are then 
analyzed in detail by the following procedure: 
The spectra obtained are analyzed by fitting of spectra ("Least squares method") 
from the naturally occurring isotopes K-40 and Rn-daughters and from 1-131. 
The remaining counts (beyond a preset level based on counting statistics) is then 
expected to be caused by other man-made radionuclides. 
Tests with an 1-131 source proved, that the system combination B and C easily 
can detect an increase of ca. 5 % in the total dose rate as a man-made 
contribution compared to increases up to 50 % from Radon daughters, which is 
the maximum observed during 4 years. 
From task B and C it is concluded that the sensitivity of the procedure developed 
for utilizing data from Band Cis in the order of ca. 5- 10% increase in the 
normal level. 
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European Communities - Commission 
EUR 12557 - Monitoring and surveillance in accident situations-
Post-Chernobyl action 
Edited by: K.  Chadwick, H.  Menzel 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
1993- XXIV,  163 pp., num. tab., fig.- 21.0 x  29.7 em 
Radiation protection series 
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